Historia de los cacerolazos : 1982-2001

2002

un incendio en el túnel de cables, el cual genera la interrupción de energía eléctrica en diez (10) barrios porteños. Más de 150.000 clientes de Edesur (aproximadamente 600.000 personas) en Capital Federal son afectados por el apagón en el primer momento; en sus domicilios, en oficinas, en bancos, en el tren subterráneo y por las calles. El apagón dura once días en pleno verano con temperaturas arriba de los +30 o C. Un problema técnico que aparentó ser de rápida solución se transformó rápidamente en un conflicto social y una crisis económica y política que duraría más de dos meses. El presente estudio de caso analiza la crisis social y política que fue producida a partir del apagón en Buenos Aires desde una perspectiva teórica cognitiva-institucional, en la cual los procesos de toma decisiones y de comunicación son vitales. Aspectos tales como definición del problema, procesamiento de información, politización de crisis y acciones simbólicas son analizados dentro del contexto cultural, político y económico de Buenos Aires y Argentina. Una de las dimensiones centrales en este análisis es la cuestión de los procesos de privatización de los servicios públicos, siendo una característica de la política económica argentina de la última década. Este trabajo es un estudio sobre el reciente apagón de Buenos Aires y también una contribución a las discusiones teóricas sobre manejo de situaciones de crisis en las esferas de 'lo privado' y de 'lo público'; del Estado y del Mercado.

Telos, 1982

The last one hundred years of Argentine history can be neatly divided in two halves. From 1880 through 1930 it was mainly a success story, a legend of rapid economic growth, of fabulous fortunes made at the top but trickling down the social ladder, of immigration, mobility, and exceptionalism. The country was in the hands of an oligarchy of landowners in dependent association with British capital. But the wealth generated by agrarian exports opened the doors to millions of Southern Europeans that flocked to rapidly growing cities, changed the cultural texture, found new occupations, and entertained new hopes. Social progress turned into political demand, and the general prosperity, coupled with the rulers' liberal bent, allowed the extension of citizenship to a rising middle class. The next fifty years were years of turbulence ending in disappointment. They were marked, overwhelmingly, by the irruption of organized labor as a political force in a context of economic uncertainty and institutional improvisation. Argentina muddled through the industrial era unable to work out satisfactory arrangements of political conviviality. This gave rise to another, darker legend of wasted opportunities, of dereliction from great promises. Nevertheless, Argentina managed to avoid the true tragedies of the century: it did not become enmeshed in serious international conflict: its crises were never catastrophic; its political errings were more colorful than dreadful. Just as it had grown in happy non-chalance, it now seemed to falter blandly. Then suddenly, in the seventies, it caught up with the horrors of our era. It is now living through its darkest hour. In terms of its development, Argentina represents a third type of social formation between classical liberal and post-liberal societies. It is a dependent society in which the main agent of development is neither a hegemonic bourgeoisie nor a powerful state capable of forging an alliance of pre-existing classes or generating new dynamic ones. It is the result of a development initiated and directed from outside, by a foreign bourgeoisis, and, today, by its more impersonal corporate heirs. Like other societies of this type, Argentina has become de-centered. It does not have an agency of change. It comprises, instead, a fragmentation of classes, a complex mix of old and new social relations, an over-extended state serving as an arena of compromise, a lack of structural unity. This is the direct result of the accretion of disparate patterns of development induced from outside. Yet, this has not meant social and cultural inertia. Far from it: in Argentina, the fragments are mobilized, and each pattern of development has left organized groups firmly entrenched in active and vociferous institutions. Rapid change hastily threw together different actors with no common framework within which to mediate their differences. The fragility and discontinuities in economic development made 1.

Hispanic American Historical Review, 2005

has written a book that is comprehensive, balanced, and full of insights into the development-and turmoil-of modern Argentine history. This book can serve as a starter for anyone interested in the topic. Specialists too will rely on it for its analysis and detail. James Brennan's translation is outstanding.-Jeremy Adelman, Princeton University The purpose of this book is to provide a straightforward synthesis of twentieth-century Argentine history in all its complexity and paradox.. .. Romero focuses on Argentina's place in the larger world, the role of the state, and the influence of culture and intellectuals on the nation's development.-Richard J. Walter, reviewing the Spanish-language edition in The American Historical Review A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, originally published in Buenos Aires in 1994, attained instantaneous status as a classic. Written as an introductory text for university students and the general public, it is a profound reflection on the Argentine dilemma and the challenges that the country faces as it tries to rebuild democracy. In the book, Romero painstakingly and brilliantly reconstructs and analyzes Argentina's tortuous, often tragic modern history, from the alluvial society born of mass immigration, to the dramatic years of Juan and Eva Perón, to the recent period of military dictatorship and democracy. For this first English-language edition, Romer o has written a new chapter covering the decade of the 1990s. A rare book combining great erudition with an engaging narrative, it is destined to be the standard English-language history of Argentina for many years to come. The son of Argentina's greatest twentieth-century historian, José Luis Romero, Luis Alberto Romero has emerged as one of the leading historians of his generation in Argentina. Romero's generation is one that has witnessed the most dramatic decades of the country's modern history, the decline of Argentina and its descent into violence, dictatorship, and despair, but also the hopeful if often difficult process of rebuilding democracy since the mid-1980s. Combining the rigor of the professional historian with a passionate

Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, 2014

This book chapter is the Introduction to the book Argentina since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future. It analyses the nature and effects of the 2001 crisis in Argentina, setting the scene for the discussion of the legacies of crisis that follow in successive chapters. First, it seeks to reject false dichotomies of 'old' and 'new'; instead synthesising them in order to incorporate both elements of continuity and elements of change into analysis. We assert that responses to crisis do not only involve the merging of old and new, but that they are also, concurrently, responses to both old and new problems – many of which were evident in the 1990s and before. Second, it recognises that crisis manifests itself in a number of realms – political, economic, social – and that heuristic devices employed to investigate them must subsequently also be drawn from a number of academic disciplines. This second point is in recognition of the fact that models of political economy, by their very nature and definition, come to encompass all aspects of social life and social reproduction. Link to full chapter can be found below

The Argentine crisis at the turn of the Millenium, 2004

The Argentine crisis broke in the last months of 2001 and developed during 2002, the year when bank deposits were trapped in the corralito, and the year of demonstrations against politicians with the clamorous demand for que se vayan todos (all of them should go). It was a year of rage and of big refounding projects. The "people", the "civil society" would succeed where politicians had failed. There was an echo of previous and faraway experiences of excessive willingness, though overshadowed by discordant voices defending strictly personal interests. In the last third of 2002, the realisation that the final collapse was not imminent, the perception that the state had some sort of capacity for negotiation and, above all, the perspective of the presidential election eased the tension a bit. The elections of March 2003 came as a surprise because of the high level of attendance and a carefully thought-out vote, distributed among several candidates. The polarisation set for the second round announced that even one of the miracles of democracy would take place: el pueblo (the people) was ready to crush the anti-pueblo (the anti-people). The first measures of the new president consisted of strong gestures of authority, oriented to what the majority of public opinion considered good causes, and in that way, the feeling of a new beginning, of a new opportunity for Argentina, became stronger. However, the crisis is still here; it has always been since twelve years ago, to whom might have wanted to see it. In contradiction with the common sense of Argentinians-if Argentina is not the best country in the world, at least must be the worst-this crisis is not so different from many other contemporary crises in the world which have affected countries whose societies, poorly

In Neary, M (ed.) Global Humanisation: Studies in the Manufacture of Labour, London and New York, NY: Mansell: 46-75., 1999

imposition: the means of productive coercion and, in this way, of a peculiar form of violence.

2012

EL FIN DE LA GUERRA FRÍA INVITÓ A UNA NUEVA LECTURA de los conflictos armados en general, y los de naturaleza interna en particular. 1 El mundo asistiría, de acuerdo con las visiones más esperanzadas de la época, al comienzo de un periodo de avance ineludible del pluralismo político, la economía de mercado y la convivencia pacífica, con lo cual se reduciría, de modo significativo, la conflictividad tanto en el ámbito internacional como en los nacionales. Esta mirada parecía validarse, al menos en términos cuantitativos. En efecto, según Wallensteen y Sollenberg, 2 en la etapa 1989-1998 existieron 108 conflictos en 73 sitios: en 1989 hubo 47, en 1992, 55; en 1997, 34, y en 1998 persistían 36 conflictos. Mientras se produjeron tres conflictos internacionales en 1989 y dos en 1998, los conflictos internos fueron 44 en 1989, se elevaron a 54 en 1992 y decrecieron a 34 en 1998.

UADE Textos de Discusión, 2002

The Economic History Review, 2005