Holism as the empirical significance of symmetries

arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics, 2019

Not all symmetries are on a par. For instance, within Newtonian mechanics, we seem to have a good grasp on the empirical significance of boosts, by applying it to subsystems. This is exemplified by the thought experiment known as Galileo's ship: the inertial state of motion of a ship is immaterial to how events unfold in the cabin, but is registered in the values of relational quantities such as the distance and velocity of the ship relative to the shore. But the significance of gauge symmetries seems less clear. For example, can gauge transformations in Yang-Mills theory---taken as mere descriptive redundancy---exhibit a similar relational empirical significance as the boosts of Galileo's ship? This question has been debated in the last fifteen years in the philosophy of physics. I will argue that the answer is `yes'. And that underlying this `yes' answer lies the true significance of gauge symmetries: an inherent non-locality, or holism, of certain physical systems...

2020

This paper explicates the direct empirical significance (DES) of symmetries. Given a physical system composed of subsystems, such significance is to be awarded to physical differences about the composite system that can be attributed to symmetries acting solely on its subsystems. The debate is: can DES be associated to the local gauge symmetries, acting solely on subsystems, in gauge theory? In gauge theories, any quantity with physical significance must be a gauge-invariant quantity. Using this defining feature, we can recast the existence of DES as a question of holism: if a larger system is composed of (sufficiently) isolated subsystems, are the individual gauge-invariant states of the subsystems sufficient to determine the gauge-invariant state of the larger system? Or is the relation between the subsystems underdetermined by their physical states, and does the underdetermination carry both empirical significance and a relation to the subsystem symmetries? To attack the question...

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2016

Much recent philosophy of physics has investigated the process of symmetry breaking. Here, I critically assess the alleged symmetry restoration at the fundamental scale. I draw attention to the contingency that gauge symmetries exhibit, i.e. the fact that they have been chosen from among a count-ably infinite space of possibilities. I appeal to this feature of group theory to argue that any metaphysical account of fundamental laws that expects symmetry restoration up to the fundamental level is not fully satisfactory. This is a symmetry argument in line with Curie's 1 st principle. Further, I argue that this same feature of group theory helps to explain the " unreasonable " effectiveness of (this subfield of) mathematics in (this subfield of) physics, and that it reduces the philosophical significance that has been attributed to the objectivity of gauge symmetries.

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2014

It is widely recognised that 'global' symmetries, such as the boost invariance of classical mechanics and special relativity, can give rise to direct empirical counterparts such as the Galileo-ship phenomenon. However , conventional wisdom holds that 'local' symmetries, such as the dif-feomorphism invariance of general relativity and the gauge invariance of classical electromagnetism, have no such direct empirical counterparts. We argue against this conventional wisdom. We develop a framework for analysing the relationship between Galileo-ship empirical phenomena on the one hand, and physical theories that model such phenomena on the other, that renders the relationship between theoretical and empirical symmetries transparent, and from which it follows that both global and local symmetries can give rise to Galileo-ship phenomena. In particular, we use this framework to exhibit an analog of Galileo's ship for the local gauge invariance of electromagnetism.

Richard Healey's talk was divided in two parts. In the first part he argued that we are not justified in believing that localized gauge potential properties are there, but we are in believing that holonomy properties are. In the second part, he conceded that the holonomy interpretation offers an incomplete local and causal account, but he maintained that the onus is on QM.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2004

Those looking for holism in contemporary physics have focused their attention primarily on quantum entanglement. But some gauge theories arguably also manifest the related phenomenon of nonseparability. While the argument is strong for the classical gauge theory describing electromagnetic interactions with quantum "particles", it fails in the case of general relativity even though that theory may also be formulated in terms of a connection on a principal fiber bundle. Anandan has highlighted the key difference in his analysis of a supposed gravitational analog to the Aharonov-Bohm effect. By contrast with electromagnetism in the original Aharonov-Bohm effect, gravitation is separable and exhibits no novel holism in this case. Whether the nonseparability of classical gauge theories of nongravitational interactions is associated with holism depends on what counts as the relevant part-whole relation. Loop representations of quantized gauge theories of non-gravitational interactions suggest that these conclusions about holism and nonseparability may extend also to quantum theories of the associated fields.

Foundations of Science, 2011

This short note develops some ideas along the lines of the stimulating paper by Heylighen (Found Sci 15 4(3): 345-356, 2010a). It summarizes a theme in several writings with Francis Bailly, downloadable from this author's web page. The "geometrization" of time and causality is the common ground of the analysis hinted here and in Heylighen's paper. Heylighen adds a logical notion, consistency, in order to understand a possible origin of the selective process that may have originated this organization of natural phenomena. We will join our perspectives by hinting to some gnoseological complexes, common to mathematics and physics, which may shed light on the issues raised by Heylighen. Note: Francis Bailly passed away recently: his immense experience in physics has been leading our joint work for many years.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2004

Holistic features figure prominently in many of the hard problems concerning the ontological foundations of modern physics. Entanglement, non-separability and the non-locality arising in the EPR-Bell correlations, the non-individuality of particlesall these prominent features of quantum theory cast doubt on the common view of the world as consisting of localized, individual and independently existing substances. These issues, in particular the notion of non-separability, all relate to the concept of holism . Moreover, the issue of holism arises not only in the philosophy of quantum physics. Certain aspects of general relativity-in connection with its non-linear field equations and the nonlocalizability of gravitational energy-have to be taken into account as well along with the characteristic features of gauge theories, where apparently holistic entities like holonomies play a fundamental role.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Symmetry-based inferences have permeated many discussions in philosophy of physics and metaphysics of science. It is claimed that symmetries in our physical theories would allow us to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world, a view that I call ‘symmetry inferentialism’. This paper is critical to this view. I claim that (a) it assumes a philosophically questionable characterization of the relevant validity domain of physical symmetries, and (b) it overlooks a distinction between two opposing ways through which relevant physical symmetries become established. My conclusion is that symmetry inferentialism loses persuasive force when these two points are taken into consideration.

2005

Symmetry considerations stand at the core of classical and quantum physics. No modern-and few older-physical theories forgo the immense services that these considerations offer. It is therefore only natural that philosophers of physics have increasingly started to study the motivations for, as well as the technical implementations and the interpretative implications of, symmetries in fundamental physics. Apart from the extraordinary foundational interest of symmetries, they provide a vehicle to study more general philosophical issues such as the relation between the physical world and its representations and between physics and mathematics. Moreover, traditional problems in metaphysics and philosophy of science such as the nature and status of laws of nature, scientific realism, and determinism naturally arise in, and enjoy substantial fertilisation from, the context of symmetries in physics. This volume, edited by Katherine Brading and Elena Castellani, which grew out of a workshop held at Oxford in 2001, thus fulfills the felt need to collect the current philosophical debates on different aspects of symmetries in physics. The editors declare at the outset that their intention was to offer a ''format that would provide a point of entry into the subject for non-experts, including students and philosophers of science in general.'' (p. ix) Indeed, some of the articles are clearly accessible (and relevant!) to this wider audience. A number of articles-among them some of the most interesting contributions-, however, presuppose at least a willingness on the part of the reader to engage with more technical material. Although this may partially undermine the editors' expressed intention, they need not worry, for these articles will stir the interest of the specialist. What is more, some of the contributions present splendid and truly didactical reviews of the core issues in the subject and will therefore be of great service in advanced courses in the foundations and philosophy of physics. Please join me in more extensively exploring the collection, which is divided into four parts. Part I concerns continuous symmetries and constitutes the most voluminous section of the collection. After brief selections of classic texts on the subject by Weyl and Wigner, Christopher Martin sets out to survey the role and significance of continuous symmetries in fundamental physics and to introduce the philosophical