Justice, Democracy and Reasonable Agreement

A review essay on Thomas Spragens’ "Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our Democratic Ideals" exploring how Spragen's insights are deepened by attention to emergent processes as discussed in the work of F. A. Hayek.

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2005

One prominent criticism of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is that it treats certain non-liberal societies, what Rawls calls ‘decent hierarchical societies,’ as equal participants in a just international system. Rawls claims that these non-liberal societies should be respected as equals by liberal democratic societies, even though they do not grant their citizens the basic rights of democratic citizenship. This is presented by Rawls as a consequence of liberalism’s commitment to the principle of toleration. A number of critics, including Kok-Chor Tan, have claimed that Rawls’s treatment of these non-liberal societies is symptomatic of a more general problem with political liberalism, namely, its reliance on toleration as its ‘fundamental principle.’ Against this view, I argue that the principle of toleration should not be understood as political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle.’ This is revealed through a consideration of the normative basis of what Rawls calls the ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy.’ A correct understanding of political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle,’ which I claim is a principle of equal ‘civic respect’ for citizens, shows that Rawls’s toleration of non-liberal societies is in fact a misapplication of political liberalism to the global domain. Moreover, I explain that political liberalism must assert that the principle of equal civic respect for citizens is the correct principle to govern the public political relations of citizens in all pluralist societies, and that most ‘decent hierarchical societies’ are pluralist in nature. Identifying political liberalism’s fundamental principle as that of equal civic respect for citizens helps to render political liberalism, in both the domestic and international domains, a more coherent and compelling approach to thinking about fundamental political issues.

It has become evident that, rather than being entirely opposed to one another, contemporary liberalism and communitarianism share many goals. For all their criticisms of the individualism of liberal polities, most communitarians are firm supporters of civil liberties and rights. And, for all their warnings about the dangers of citizen involvement and communal sentiments in politics, most liberals would welcome a revival of civic virtue and a renewed sense of common purpose in America. But while a modicum of peace has come to the liberal—communitarian debate, important questions, of both a theoretical and practical nature, remain about how to reconcile liberal and communitarian ideals. Part of the reason that these questions arise is due to uncertainty about the fundamental aims of both liberalism and communitarianism. What, for liberalism, is the basis of our right to civil liberty? Is civil liberty merely a means to our ends? Or is it necessary for deeper reasons? And what, for communitarianism, is the ultimate basis for civic virtue? Does communitarianism seek to support any or all conceptions of civic virtue and the common good? Or is communitarianism best seen as a defense of a more or less Aristotelian conception of moral virtue, one that, in our time, can best be realized by the revival of civic virtue and communal life of certain kind? By answering these questions, this paper attempts to show how liberalism and communitarianism can be reconciled. Rather than start with abstruse theoretical conflicts between liberalism and communitarianism, the first part of this paper addresses the most pressing practical problem, the proper extent of civil liberty and state action. Most contemporary liberals defend a broad right to freedom on the grounds that a liberal state must be neutral between competing conceptions of the human good. And, on these same grounds, they argue that government must not use its powers to tax, subsidize, and regulate our activities in order to help people pursue one view of the human good rather than another. Communitarians, however, explicitly defend a non-neutral state. And they seem willing to limit human freedom in order to form citizens of a certain kind. My suggested resolution to this debate is that communitarians accept the most extensive civil liberty while liberals accept government action in support of one or another conception of the human good, so long as (1) that action is taken in as decentralized a manner as possible and (2) freedom remains unrestricted. On my view, the state may not set any limits on what we think, say, and, in the privacy of our homes, do. But, at the same time, the state can encourage, honor, and subsidize particular ways of life. In doing so, however, it must adopt the principle of subsidiarity: government endorsement of a particular conception of the good must be undertaken in as local a form of government as is consistent with the good in question. I apply this general principle—which I call the principle of freedom—to a number of contemporary debates concerning such matters as abortion, schooling, and sexual orientation. While my proposal cuts the knot of conflict between liberalism and communitarianism, it needs some defense. The second part of the paper argues that the principle of freedom rests on the notion that human beings have the capacity, in both our political and individual lives, to pursue a reasoned account of human nature, the human good, and our own good here and now. I suggest that we think of reasoning about the human good as a fallible, empirical activity. There are no guarantees that any features of human nature are broad enough and widely enough shared to sustain an account of the human good. Nor are their any guarantees that we will reach consensus about the human good. But we do not need such guarantees in order to explore questions of our own nature and our good. Nor do we need consensus in order for reasoning about the human good to be productive of individual and political and social enlightenment. Moreover, the mere possibility of reasoning about the human good mandates that we have the freedom, in both our individual and collective lives, to examine and test different conceptions of a good life. This freedom is most likely to be found, I argue, when we protect the most extensive civil liberty to express our ideas and to do as we please in our private lives and when local and regional governments can support a particular conception of the good life. In the third part of my paper, I examine two important consequence of my proposed reconciliation of liberalism and communitarianism. I argue, first, that communitarians should not see community and civic virtue as ends in themselves. Liberals, I argue, are quite right to think that civic virtue and a communal spirit can lead to trouble. Trouble can arise, as liberals have pointed out, when the pursuit of civic virtue and community takes illiberal forms or leads to the kinds of conflicts that cannot easily be constrained in a liberal polity. It can also arise, however, when community and a civic spirit make it more rather than less difficult for human beings to lead a fulfilling life. Community and civic virtue are only defensible ideals when they take a form that helps human beings live a good life. If they accept the principle of freedom, communitarians will be pluralists, who value a wide range of experiments in community. But while, as a matter of principle, communitarians should allow for the greatest variety of conceptions of civic virtue and communal solidarity, they should not be reluctant to express their preferences for one idea of virtue and community over another. They should, in other words, encourage free people to choose well and wisely. There is no principled way to accomplish that task, however. If reasoning about the human good is a fallible, empirical activity, then we cannot know in advance what kinds of troubles will result from our pursuit of civic virtue and community. Nor is there any algorithm than can tell us when even attractive forms of communitarianism—those that might help people sustain a fulfilling way of life—can threaten the central ideals of liberalism. For, we should not kid ourselves: there are likely to be tensions between individual and collective freedom, and thus between civil liberty and the pursuit of a good polity and society. In the principle of freedom, I propose a clear line between what we might call the communitarian good and the liberal right. But, while helpful, no such line can solve all our problems. It cannot warn us when political and social institutions and practices meant to realize a good life are likely to set off a movement that threaten our freedoms. Nor can it tell us what kinds of communitarianism are likely to help us live better lives. So, the second consequence of my reconciliation of liberalism and communitarianism is the recognition that, in any sound political theory, principles must be supplemented by prudence or practical wisdom. Finally, if we are to defend an account of reasoning about the human good that supports the principle of freedom and makes room for prudence, and we need a sound philosophical psychology or anthropology. Thus I agree with Michael Sandel in holding that some view of human action and of human desires underlies our conception of the task of politics. But, in the fourth part of this paper, I sketch a philosophical psychology that transcends the difference between the two views he presents in Democracy’s Discontent. The self, I argue, is neither entirely prior to its ends nor entirely defined by its ends. Rather I see the self as capable of both the discovery of our deepest ends and the invention of new ways of life that best enable us to satisfy those ends. The self is, in other words, a product of an intertwining of nature and culture. As we seek our own good, we also search for the best way to understand how our ends are the product of both nature and culture. Precisely because we can do this, however, we can stand apart from our ends and evaluate them from a distance. We are not so constituted by our ends that distance from them is impossible. Nor are we capable of a standing so far from our ends that they lose all importance. It is the tension between what we are by nature and by culture that creates the occasions for and the possibility of distance. And it is the congruence between what we are by nature and by culture that makes our way of life inescapably important to us.

Social Justice Research, 2005

Mackie's volume is a path-breaking, thorough, and innovative overview of the subject of social choice and its implications for understanding democracy. It is made up of various lines of analysis including historical interpretation, a review of massive numbers of statistical studies and a careful analysis of numerous aspects of the logical proof of Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. It will be 'must reading' for all who wish to understand democracy given the work in the social choice field over the last 50 years. On the other hand, it has its shortcomings. By focusing on a particular school of attackers of democracy (led by William Riker), the book becomes less balanced and less useful than it might be. Most unfortunately, Mackie does not take the plunge to see what positive elements flow from such related fields as theories of justice. Finally, by avoiding these other fields, the centrality of politics in the pursuit of justice is one of the implications of the analysis that is missed.

Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

Political philosophy was once dominated by discussion of the virtues of character and their importance to the good life and the good society. Contemporary political philosophers, however, following the towering influence of John Rawls, have primarily focused on a single virtue of institutions: justice, while mostly avoiding discussions of the good life. As a result, political philosophy lacks a unified account of the virtues of institutions and the virtues of character. More importantly, we lack an understanding of the connection between the just society and the good life. This article begins to mend this broken seam. The central argument is that the virtues of character require institutions, while good institutions enable persons to live together virtuously. Institutions are a necessary precondition for the moral agency required by the virtues. But good institutions enable virtue to grow, while helping to constrain the moral excesses of vice. On this view, justice emerges primarily as a virtue of character, not institutions. The just person balances conformity to existing institutional norms with practically wise reforms that serve the common good. The just society and the good life are linked through the common good of virtuous activity within the shared institutions of a political community.

2019

The paper discusses two ways to understand political liberalism. On the one hand, political liberalism may rely on the existence of an overlapping consensus among all reasonable comprehensive views present in our society. On the other hand, we may ground political liberalism on the moral value of equal respect for everyone. The dilemma between a factual identification of an overlapping consensus and a normative appeal to moral values arises at two levels. First, when we fill the content of our political conception of justice. And second, when we require impartiality to fill that content. In the former case, we may argue for a particular conception of justice through normative argument with moral premises, or our political conception of justice might be the area where all reasonable comprehensive views overlap. Similarly, we require that citizens offer impartial public reasons because this is what people holding different comprehensive views do think appropriate , or because they should consider it so. The author argues that we should define our political conception of justice through impartial normative argument, and that we should ground the demand of impartiality on the moral value of equal respect.

European Journal of Political Theory, 2011

The topic of social justice is not directly associated with the British idealists. Issues about which we more habitually seek their wisdom include citizenship, the role of the state, the common good, moral character or self-realisation. With respect to the post-Rawlsian dichotomy 'justice versus virtue' we tend to see the British idealists as the philosophers who engage with virtue. However, they do have a distinctive contribution on social justice. Certain aspects of this contribution are already well recognised, while some still await recognition. David Boucher has emphasised the difference between the post-Rawlsian approaches to justice which focus on fairness, impartiality, mutual benefit, desert and entitlement, on the one hand, and the British idealist understanding of justice as a theory that rests upon the metaphysics of the person and a definite conception of the good, on the other. 2 With respect to justice, the British idealists focus not so much on procedures and impartiality, but on substantive visions of social and personal good. In addition to being different, on Boucher's account, the British idealists' theory of justice overcomes certain dualisms that seem to dominate contemporary analytical political theory, most importantly, the 'justicevirtue' dualism. 3 Simhony has demonstrated the capacity of Green's rights theory to overcome the liberal anxieties about the British idealist teleological conception of rights. If anything, she argues, Green's theory has the resources for a constructive critique of liberalism itself, challenging its assumption that a teleological conception of rights subverts the primary normative role of rights because teleological rights are supposed to be derivative, not fundamental. 4 In other words, Green's theory of rights not only defies liberal anxieties but also reveals the complex nature of liberalism.

Routledge, 2024

This volume brings together diverse sets of standpoints on liberalism in an era of growing skepticism and distrust regarding liberal institutions. The essays in the volume: - Relate concerns for liberal institutions with classical themes in perfectionist politics, such as the priority of the common good in decision-making or the role of comprehensive doctrines. - Analyse how perfectionist intuitions about the political life affect our concepts of public reason or public justification. - Outline various moral duties we have toward other persons that underlie the liberal institutions or notions of rights functioning across the contemporary political landscape. - Explore various aspects of pluralism from within influential religious or philosophical traditions, applying insights from those traditions to issues in contemporary politics. The comprehensive volume will be of great interest to scholars, students, and researchers of politics, especially those in political philosophy and political theory.