The Very Repugnant Conclusion i Åkvists festskrift

2002

We provide a characterization of the generalised satisfaction-in our terminology non-deprivation-quasi-ordering introduced by S.R. Chakravarty (Keio Econ Stud 34:17-32, (1997)) for making welfare comparisons. The non-deprivation quasi-ordering obeys a weaker version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for specific combinations of progressive transfers, which impose that the same amount be taken from richer individuals and allocated to one arbitrary poorer individual. We identify the extended Gini social welfare functions that are consistent with this principle and we show that the unanimity of value judgements among this class is identical to the ranking of distributions implied by the non-deprivation quasiordering. We extend the approach to the measurement of inequality by considering the corresponding relative and absolute ethical inequality indices.

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ. Letters, 57: 289-296; 1997) have shown that maximization of social welfare precludes income equality in this setting. We show that their case breaks down when the public good is impure: there exist individual preferences under which maximization of social welfare necessitates exact income equalization. Even if the public good is pure, any given, positive level of income inequality can be shown to be socially excessive by suitably specifying individual preferences. Thus, sans knowledge of individual preferences, one cannot reject the claim that a marginal redistribution from the rich to the poor will improve social welfare, regardless of how small inequality is in the status quo.

2008

We provide a characterization of the generalised satisfaction -- in our terminology non-deprivation -- quasi-ordering introduced by S.R. Chakravarty (Keio Economic Studies 34 (1997), 17--32) for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. We show that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering obeys a weaker version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for specific combinations of progressive transfers which

2013

Inequality studies tend to assume a positive correlation between income and wealth inequality. We doubt whether this holds for Rhineland welfare states as they seem to combine low income inequality with high wealth inequality levels. We hypothesize that publicly funded life-time income security, which is so typical for Rhineland welfare states, enhances private debt creation, while the redistributive taxes required to finance this system are targeting income rather than wealth.

2004

Few generalizations in the social sciences enjoy such wide-ranging support as that of diminishing marginal utility of income. Put simply, this proposition states that the effect on subjective well-being of a $1,000 increase in income becomes progressively smaller the higher the initial level of income. Distinguished scholars in economics, political science, psychology, and sociology who have made major contributions to the study of subjective well-being concur on this assertion. Its policy appeal is great, because it implies that raising the income of poor people or poor countries will raise their well-being considerably, while an increase of equal amount for the rich will have comparatively little effect. The diminishing returns generalization is based on point-of-time bivariate comparisons of happiness with real income, either among or within countries. If, as these cross sectional studies suggest, there is diminishing marginal utility of income, then this point-of-time pattern sh...

Social Choice and Welfare, 2009

We introduce a new criterion for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. This method constitutes a natural alternative to the standard approach in normative economics, which consists in comparing the generalised Lorenz curves of the distributions. The generalised Lorenz criterion is consistent with the principle of transfers, which requires that welfare increases as the result of an arbitrary progressive transfer. The criterion we propose obeys a weaker version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for some specific combinations of progressive transfers, where the positions of the donors and beneficiaries of the transfers play a crucial role. We extend the approach to the measurement of inequality by considering the corresponding relative and absolute ethical inequality indices.

Social Indicators Research, 2005

Few generalizations in the social sciences enjoy such wide-ranging support as that of diminishing marginal utility of income. Put simply, this proposition states that the effect on subjective well-being of a $1,000 increase in income becomes progressively smaller the higher the initial level of income. Distinguished scholars in economics, political science, psychology, and sociology who have made major contributions to the study of subjective well-being concur on this assertion. Its policy appeal is great because it implies that raising the income of poor people or poor countries will raise their well-being considerably, while an increase of equal amount for the rich will have comparatively little effect. The diminishing returns generalization is based on point-of-time bivariate comparisons of happiness with real income, either among or within countries. If, as these cross sectional studies suggest, there is diminishing marginal utility of income, then this point-of-time pattern should be replicated over time as income traverses the range of values covered in the cross sectional analysis. I propose to test whether historical experience reproduces the point-of-time relationship, first, using an international cross section of happiness and income, and then, a within-country one for the United States. As in the studies cited, I use a simple bivariate comparison. It turns out that income change over time does not generate the change in happiness implied by the cross sectional pattern. The present analysis is not exhaustive, but it does suggest the need for caution in assuming that cross sectional generalizations about diminishing marginal utility of income can be safely used to anticipate change over time.

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009

This paper provides direct evidence that comparisons exert a significant effect on subjective well-being. It also evaluates the relative importance of different types of benchmarks. Internal comparisons to one's own past living standard outweigh any other comparison benchmarks. Local comparisons (to one's parents, former colleagues or high school mates) are more powerful than self-ranking in the social ladder. The impact of comparisons is asymmetric: under-performing one's benchmark always has a greater welfare effect than out-performing it (in absolute value). Comparisons which reduce satisfaction also increase the demand for income redistribution, but there, the relative impact of subjective ranking is preponderant.