US-Russian geopolitics in the re-making
Thomson Ambooken2018
Sign up for access to the world's latest research
checkGet notified about relevant papers
checkSave papers to use in your research
checkJoin the discussion with peers
checkTrack your impact
Abstract
Nuclear deterrence has been a critical aspect in governing bi-lateral relations between the United States of America and Russia during the Cold War since the 1950s, and this has gradually again increased in prominence during the last decade and a half. The essential focus is placed on the concept of 'minimum' nuclear deterrence and its link to one of the major pillars of post-Cold War international security; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). This was signed in Washington on 8th December 1987 between the United States, and the USSR; coming into force on 1st June 1988. It eliminated all nuclear and conventional missiles, including their launchers, with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometres (310–620 miles – classified as short-range) and 1,000–5,500 km (620–3,420 miles – classified as intermediate-range). But, the treaty did not cover sea-launched missiles and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Nevertheless, by May 1991, 2,692 missiles were eliminate...
Related papers
The future of US–Russian nuclear deterrence and arms control
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Volume 73, Issue 4, pp.271-278. (co-authors: Tatiana Anichkina and Nickolas Roth), 2017
After Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty Demise: Understanding Russia-US Rivalry in a New Cold War Narrative
Issue Brief, 2019
The demise of the INF treaty between Russia and the United States (US) has drawn critical scrutiny. Whilst both Russia and the US have traded allegations and counter-allegations over responsibility for the demise of the INF treaty, global concerns mount about an intensified to nuclear arms race. The demise of the Treaty has further presaged the emergence of the ‘new’ Cold War (NCW) narrative. The question is whether the current Russia-US rivalry is indeed a NCW phase or is it a mere case of failed accommodation of interests by both the countries at the bilateral level. Also, the emergence of this New Cold War narrative for the West towards Russia is limited to its military resurgence. Interestingly, Russia too seem to accept this narrative. This could possibly because it elevates its position in the great power rivalry in par with the US despite its many drawbacks such as in its economic growth performance. Given these scenarios, it is crucial to evaluate the relevance of INF Treaty in today’s global context, and deconstruct the much hyped NCW narrative to evaluate the future scope of Russia-US relations and its likely impact on common partners such as India.
Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-Russian Relations Beyond the Moscow Treaty (2005)
This study assesses alternative roles of strategic nuclear weapons in US-Russian relations after expiration of the 2002 Moscow Agreement, a successor agreement to the START I Treaty. A range of alternative nuclear futures beyond a QDR-defined baseline in a post-2012 security environment are explored, focused on the degree in which the U.S. would require nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia and other states, key indicators of changes in U.S-Russian security relationships, future threats and political utility of nuclear weapons under alternative futures and nuclear force postures. Key questions for investigation are: • To what degree will the US need nuclear weapons after 2012? • Will the United States need nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia after 2012? • What direction might future American and Russian nuclear force postures take after expiration of the Moscow Agreement after 2012? What are the indicators of change? • For the US and Russia, will the future political utility of nuclear weapons increase or decrease after 2012? • Given a degree of uncertainty in the US-Russian cooperative relations, what combination of currently planned and programmed strategic force investments offer the least risk? Six alternative nuclear futures are outlines and assessed.
End of the INF Treaty: Are We Entering a New Cold War Era?
This article analyzes possible consequences of the abolition of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed between the US and the USSR in 1987 and banning developing, testing and deploying intermediate-range missiles. The article argues that termination of the treaty would result in a conventional and especially a nuclear arms race as during the Cold War, and might trigger scrapping further agreements, although common sense in both parties enabled extending of the New START Treaty for 5 years. The new environment, with regional and global crises and massive armament by the global powers, including missile defense systems and hypersonic missiles, would endanger possible cooperation.
US-Russian nuclear arms control and disarmament
SIPRI Yearbook 2019, 2019
Chapter by Petr Topychkanov, Shannon Kile and Ian Davis. In 2018 Russia and the United States completed the implementation of the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). In February, the two countries announced that they had achieved the final New START force reduction limits by the specified deadline. However, the prospects for sustaining this progress appeared increasingly remote, given the political and military differences between the two countries. New START will expire in 2021 unless both parties agree to extend it, but there were no discussions in 2018 about doing so.
One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses
Science & Global Security, 2011
Nuclear exchange models using Monte Carlo methods were used to test the stability of U.S.-Russian deterrence for reduced nuclear force sizes off alert in the presence of missile defenses. For this study U.S. and Russian weapons were partitioned into a postulated First Echelon, consisting of single-warhead, silo-based ICBM launchers that can be generated in hours to launch-ready status, and into a postulated Second Echelon of more diverse nuclear forces including multiple-warhead, road-mobile and sea-based systems that require days to weeks to become launch ready. Given reasonable estimates of weapons characteristics, First Echelon nuclear forces can survive to retaliate in numbers that satisfy the requirements of deterrence, given limitations on the numbers of missile defense interceptors, a result which is bolstered by the added capabilities of the more deeply de-alerted Second Echelon. The aim of this study is to assess the impacts of sharply cutting the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals and lowering their launch readiness on the stability of mutual deterrence. The study also assesses the implications of introducing a limited deployment of missile defense systems into this equation.
Russia's missile industry and U.S. nonproliferation options
The Nonproliferation Review, 1998
U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Cooperation: Rebuilding Equality, Mutual Benefit, and Respect
2015
Nuclear terrorism is a low probability, high consequence event that all countries must guard against, especially those with nuclear-weaponsuseable material. The detonation of even a small nuclear weapon in a populated area would have devastating human, economic, and political consequences not just at ground zero, but also around the world. Recent history has demonstrated that well-funded, technically sophisticated terrorist organizations have pursued nuclear weapons. If presented with the opportunity, they are likely to do so again.1
Related topics
Related papers
Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-Russian Relations Beyond the Moscow Treaty (Annexes, 2005)
Annexes to "Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-Russian Relations Beyond the Moscow Treaty": • Assumptions and Analytic Framework • Definitions: Future Global Security Environments and Future Russian States • Six Alternative Nuclear Futures
Obstacles and Opportunities for a Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty between Russia and the United States
Contemporary Security Policy, 2014
Tactical nuclear weapons have emerged as an unavoidable issue for future nuclear weapons negotiations between Russia and the United States. This article discusses challenges and opportunities regarding a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. It begins with an overview of precedents from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. These and subsequent experiences show three major obstacles that must be overcome to permit bilateral agreement on tactical nuclear weapons: definitional issues over differentiating tactical from strategic nuclear weapons; negotiation challenges including the asymmetries between American and Russian tactical arsenals and non-nuclear capabilities such as ballistic missile defence and conventional prompt global strike; and verification questions over whether and how warhead status can be verified without disclosing sensitive information. This analysis examines whether the International Atomic Energy Agency could have a role in verification to help facilitate agreement. Lastly, this article offers various confidence building measures, emphasizing areas where the two countries could cooperate. While the obstacles are serious, there are opportunities for achieving consensus on some contentious issues.
History of and Aftermath from the Withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
2020
On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.
Cancellation of the Treaty of 1987 on the Eradication of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles and Its Impact on Pan-Regional Security in Aegis of the ‘Three Seas’ Area (Baltic, Adriatic-Black Sea Space)
Ante Portas, 2019
The issue of the international security has become more pressing actual in 21 st century due to the appearance of new dangers and challenges in the modern world, which were not typical for the previous century. On the background of geopolitical transition, the role of strategic offensive arms and weapons of mass destruction has become more important. In the modern world, it is important to maintain strategic parity on arms when global challenges pose a serious threat to all humanity. In this paper, we discussed the reasons for the cancellation of the Treaty on the Elimination of intermediate-range and short-range missiles of 1987 and the dangers that are threatening the world. The USA and Russia have officially announced that they are starting modernizing and producing ballistic missiles and what is more important, their policies are forcing other countries to produce similar arms. The paper focuses on the security environment of the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea regions, the dangers that resulted from the cancellation of the abovementioned agreement. The Politics of Strategic Bullying in the Bipolar Era, the "Cold War" phenomenon and geopolitical processes of New Cold War is also discussed in this paper. Also, discussing the role of strategic offensive arms and defining NATO's role in ensuring international security has an important place in this paper.
Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty [January 3, 2011]
2011
On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Treaty of Moscow) that will reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. Russia convinced the United States to sign a legally binding treaty, but the United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would require the elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service. It wanted the flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace, and to restore warheads to deployed forces if conditions warranted. Russian officials have hailed the success of Russia's diplomacy in convincing the United States to sign a legally binding Treaty that casts Russia as an equal partner in the arms control process.
Loading Preview
Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.