The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter
Kit Fine2003, Mind
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Abstract
There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this 'opacity' defence has intolerable consequences for the functioning of our language and that the original argument should therefore be allowed to stand. 7 Extreme monists include Gupta (), Burke (, , ), van Inwagen (), Sider (, ). Strictly moderate monists include Lewis (), Gibbard ( in Rea Ch. ), Robinson (a, b), Heller (, ). Opponents of moderate monism include Doepke , Wiggins (, ), Sosa (, ), Johnston (), Baker ().
Key takeaways
- In asserting that the statue is badly made but that the coincident piece of alloy is not, there must be a shift in the property attributed to the very same thing.
- The monist wishes to maintain that a sortal phrase, such as 'the statue' , is capable of invoking the relevant sort in terms of which a given sentence, such as 'the statue is badly made', is to be understood.
- For by the second rule, 'the item Bo admired' will be assigned a certain mere thing as referent and piece of alloy as sort and so, by the first rule, the sentence 'the item Bo admired is badly made' will be true iff the mere thing is badly made qua piece of alloy.
- And since such a notion of identity would appear to be involved in the ordinary judgement that the statue is identical with the (coincident) piece of alloy, the monist should conclude, along with the pluralist, that all such judgements are false.
- According to the monist, the statue is the same as the alloy.
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I have both a smaller and a larger aim. The smaller aim is polemical. Kit Fine believes that a material thing—a Romanesque statue, for example, or an open door—can be distinguished from its constituent matter—a piece of alloy, say, or a hunk of plastic—without recourse to modal or temporal considerations. The statue is Romanesque; the piece of alloy is not Romanesque. The door is open; the hunk of plastic is not open. I argue that these considerations, when combined with a proper understanding of how the use of ‘not’ is functioning, entail that the statue is the piece of alloy, and that the door is the hunk of plastic. Far from challenging the doctrine that a material thing is its matter, Fine’s observations confirm the view. My larger aim is methodological. I will show that natural language semantics can guide inquiry in certain areas of metaphysics by helping us to advance lingering debates.
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