Social Empiricism and Science Policy

Philosophy of science is showing an increasing interest in the social aspects and the social organisation of science—the ways social values and social interactions and structures play a role in the creation of knowledge and the ways this role should be taken into account in the organisation of science and science policy. My thesis explores a number of issues related to this theme. I argue that a prominent approach to the social organisation of science—Philip Kitcher’s well-ordered science—runs into a number of problems. They undermine its philosophical plausibility and practical usefulness. I agree with Kitcher that arguments about the social organisation of science should recognise profound societal consequences of science. Kitcher argues that the appropriate organisation of science should therefore take into account laypersons’ values and needs when making decisions concerning research planning, evaluation and application. My criticisms show that this is not enough. Drawing on Helen Longino ideas, I argue that laypersons’ perspectives and knowledge may also be relevant when doing research. In order to show how more inclusive research practices may be possible, I discuss connections between philosophy of science and some developments in science policy, which has also recently shown considerable interest in democratic participation. I demonstrate how public participation experiments in science policy may sometimes be close enough to what the philosopher would recommend. Their analysis can thus be helpful for understanding how societal developments may provide opportunities for the involvement of laypersons in science and what factors may endanger its success. I conclude that a way to pursue a more socially relevant philosophy of science is to focus on the points of contact and possibilities of cooperation between philosophical proposals and these public participation initiatives.

Science & Technology Studies, 2005

2004

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2019

At some point during the 1950s, mainstream American philosophy of science began increasingly to avoid questions about the role of non-cognitive values in science and, accordingly, increasingly to avoid active engagement with social, political and moral concerns. Such questions and engagement eventually ceased to be part of the mainstream. Here we show that the eventual dominance of 'value-free' philosophy of science can be attributed, at least in part, to the policies of the U.S. National Science Foundation's "History and Philosophy of Science" sub-program. In turn, the sub-program's policies were set by logical empiricists who espoused value-free philosophy of science; these philosophers' actions, we also point out, fit a broad pattern, one in which analytic philosophers used institutional control to marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. We go on to draw on existing knowledge of this pattern to suggest two further, similar, contributors to the withdrawal from value-laden philosophy of science, namely decisions by the editors of Philosophy of Science and by the editors of The Journal of Philosophy. Political climate was, we argue, at most an indirect contributor to the withdrawal and was neither a factor that decided whether it occurred nor one that was sufficient to bring it about. Moreover, we argue that the actions at the National Science Foundation went beyond what was required by its senior administrators and are better viewed as part of what drove, rather than as what was being driven by, the adoption of logical empiricism by the philosophy of science community.

Science, 2005

The role of scientific knowledge in general and social science knowledge in particular is changing in emerging and advanced knowledge societies. Science is becoming more important in identifying and framing social challenges and providing ‘suitable and feasible’ solution to decision-makers. Yet, scientific authority is increasingly challenged and contested. This increased social significance of scientific knowledge claims call for an elaborate social philosophy of science. However any attempt to develop a theoretical framework for a social philosophy of science has to face three challenges: (1) an increased challenging of scientific authority, (2) the need for interdisciplinarity to cope with ever more complex problems and (3) to elaborate on a social epistemology and/ or social ontology respectively.

Poiesis & Praxis, 2010

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1991

Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2015

The role o f s cie n tific knowledge in general and social science knowledge in partic u la ris changing in em ergingand advanced knowledge societies. Science is beco ming more im p o rta n t in id e n tify in g and fram ing social challenges and providing 'suitable and feasible' solution to decision-makers. Yet, s c ie n tific a u th o rity is in creasingly challenged and contested. This increased socia lsign ifica n ce o f s c ie n ti fic knowledge claims call fo r an elaborate social philosophy o f science. However any a tte m p t to develop a th e o re tica l framework fo r a social philosophy o f science has to face three challenges: (1) an increased challenging of s c ie n tific authority, (2) th e need fo r in te rd is c ip lin a rity to cope w ith ever more complex problems and (3) to elaborate on a social epistem ology a n d / or social ontology respectively.

International Journal of Science Education, 2010

This research study sought to identify prominent features of the nature of science (NOS) embedded in authentic scientific inquiry. Fourteen well-established scientists from different parts of the world, working in experimental or theoretical research, in both traditional fields such as astrophysics and rapidly growing research fields such as molecular biology, participated as the informants of the study. The descriptions of their practices revealed eight prominent categories of NOS features. In an earlier paper (Wong & Hodson, 2009a), we have reported four categories under the two themes: (1) the methods of scientific investigation and (2) the role and status of scientific knowledge. In this paper, we focus on the remaining four categories under the theme: social dimensions of science. Scientists' descriptions of their practices have 'put some flesh on the bones' of the assertion that science is socially and culturally embedded. These descriptions also have considerable potential for development into interesting case studies as teaching resources to enhance and enrich students' understanding of NOS.