The Making of Peace: Processes and Agreements

African Affairs, 2013

A decade ago international peacemakers turned a blind eye when violence in Darfur, Sudan, first escalated into civil war. This article addresses the war's brutal beginnings, using a close reading of internal communications, interviews, and public statements to deepen our understanding of the predicament that key peacemakers found themselves in, and dug themselves into. For a long first year, when the majority of violent deaths in Darfur occurred, peacemakers employed a set of discursive strategies that intentionally depoliticized Darfur's conflict. Despite knowledge to the contrary, peacemakers carefully avoided connections between Darfur and the ongoing north-south peace negotiations they were championing to end Sudan's long second civil war. These ideational moves gave peacemakers a degree of cover for not responding directly to the conflict, but they also shaped the political calculations and opportunities of domestic actors in ways that further enabled armed violence, ultimately leading to policy failure. The problems of peacemaking in Sudan highlight the particular challenges that arise from negotiating peace. Negotiations give words a privileged place in taming the materiality of violence, yet this also leaves peacemakers liable to shaping new trajectories of political violence born out of local dissatisfaction with the prospects for peace. ENDGAMES IN AFRICAN CIVIL WARS predominantly involve detailed negotiated settlements rather than victory or surrender, yet peace agreements often fail to avert renewed conflict. When peace is negotiated, words hold a privileged place in taming the materiality of violence. Peace negotiations frame what the war is, and is not, about, and in turn prefigure possibilities of what peace might tangibly mean. When armed violence recurs during peace negotiations, especially when such violence is to some extent aimed at influencing the ideas of peace at stake, peacemaking plays a significant role in determining its political significance. The achievements of peacemaking may in this way be sullied by their role in generating new and

ASPR Report No 5, 2020

This research draws on discussions held at two Joint Analysis Workshops in October and November 2019 organised by the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP). The workshops were held in cooperation with The British Academy (BA) and the Rift Valley Institute (RVI). In total, over 100 participants from 25 countries involved with or researching on local peace agreements contributed to thematic discussions. The research also draws on the PA-X Peace Agreements Database (www.peaceagreements.org), a database of all peace agreements at any stage of the peace process from 1990 to 2019. The database is fully searchable and supports both qualitative and quantitative examination of peace agreements.

Journal of Global Peace and Conflict, 2016

The signing of peace agreement does not always end conflicts. Rather, dying conflicts have resurrected after the failure of peace implementation. This article introduces the concept of Peace Agreement-Implementation Gap (PAIG) as an explanation to why waning wars wax after peace agreement. The Arusha Peace Accord (APA) and the infamous Rwandan Genocide is revisited to examine the role of spoilers and incentive incompatibility in the failure of peace agreement. The article argues that the negotiation of the APA was flawed by the exclusion of key stakeholders who later became substantively organised spoilers, thus, undermining the peace agreement. Additionally, with a lack of potential benefit, there was minimal international commitment to the implementation of the APA. Ultimately, the reluctance of strong powers to commit troops in a difficult field coupled with the internal wrangling of local spoilers hindered the successful implementation of the APA, which in turn led to the genocide.

Why do some peace agreements end armed conflicts whereas others do not? Previous studies have primarily focused on the relation between warring parties and the provisions included in peace agreements. Prominent mediators, however, have emphasised the importance of stakeholders at various levels for the outcome of peace agreements. To match the experience of these negotiators we apply a level-of-analysis approach to examine the contextual circumstances under which peace agreements are concluded. While prominent within the causes of war literature, level-of-analysis approaches are surprisingly scant in research about conflict resolution. This article compares two Sudanese Peace Agreements: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) that ended the North–South war and led to the independence of South Sudan, and the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) which failed to end fighting in Darfur. We find that factors at the local, national and international level explain the different outcomes of the two agreements. Hence, the two case studies illustrate the merit of employing a level-of-analysis approach to study the outcome of peace agreements. The main contribution of this article is that it presents a new theoretical framework to understand why some peace agreements terminate armed conflict whereas others do not.

Politics & Policy, 2008

Using a ‘Metrics Framework for Accessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization’ developed by the United States Institute of Peace, this study analyzes the effectiveness of the 2005 Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement in dealing with the underlying causes of conflict. We aim to draw out and develop several important lessons for future international mediators. These lessons are: the recognition that good timing is essential for a successful outcome; the importance of a completely neutral and independent mediator; the clear definition of the role of international parties in order to prevent abuse by parochial interests; the necessity of identifying all aggrieved parties and issues for inclusion in the process; the importance of an international presence on implementation mechanisms; the provision of overarching review mechanisms; the inclusion of specifics on key issues such as the integration of ex-combatants; and, finally, the need to apply lessons identified and learned.

Routledge eBooks, 2022

South African Journal of International Affairs, 2017

The conflicts in the formerly united Sudan have led to millions of deaths since the country's independence. The Naivasha Agreement was meant to end these wars. The January 2005 agreement foresaw a future where the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement and the Sudanese government would coexist within the framework of a united country. Subsequently, in 2011, however, the country was partitioned and the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan have continued unabated. Interrogating the treaty texts and employing a case study approach and analysis of the economic and power dynamics within the region, this paper addresses the reason behind the failure of the comprehensive peace agreement and subsequent agreements intended to bring peace after partition. It becomes evident that the same dynamics that fed the partition of the country have helped bring conflict within its two successor states. In short, agreements are not sufficient to build peace.

In the context of statebuilding and peacebuilding, Catherine Barnes of Conciliation Resources examines changes in 'the political settlement' in war-to-peace transitions. The paper was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and the first part explores concepts such as statebuilding, political settlement, social contract and also conflict and state transformation and peacemaking and peace agreements. The second part looks at the limits of externally imposed settlements, more inclusive peace negotiations and fostering effective peacemaking. The study uses diagrams and tables and also contains a list of policy implications. - See more at: http://www.c-r.org/resources/renegotiating-political-settlement-war-peace-transitions#sthash.gZHKZHKz.dpuf

A strategic approach to peacebuilding seeks to achieve stable peace through an inclusive, comprehensive and sustained peace process that complements a political settlement with other cooperative and mutually supportive activities. Such a process, grounded in recognition of the complex causation of violent conflict and a ‘positive peace’ concept, remains an ideal type rarely if ever found in the real world. This chapter compares the process leading to and following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan with this ideal, focusing particularly on external intervention. It briefly examines the historical background and causes of the conflict before considering which ‘ideal’ elements were present and which were missing in the peace process, the reasons why this was so and the material and ideational constraints that prevented the ‘Naivasha Process’ from achieving the perhaps unattainable ideal. The chapter thus seeks to develops constructive lessons for those planning for or conducting peace processes. [Note: This paper is a pre-proof draft chapter for 'Making and Breaking Peace in Sudan and South Sudan', edited by by Sarah Nouwen, Laura James and Sharath Srinivasan.]

International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2011