Crime at the Workplace. Denial and Solutions

2015

2015

Department of Leadership and Organization at the Norwegian School of Management. She publishes and teaches organizational learning, knowledge sharing and leadership in organizations and the police force. She has written several books on these topics. Petter Gottschalk is Professor of information systems and knowledge management in the department of leadership and organizational management at the Norwegian School of Management. Dr. Gottschalk has published several books and research articles on crime and policing. Hans Solli-Saether has a MSc degree from the University of Oslo and a PhD degree from the Norwegian School of Management. He has been the CIO of Norway Post and has several years of practical experience in management. Dr. Solli-Saether has published several books and research articles on outsourcing and IT management.

The purpose of this work is just to highlight the manner in which the study of crime informs the practice of security management. First the idea of security management, its area of competence and specific activity will be outlined. Then, an examination of the meaning of crime study, intended as analysis and interpretation of crime problems, will follow. Lastly, an example of the manner in which crime knowledge can aid the security management function to carry out its duty more effectively, will be provided. The thesis supported here, is that an accurate study of crime problems, particularly by an analysis of trends and patterns of offending along with interpretation of ‘criminogenetic situations’(Clarke, 1980), would aid security managers in targeting their preventive effort.

2018

El autor concluye con la virtud que muestra la obligación jurídica que tiene la empresa de adoptar e implementar en su seno un modelo de prevención adecuado a nuestra situación particular, que contenga un adecuado seguimiento y medidas de control para prevenir los delitos antes señalados o para reducir significativamente el riesgo de su comisión; lo que constituye la introducción de un nuevo paradigma de prevención criminológica en el país a nivel de la organización empresarial.

To understand the circumstances that lead to organizational crime, we need to consider the insights of strain theories on the distribution of legitimate and illegitimate opportunities, of labeling theory on the way stigmatization can foster criminal subculture formation, of subcultural theory as applied to organized business subcultures of resistance to regulation, and of control theory. It is contended that an integration of these perspectives into a theory of organizational crime is possible; a continuity can be estab­ lished with the mainstream traditions of criminological theory in the do­ main of organizational crime. Thirteen propositions are advanced as a basis for building such an integrated theory. The key to this attempt as synthesis is the notion of differential shaming-the shaming from organi­zational cultures of compliance versus the shaming from subcultures of resistance to regulatory law.

Studia Prawnicze / The Legal Studies, 2018

Pracodawcy na potęgę łamią przepisy. Trzeba zmienić prawo http://tvn24bis.pl/wia domosci-gospodarcze,71/pracodawcy-na-potege-lamia-przepisy-trzeba-zmienic-prawo, 485006.html (July 2018).

2020

This article studies inter-agency coordination in a “wicked” policy area by examining the Norwegian model against work-related crime. The main research questions are: How does the Norwegian government work to ensure coordination in the field of work-related crime? What enables and constrains horizontal and vertical coordination in this field? We find that the case represents a push towards joint intelligence efforts at the national level to create more analytical capacity and more effective use of punitive sanctions. By analysing data in the period from 2014 to 2019 we show that coordination has intensified over time, but that sector-based priorities, regulations and performance targets remain important obstacles for coordination. The article shows how a secondary organizational structure, ensuring a more coordinated, cross-sectoral strategy for combating workrelated crime has been established at the national (strategic) and regional (tactical/operational) level. This supplements th...

ISRGJA, 2024

All business organizations in all countries and at all times suffer insider-crimes in general. The insider criminal accounts are difficult to detect because most are planned in details, some take advantage of existing security laxes and others due to opportunity. Crime Opportunity Theory (COT) is the crux of the study. A criminal is attracted to an object of value when there are no persons or equipment to guard it. An insider crime is a motivation of indication of failure on the part of management to adequately engage security at the business place. Expositive method was adopted for the study, with the aim as a review and compilation of security measures at reducing/preventing crimes in business organizations. The study proves that, an insider crime exists at every level of the business organization, from management to junior workers, from production, distribution chain and marketing sub-units. The means to insider crime is opportunity of free access to business premises, information, persons. It is recommended that, since insider security is relative to the business organization, products and services, management factors and polices, environment, number of employees and management styles, effective communication, team building, reporting system and punishment will help reduce operations.

Working woman

If you steal $50,000 from a bank in a robbery using a gun you probably will spend several years in prison. What happens if you steal a few hundred million dollars from a bank in a white-collar fraud with nothing more dangerous than a ball-point pen? Maybe almost nothing. In 1975, the president of a large California bank and director of a rather sizable conglomerate pleaded no contest to charges of what has been described as one of the largest systematic lootings of a public company ever recorded in the United States. Because of the plea of nolo contendere, a detailed account of the swindle was not made public. The penalty was ludicrous: a fine of $30,000 to be paid at the rate of $100 per month for the next 25 years at no interest, plus five years of probation.