Anthropomorphism and mechanomorphism

Computers in Human Behavior, 1986

Bensselaer Polytechnic lnstitute Abstr^ct-Th;s paptt etploru the ambiguitl oJ the 'human machinc. " It tuggests that anthropomor phism results Jrom a ''deJault schema" appLied to phnomena. including machines, that a perceioer Jintb othmr.tie inexplieable. .\4echanomorphism, the atlribulion of machine character;stics lo humans, is a cultural$ dertaed melaphor lhat presentllt dominales cognitile science. The relationships hetween anthropomorphism and mechanomorphism pose a spuial dfficuLry Jor the quzslion, "Can nuchines think.)" Docs a positiue responte r|lect a cognitiae bias on lhe pa 0f lhe percent ol a genuine attribule oJ the compuln.) The ltroblem is illustratedJor Turing's "imitation eamz''1br thinking machines, and a strateglt Jor nnstraining anthropomorphic attibutions is propased. Anthropomorphism is the ascription of human characteristics to nonhuman entities. We think of anthropomorphism in the context of primitive peoples who attribute human forms, emotions, motivations, and activities to the wind, sun, moon, trees, rivers and animals, use them as causal explanations for otherwise inexplicable events, and attempt to manipulate them with social mechanisms such as entreatv or threat. Anthropomorphized, nonhuman entities became social entities. Anthropologists hold that anthropomorphic thought develops from animism (the belief that all things have a spirit or soul), Iegend, and the need to have visual images of gods. Thus, anthropomorphism is common.lv considered to be the quaint and archaic activitv of people far removed in time ard place l'rom the complex functioning of contemporary technological soci€ty. But anthropomorphism is widespread in modern life, so common that we take it for granted and fail to react to its peculiarity. Many people have entreated, coaxed, and threatened a recalcitrant car, have inferred human feelings and motivations as causal explanations for otherwise inexplicable malfunctioning, and in shon, entered (briefly or extensivelv) into social relations with their automobiles. Anthropomorphized, even unintelligent machines may become social entities. This assertion is not invalidated by the claim that primitive peoples held a conviction that nonhuman entities really do have Prcparation of this anicle was supponed in pan bv National Science Foundation Grant IST 81 10625. I am indebted to Glen Culbertson, Robyn Dawes. C.M. Heyes, and Warren Thomgate for their comments and criticisms. I also thank Ihe Depanment ofAnthropologv at the,A.merican Museum of Natural History, New York Citv, for their hospitalitv during the completion of this work. Requests for reprints should be sent to L.

International Journal of Primatology, 1999

Reviewed by Matt Cartmill1 Scientific assumptions of uniformity are not themselves uniform. When it comes to physical phenomena, we like to think that human beings obey the same laws as other things. This is called "physics" and "chemistry." Yet when mental phenomena are in question, we prefer to assume that human beings differ from everything else in the universe. This is called "Morgan's Canon." Suppositions that go against Morgan's Canon constitute "anthropomorphism," which is generally held to be a bad thing. When my dog repeatedly drops her ball at my feet, prods me, and wags her tail, I am guilty of anthropomorphism if I say that she is trying to get me to play with her. It is thought to be a victory for science if I can instead manage to describe her behavior in terms of instincts, reflexes, or conditioned operants-anything to avoid attributing wishes or intentions to a dog. Psychologists and biologists used to be pretty solidly united in condemning anthropomorphism, but that consensus has been coming unglued in recent years. This anthology provides a sample of current opinion, with a bias in favor of anthropomorphism. (The editors' sympathies are clear from the book's dedication to Ernest Thompson Seton.) Most of the 37 contributors think that anthropomorphism is sometimes warranted-that humanlike mental properties can be correctly as well as incorrectly attributed to animals, and that it is often possible to tell which is which. Most of them regard the existence of animal minds as an open question, which cannot be resolved simply by crying "Anthropomorphism!" and looking

Metascience, 2008

Lausanne: Frontiers Media, 2019

The attribution of human traits to non-humans - animals, artifacts or even natural events - is an attitude, deeply grounded in human mind. It is frequent to see children addressing dolls and figures as if they were alive. Adults often attribute mental states and emotions to animals. In everyday life humans speak of events such as fires as if they possessed some form of intentionality, a behavior sometimes shared also by scientists. Furthermore, a systematized form of anthropomorphism underlies most religions. The pervasiveness of this phenomenon makes it a particularly interesting object of psychological enquiry. Psychologists have set out to understand which aspects of human mind are involved in this behavior, its motivations and the circumstances favoring its enactment. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate among scientists about the merits or harm of anthropomorphism in the scientific study of animal behavior and in scientific discourse. Despite the interest and the specificity of the topic most of the relevant studies are scattered across disciplines and have not built a systematic research framework. This observation has motivated the collection of articles presented here, under the unifying perspective of the cognitive underpinnings of anthropomorphism. Within this general umbrella, the authors included in this e-book have explored the issues mentioned above from different points of view. From their work it emerges that far from being the result of naive beliefs, the exercise of anthropomorphism involves a multiplicity of mental abilities including perception and imagination. They also show that the context and the interactive situation are crucial to understanding this phenomenon. Some authors analyze the relationship between anthropomorphization and theory of mind abilities both in typical and atypical populations. Finally, others contributions have identified possible benefits deriving from the natural attitude to anthropomorphize, as a design philosophy for robots and artifacts in general, or as a useful heuristic in the scientific study of animal behavior.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM is an inveterate tendency to project human qualities into natural phenomena-consciously or not. The standard and most important variant of anthropomorphism is animism which sees a soul in everything in nature. Before entering into the role of anthropomorphism in the history of science, let us consider a few important and usually neglected logical aspects of the idea.

Taboo-Transgression-Transcendence in Art & Science 2020 , 2022

Authors are responsible for obtaining the necessary licences for the images that are subject to copyright. The editors shall thus not be held responsible for any obligation or legal action that may derive from the work submitted in terms of violation of third parties' rights, whether intellectual property, trade secret or any other right.

Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, A. Runehov &L. Oviedo, eds. Dordrecht: Springer, n.p., 2012

Anthropomorphism has long been considered a cardinal error when describing animals. Ethicists have 16 feared the consequences of misrepresenting animals in their reasoning. Recent research within human-animal studies, 17 however, has sophisticated the notion of anthropomorphism. It is suggested that avoiding anthropomorphism merely 18 creates other morphisms, such as mechanomorphism. Instead of avoiding anthropomorphism, it is argued that it is a 19 communicative strategy that should be used critically. Instances of anthropomorphism in animal ethics are analyzed 20 in this paper. Some analogies made between people and non-human animals in present theories of animal ethics are 21 clear instances of psychological anthropomorphism. Other analogies are implicit cases of cultural 22 anthropomorphism. It is argued that animal ethics need to take the wider discourse of critical anthropomorphism into 23 account in order to sophisticate the understanding and use of anthropomorphic projections. Anthropomorphism is an 24 efficient tool of communication, and it may be made an adequate one as well. 25 26 27 28

Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 2006

International Journal of Primatology, 1999