Attention (and Joint Attention)

Journal of Pragmatics, 2007

We demonstrate that ''joint attention'', usually conceived of in the psychological sciences as indicative of such minded processes as the capacity for understanding the intentional, goal-directed behavior of others, is fundamentally an interactional process, one that cannot be extricated from the ongoing flow of social activity. We examine very young children's actions of showing objects to others, and explicate the practical procedures by which they draw and sustain another's attention to an object, and convey ''what for''-that is, what another should do in response. At issue is how children in a natural social setting (here, a daycare center) track the activities of others for felicitous moments to present objects, and design and position their actions by reference to the ongoing preoccupations, commitments, and distractions of others. Further, drawing another's attention poses sequential implications for children's actions which structure opportunities for parties (child and other) to display, and modify, their understandings of what sort of social exchange is transpiring between them. #

乳幼児発達臨床センター年報 Research and Clinical Center For Child Development Annual Report, 2002

The development of visual joint attention has been examined almost exclusively from the point of view of the infant's capacity. Researchers have focused on issues such as its developmental origins and timing, its implications for the development of social cognition, and the possible mechanisms for the changing patterns of joint attention. However, this approach does not reveal how this skill emerges from the infant's interaction with the caregiver. In this paper, joint attention is viewed as an interaction state achieved by the infant and the caregiver system. The development of this state is described first as led by the caregiver monitoring the attention of the infant and overcoming the spatial constraints. As the infant becomes able to control his posture and to respond to caregiver's attention getting bids, caregiver begins to introduce objects and their manipulations, thus extending the frame of joint attention. With the emergence of language and narratives, the 'window' of joint attention opens to include events beyond the here and now. The interaction system gradually overcomes the temporal constraints. The last stage of development sees the infant actively taking over the role of the caregiver by initiating attention getting. A full-fledge joint attention is characterized by the dyad's having overcome both the spatial and the temporal constraints.

Synthesis philosophica, 58, 235–251, 2015

In this paper I criticize theory-biased and overly individualist approaches to understanding others and introduce the PAIR account of joint attention as a pragmatic, affectively charged intentional relation. I argue that this relation obtains in virtue of intentional contents in the minds of the co-attenders, and – against the received understanding of intentional states as propositional attitudes – that we should recognize what I call “subject mode” and “position mode” intentional content. Based on findings from developmental psychology, I propose that subject mode content represents the co-attenders as co-subjects, who are like them and who are at least disposed to act jointly with them. I conclude by arguing that in joint attention we experience and understand affective, actional and perceptual relations at a non-conceptual level prior to the differentiation of mind and body.

A BST R A C T : Attention is often regarded as a process belonging to the sphere of perception. The relationship between attention and language is rarely addressed in philosophy. I argue that there is a circular process of attention informing language and language informing attention in experience. Attention is the prerequisite for demonstrative reference and the grasp of general concepts. Attentional modifications of experience take place in a context of pre-understanding that is always already shaped by language in form of our prejudices and previous judgments about objects in a certain object domain. As a social medium, language also shapes our attentional behaviour by way of instruction and the learning of social norms and manners.

Transformacoes Em Psicologia, 2009

Joint attention entail the mutual focus of two human beings on either a common object of interest or on each other. When two persons focus on one another, emotional and mental states can be inferred by means of mirror neurons, dispersed over brain regions involved in emotionality and motor coordination. The mirror neuron system is suggested to have an important role in motor synchronization for shared behavioral goals, as well as imitation of articulation and speech gestures. Joint attention bids associated with a common object of interest can accommodate learning, especially by forming proper learning environments for language acquisition in infants. Attention-regulating areas in the prefrontal cortex have a central role in the initiation of joint attention, and a pattern of specialization has to mature in children, as areas responsible for initiation and maintenance of joint attention migrate towards the frontal poles of the brain.

2020

Early language development is built on many preverbal skills such as joint attention, vocalization, and characteristics of child`s play. Between thes

A multi-layered discourse analysis of the interaction of three to five-year-old children in two preschools reveals a highly structured process occurring between the children and their caretakers to build and maintain joint attention. This process, serving to promote socialization into preschool, is constructed through language, gaze, intonation, and physical embodiment.

Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, 2011

It is one thing for two or more persons to perceive the same object, and it is quite another for two or more persons to perceive the same object together. The latter phenomenon is called joint attention and has recently garnered considerable interest from psychologists. However, contemporary psychological research has not succeeded in clarifying how persons can share perception of an object. Joint attention thus stands in need of phenomenological clarification. Surprisingly, this has yet to be offered. Phenomenologists have provided thoroughgoing analyses of perceptual experience, but have overlooked the perceptual experiences of co-perceivers; and while a number of well-known phenomenologists have offered accounts of how one encounters other persons, they have neglected the phenomenon of perceptually attending to an object with other persons. This paper addresses a shortcoming of both contemporary psychological research and the phenomenological tradition by providing a phenomenological analysis of joint attention.

Topoi, 2024