Dialogical Sovereignty: Preliminary Metaphorical Musings

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique, 2012

The paper considers the nature of the state understood as the political unity articulated on the basis of a collective identity which provides the state with its capacity to make decisions. The foremost decision of the state to protect and defend this identity is the source of its authority to enforce laws. Collective identity thus represents an object of special interest, unlike both ''political'' interests (Millian other-regarding acts) and private interests (Millian self-regarding acts). The validation of laws through this special interest is a necessary condition for both of these latter kinds of interests to materialize. Hence, unlike the Millian thesis of two different kinds of interests (self-and other-regarding), here we take that there are three types or spheres of interests. Any conception of rights, then, will cover a subset of interests found in the domains of all of those three types of interests: in the domain of political interest the issue concerns selection among competing sets of legitimate interests, within the domain of private interests the point is to discern those that will be protected by law, while the third type of interests, the object of which is a unique collective identity and its defining specificity, represents an overarching interest that is embedded in any legitimate collective concern. In this scheme, well-suited for democratic theory, the majority/minority discourse is a matter of distinguishing which particular set of legitimate interests is chosen to be dominant (e.g., which political party is in power) and which ones are waiting for the opportunity to achieve their transformation from minority (opposition) to majority (i. e. government). If, however, there is no well-defined collective identity, minorities acquire a new meaning. Rather than being possible future majorities, they form a nucleus of competing collective identities with, sometimes hopeless but still alive, aspirations to sovereignty. Thus they become sources of likely conflicts that may go well beyond political controversies.

Sovereignty is a highly controversial concept in political science and social theories, offering a full array of issues to be analysed. In recent times, newly the thesis is under discussion that political concepts and international laws are not to be based on a static, absolute truth out there, but should rather be built up from a framework to which all its subjects – and probably only the ones subject to it – can agree and identify with. According to Rothkopf (Rothkopf, 2008), a prominent analyst in international policies, specialized in the study of social elites, sovereignty is the reflection of a society’s current believes and values. To find a framework to which all involved can agree and enter in communication which each other, will be a central part in current and future peace building. Where people wish to live together in peace, ideas and concepts must be translated, conversed into a language which everybody involved understands and can agree to. This approach can be found by Appiah, a philosopher near to the United Nations policies, whose works are appreciated for his special sensitivity in the multiculturalism as a social phenomena (Appiah, 2003). Under the 17th Century's English Constitution sovereignty has been discussed under circumstances comparable with issues of our time; diverging ideas, disagreement in religious believes and a weak legal framework were the major threat to the balanced in the state. After cruel revolutions, further civil wars seemed to knock at the doors of the English Parliament which to avoid was prior political task. Struggle about the power and stability in the Kingdom motivated many political philosophers of those times to put under prove the meaning and roles of sovereignty in the state. To understand these divergent ideas about the concept of sovereignty will be the core issue under discussion in this essay. Difficulties in constitutional theory should be made visible by a descriptivist analysis taking as reference the constitutional theory of John Locke developed in his work “Second Treaties of Government” (Locke, 1689). How individual believes, the law and the state correlate and are synthesised in sovereignty and why this concept has been of major interest during times of constitutional crisis will become understandable hereunder.

Transmodernity, 2015

1992

Law and sovereignty are equivocal terms with competing definitions. Sovereignty can refer to coercive state power or a human being's right to self-determination. In international law sovereignty usually means legalized state autonomy, but that definition is misleading, as state power relies either on domination or cooperation in order to "feel" like sovereignty. Agamben's analysis of sovereignty as the "nomos of the west" gives us the hard case against saying sovereignty can stand also for human self-determination. But his definitions of law and sovereignty are too narrow to sustain his theory. Constable's meditation on the silence of justice in modern law counters Agamben, and demonstrates why sovereignty, despite its ties to coercive state power, still holds out resources of freedom and selfdetermination that no one can afford to forego.

Since the linguistic turn, the subject has been shaken from its Cartesian foundation, and is decentred. But, to be the socially and legally recognisable person one is supposed to be, the subject must be ruled as if a reified identity in the public space. This presupposes a Sovereign in possession of knowledge about the identities of subjects. But the instantiation of sovereignty depends in turn upon a people in whose name sovereignty is instituted and its actions performed. So neither should the Sovereign be reified, as if it were a fixed identity and source of power. It too may be deconstructed. The present argument begins from the hypothesis that 'to be is to be ruled', but only to falsify it.

2009

The Incarnate Word, 2023

What follows is a translation of chapter 2, “The Problem of Sovereignty,” of Julio Meinvielle’s book, Concepción católica de la Política (Buenos Aires: Cursos de cultura católica, 1932); second edition, corrected and enlarged, (Buenos Aires: Cursos de cultura católica, 1941); third edition, (Buenos Aires: Theoria, 1961); and re-edited in Concepción católica de la política ; Los tres pueblos bíblicos en su lucha por la dominación del mundo ; El comunismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Dictio, 1972). For more information about Julio Mein- vielle and his works, see www.juliomeinvielle.org. This text uses two sets of footnotes. The first set, designated with Arabic numerals, are the au- thor’s original notes; the only changes introduced in this set were to standardize names and refer- ences and to replace texts quoted in a language other than Spanish with an English translation. Occasionally a reference has been changed to “cf.” when the text does not match the Latin original. The second set, indicated with letters, includes the texts as quoted by the author in their origi- nal language, the citations for the translations uti- lized, and comments regarding the author’s origi- nal text.