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2015
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India's new Hindu nationalist Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, faces numerous challenges including how to revive a flagging economy while reconciling the demands of his base with the realities of managing a diverse society. Katharine Adeney reports from the world's largest parliamentary democracy.
2018
When Narendra Modi was elected Prime Minister of India in 2014, he promised to push through key reforms and bring about the massive economic development needed for the “world’s largest democracy” to win its place among global superpowers. With over 1.3 billion citizens, India is soon to become the world’s most populous country, and more than one quarter of the people joining global workforce during the next decade will be Indian. The poorest of the world’s 20 largest economies, India’s potential for catch-up growth is enormous. And so are the limits and contradictions India must overcome for Modi’s vision to gain momentum. What has his government achieved so far? How likely is Modi’s “Minimum government, maximum governance” strategy to deliver? Is the “reluctant superpower” now closer to becoming a regional leader? This volume investigates the economic and political trajectories of Modi’s India in its quest for a global role.
Udeepta Chakravarty BJP supporters at a roadshow held by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi canvassing votes for the Chennai Lok Sabha BJP candidates (April 09, 2024) | Srinivasa-Krishnan / Shutterstock
The International Spectator, 2015
In May 2014 Narendra Modi became India’s Prime Minister in the wake of a historic electoral victory. He has generated two kinds of expectations: on the one hand, his voters expect him to create millions of new jobs for a fast-growing working age population; on the other hand, Hindu extrem- ists hope that he will pursue an aggressive policy aimed at ‘hinduising’ India’s society. The first months of his premiership show that Modi is act- ing in both spheres, while pursuing a radical centralisation of power in his hands.
Asia Maior, 2019
The seven months starting with the formation of the second Modi’s government in May 2019 and the end of the year were characterised by the systematic and massive assault on democracy launched by the incumbent government. The highpoints of this assault were basically two. The first was the hollowing out of two key articles of the Constitution, which had guaranteed the autonomy of Jammu & Kashmir, the only Union state with a Muslim majority, followed by its dismantling as a state and its transformation into an internal colony brutally ruled through military force. The second highpoint was the attempt to modify the concept of Indian citizenship by introducing a religious criterion aimed at excluding persons of Muslim religion. Both moves appeared to be in contrast with the Indian Constitution; however, the Supreme Court studiously avoided contrasting the Modi government’s policies. The most important Supreme Court’s sentence in the period under review, far from being related to the possibly unconstitutional activities of the government, dealt with Ayodhya question and de facto justified the destruction of the Babri Masjid by Hindu extremists in 1992. Eventually a reaction to the country’s slide towards authoritarianism set in at the beginning of December, when a mass movement against the modification of the secular concept of citizenship spread in large parts of India and was harshly repressed in the Union states governed by Modi’s party, the BJP. Modi and his closest aides, while focussing their efforts on the assault on democracy, seemed to be disinterested in the disappointing economic situation, possibly as a consequence of their inability, during the previous term, to manage it properly. Hence, the real dimensions of the slowdown, resulting from the first Modi government’s mismanagement of the economy became increasingly evident. As evident became the inability of the new finance minister to redress the situation. Ominously, by the end of the period the GDP appeared to be sliding back to the infamous «Hindu rate of growth», namely the slow growth characterising the years from 1950 to 1980.
Narendra Modi’s 2014 election generated enormous expectations in the economic sphere. However, in 2015, on the one hand, Modi was unwilling or unable to push through any «big bang» reforms; on the other hand, jobs generation – one of Modi’s key electoral promises – proceeded at an excruciatingly slow pace. At the macroeconomic level, the Indian GDP grew by 7.3% during 2014/15, making India the fastest growing among the major economies. However, these data were the result of a new methodology, and most economists, including some politically close to the Modi government, were uncertain about its reliability. Moreover, when applied to the previous years, the new methodology unequivocally showed that the positive turn-around in the economy had happened before Modi’s government came to power. The Indian economy was also severely affected by a deepening rural crisis. Some of its causes were beyond the reach of Modi’s government, but it is a fact that its response was disappointingly inadequate. Domestic politics was a constant source of difficulty for Modi. First, state elections in Delhi and Bihar dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Modi – and Amit Shah – led BJP, which was soundly defeated by local outfits. Second, the government struggled to pass key legislation in Parliament, also thanks to the unexpectedly successful opposition of the Congress party. Finally, the most worrying development on the domestic front was the rise of intolerance against non Hindus, who were victims of Fascist-like, sometimes deadly, aggressions by Hindu outfits. This happened while the Prime Minister appeared basically unconcerned about the climate of growing violence and some members of his government went so far to openly justify this state of affairs. The aim of Modi’s foreign policy was projecting India as a major power on the world stage and getting all the possible foreign help in promoting India’s economic development. To this end, India’s foreign policy was articulated along two main axis: the India-US connection and the India-China connection. In turn, the latter had two faces: engaging China and containing China. At the end of the day, the India-US connection was high on hype but low on content, among other reasons because the US business community, after its initial enthusiasm for Modi, had come to perceive him as well intentioned but unable to further liberalise the Indian economy. India’s economic engagement with China brought about the signing of several MoUs and China’s promise to invest in India. However the concrete fall-out of all this was limited. More concrete appeared the containment aspect of Modi’s China policy, which, at a more general level was expression of India’s strategic surge, aimed at reclaiming the position of great power.
According to Peter Roland Desouza, „from getting the UN to declare International Yoga Day on 21 June to having the US President as Chief Guest for Republicn Day to establishing a BRICS development bank to land swaps with Bangladesh (…) Modi has been the most effective” in the realm of foreign policy. While similar remarks have been made by many, such as Sanjaya Baru or Ravi Shankar Prasad, overall assessment of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first year shows rather mixed results both in terms of India’s bilateral and multilateral relations.
This paper addresses the Indian political situation on the eve of 2014 general elections. It examines the current political balance, taking into consideration the Congress's decline, the inexorable ascent of the BJP's Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, and the unexpected emergence of a new political force, represented by the Aam Admi Party. The article analyzes the causes and the potential evolution of the aforementioned developments. In the end, the Indian foreign policy evolution is investigated through analyzing continuities and changes occurred in the last two decades, in order to understand if a political shift at national level would affect India's strategy.
In 2017 the situation of Indian democracy deteriorated, as shown by the continuing attacks against Muslims and Christians, and by the intimidation against the opponents of political Hinduism. This intimidation culminated in the assassination of well-known journalist and BJP critic Gauri Lankesh. Meanwhile Narendra Modi, in spite of the unsatisfactory economic trend and botched economic reforms, continued to be India’s most popular politician. Also, during the period under review, Modi’s party, the BJP, went from one success to another, strengthening its political hold on the country by conquering four Indian states (Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand), and by retaining its hold on two more (Goa and Gujarat). However, the latest of these elections, the one in Gujarat, although confirming the BJP in power, saw an unexpected good result on the part of a resurgent Congress. Some analysts saw this as an indication that the BJP’s tightening hold on the Indian political system was not unbreakable. India’s foreign policy continued to be characterised by the increasingly closer and increasingly militarised connection with the US and by the ever more adversarial relation with China. It was in this field that the Modi government conquered a clear (although possibly temporary) success, by facing down China in the Himalayan Doklam plateau.
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