In search of a European Russia strategy

In March 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, relations between Moscow and the European Union precipitated into their deepest crisis since the end of the Cold War. Throughout 2014 and early 2015, the Ukraine crisis made headlines and emerged as the most urgent security challenge for the EU and its member states. Between 2015 and 2017, however, the international scenario became even more complex, with significant repercussions for Europe-Russia relations. The refugee crisis, escalating civil wars in Syria and Libya, terrorist attacks, Brexit and the weakening of the transatlantic alliance following Donald Trump’s election posed new formidable challenges for the EU. Russia sought a role in many of these crises, for instance by proposing an anti-terrorism coalition with the West in the Middle East or by reportedly intervening in some Western election campaigns. This report zooms in on the debates on Russia in several EU member states that play a key role in the Union’s relations with Moscow. It reveals how national perspectives evolved and sometimes diverged due to different assessments of the crises and of Russia’s role in them.

Relations between the EU and Russia have been stagnating for many years. Expectations on both sides differ greatly, and their non-fulfillment compounds mutual frustration. The EU needs a more realistic assessment of the current situation in Russia, one that is not based on hopes, unrealistic expectations, and stereotypes. The right approach lies neither in focusing entirely on human right issues nor in only doing business with Russia. Rather, the EU should concentrate on setting the rules, even if this comes at a cost in the short run. The analysis of three key areas in the relations-energy, neighborhood, and visa policy-shows the degree to which the assessments of relations differ. It also underlines how security concerns still influence policy. The conclusion is that even if Russia is a difficult partnerespecially now, as it blocks nearly every cooperation initiative-the EU can and must do more. First of all, the EU should not accept Russian rules for the relationship but set and enforce its own rules. Secondly, the EU should use and apply existing instruments in a less ideological, but more pragmatic way. Finally, rather than give priority to stabilizing the ruling elite, Brussels should refocus its policy on potential partners within the elite and society at large.

European View, 2011

The EU’s relationship with Russia is crucial for Russia’s economic and political development, the stability of the region, the security of the EU’s energy supplies and the credibility of its foreign policy. Despite burgeoning economic relations and multiple joint projects and policy initiatives, the relationship has fallen well short of expectations and potential. The EU has toned down its rhetoric about building a ‘strategic partnership based on common values’, relying instead on day-to-day cooperation in an attempt to help Russia align itself with European norms and rules. But even this more pragmatic approach has produced more frustration than tangible progress.In this paper, three long-time observers of Russia and the EU perform a reality check on the EU–Russia relationship. Christopher Coker takes a look at the situation from a cultural perspective and asks whether it makes sense for the EU to assume that Russia is ‘like us’, or at least on a path towards becoming so. His answer i ...

Russia–EU Relations and the Common Neighborhood, 2017

Examining Russia-EU relations in terms of the forms and types of power tools they use, this book argues that the deteriorating relations between Russia and the EU lie in the deep differences in their preferences for the international status quo. These different approaches, combined with economic interdependence and geographic proximity, means both parties experience significant difficulties in shaping strategy and formulating agendas with regards to each other. The Russian leadership is well aware of the EU's "authority orientation" but fails to reliably predict foreign policy at the EU level, whilst the EU realizes Russia's "coercive orientation" in general, but cannot predict when and where coercive tools will be used next. Russia is gradually realizing the importance of authority, while the EU sees the necessity of coercion tools for coping with certain challenges. The learning process is ongoing but the basic distinction remains unchanged and so their approaches cannot be reconciled as long as both actors exist in their current form. Using a theoretical framework and case studies including Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, Busygina examines the possibilities and constraints that arise when the "power of authority" and the "power of coercion" interact with each other, and how this interaction affects third parties.

The study of the four Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation and their changes in terms of tone and substance enable us to understand the country’s evolving understanding of international affairs and its perception of its own role in this environment. It also helps with the observation of the internal political dynamic in Russia, announcing a shift towards Eurasianism as well as allowing us to put Russian attitudes to Western behaviour through years. The analysis of EU-Russia relations within this wider perspective highlights the mutual misunderstanding and lack of empathy between both entities that prevented them from avoiding some significant faux pas that led them to the current situation. From vacillations and hesitancy to a dialogue of the deaf clouded by distrust, we will be aim to specifically analyse Moscow’s reaction to EU involvement in Russia’s “sphere of influence”.

On 7 May 2018, Russia entered the fourth and probably final presidency of Vladimir Putin. This was preceded by a further increase in tension and mistrust between Russia and the West as a result of the Skripal affair and yet another chemical attack in Syria. In this context, the European Union reconfirmed its policy on Russia, centred on five principles: the implementation of the Minsk Agreement, which is a precondition for the lifting of sanctions; strengthening relations with the EU’s Eastern Partners; strengthening the EU’s resilience; selective engagement with Russia; and fostering people-to-people contacts. This report analyses the ramifications of and short-to-medium-term prospects for relations between the EU and Russia. It is structured around three main arguments. First, the views of the EU and Russia on the international and European security order are largely incompatible, which constitutes a difficult framework for the relationship. Second, these disagreements are on display in the conflict in and over Ukraine, where both the EU and Russia remain committed to the Minsk Agreement but pursue their own interpretation of it. And third, economic ties between Europe and Russia will remain significant in the foreseeable future, but this is no panacea for improving the relationship. Foreign-policy experts on both sides broadly share the view that a rapid normalisation of relations is unlikely. Ukraine remains a key obstacle where no quick progress is to be expected. Moreover, the Skripal case revived doubts over whether Russia is really interested in normalising relations with the West; most probably it lacks a domestic consensus on the importance and viability of such a goal. Hence, the report argues that this is not the time for major new initiatives from the EU side. Its priority should be to maintain both its own coherence and pressure on Russia, emphasising that a change of policy is needed on the Russian side as a precondition for improved relations, including the prospects for Russia to benefit from the restoration of full economic ties. Maintaining a consistent approach on security issues, aimed at defending the European security order in the face of Russia’s actions against Ukraine as well as against EU member states, should continue to be at the core of EU policy.

Reshaping the European Union internally and externally – new matrix?, 2019

The aim of this paper is to present the main objectives of the EU's policy towards Russia, and then to indicate the reasons why this policy is a failure. The basic objective of the EU was to help Russia in the process of its systemic transformation, which was to lead to the democratization and the adoption of a peaceful foreign policy course. Thanks to this, the EU was to gain in its Eastern neighborhood a friendly partner with whom it would be possible to develop a comprehensive cooperation. However, this goal has not been achieved, and one of the main reasons is the fundamental contradiction between the ideological and political systems of both sides. As a result, it also creates a contradiction of basic geopolitical interests, which, in turn, translates into problems with the functioning of the main instrument of mutual relations, which is the EU-Russia strategic partnership. This partnership operates on various levels - while in the sphere of economic relations compromises or cooperation are possible, in practice there is no place for this in the sphere of foreign policy and especially of ideology.

The present study intends to conduct a historical retrospective analysis of the relations between Russia and the EU, all the way since the Cold War until the current era. Recently, the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Crimean crisis and the Russian interference in some Eastern European countries, have led to rising tensions amongst the relations concerning Russia and the UN. Other than a political crisis, such tumultuous interactions reflect a geopolitical confrontation between the two entities, which is deeply rooted in History itself. Comprehending the political and economic evolution of both parties is nuclear towards understanding the attitudes and motives that drive the behavior of each side and to also demystify common misconceptions related to the public perception of how these relations have been carried out. Overcoming future challenges is entirely dependent, on whether or not ascertaining the intents and capacities of both entities is a feasible reality, especially the perception that each one has of its own position within the international system.

International Politics

EU-Russia relations have often been considered in scholarship to be governed by the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation. Cooperation has often coexisted or overlapped with conflict on a significant number of issues and policy areas, making relations between the two actors very complex. This article explores the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation, highlighting the way it has influenced the two actors' policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. It posits that

Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies, 2018

This text will analyse the determinants of the foreign policies of Russia and the European Union (EU) in order to present their mutual relations. 1 It is centred on an attempt to give an overview of the relations between Russia and the EU following the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The text will first identify the basic theoretical starting points for interpretations of international politics and the essential determinants of Russia's and the EU's foreign policies. The second part of the text will discuss the legal basis for the relationship between Russia and the EU that is regulated by the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and compare the energy politics of both sides. Finally, I will try to make a projection of the most important characteristics of future relations between Russia and the EU.

2009

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Russie. Nei. Visions, 2006

Debater a Europa, 2018

After a decade of sporadic cooperation between newly emergent Russia and the countries of the West, differences have mounted to the point where the two sides now confront one another with alternative visions of a future Europe – especially Central and Eastern Europe – and relations that mirror some of the worst days of the Soviet-Western cold war. The central issues in the dispute include Moscow’s commitment to rebuilding ‘Greater Russia,’ the European Union (EU)’s goal of surrounding itself with stable democratic states, and the fact that these goals conflict in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The revival of the Russian economy and political system under Vladimir Putin has enabled Moscow to use various forms of coercive diplomacy, including outright military intervention, to pursue its goals. The EU’s support for democratic governances in the region is viewed in Moscow as a direct challenge to Russia’s interests and to the Russian state itself. The result has been a co...

2013

The European Union and Russia are strategic partners – through their geographic situation, their common history, through social and economic obligations. Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia are under pressure for innovation. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political integration. For that reason, the EU’s relations with Russia depend on the Union’s ability to overcome the crisis and undertake reforms.