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2014, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
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17 pages
1 file
In October 2012, thousands of citizens took to the streets of Kuwait City to protest an emergency decree by the emir that amended the country’s electoral law in such a way as to undermine the position of the opposition within parliament. The demonstrations were unprecedented both in size and political rhetoric. An estimated 50,000 people addressed the ruler with slogans such as ‘we will not let you’. Security forces used tear gas and stun grenades to break up the gatherings. Youth groups formed the backbone of the movement’s leadership (at least initially) and supplied much of its rank and file. However, within months, this vibrant and defiant campaign had largely dissipated. Having failed to attain its goals, it was unable to maintain a permanent political presence. Throughout the Gulf region, other youth-led movements have suffered a similar fate. Once groups achieve their original goals or lose their initial momentum due to government resistance, they soon break down, often disappearing altogether from the political scene. Thus, youth activism in the Gulf can be described as both effective and ephemeral. On the one hand, the enthusiasm and passion of young people has played a paramount role in driving mass mobilisation. On the other, youth movements have been neither centralised nor ideologically unified, and have often made unrealistic and undeliverable demands on government. Established political groups have sometimes been able to manipulate them for their own political gain, and several youth-led groups have succumbed to the same deep-seated social divisions that their activism might once have been expected to overcome.
POMEPSStudies 36: Youth Politics in the Middle East and North Africa, 2019
Review of Middle East Studies, 2013
After nearly a decade of political demobilization, popular support for the Palestinian intifada in 2000 has stimulated the resurgence of youth activism, this time breaking with many of the taboos that characterized Egyptian life for several decades. Like much of the Arab world, Egypt is witnessing a youth bulge or " period in which the proportion of youth in the population increases significantly compared to other age groups " Today, youth constitute approximately one third of the population, a population that has been historically excluded on the political and economic level due to policy failures. While marginalized as a social group, they continue to entertain high expectations due to urban exposure and education, and are therefore amongst the most politically mobilized groups in Egyptian politics. Youth activism is demonstrating unique characteristics that are setting it apart from the earlier waves of youth activism in Egypt. It is occurring largely outside existing parties; it is non-ideological, inclusive and internally diverse, and is largely taking place outside their traditional place of operation, the university campuses. Interestingly, Islamist youths are this time playing a secondary role in the current wave of youth activism. Youths are also making use of a much more extensive array of information and communication technology as a tool to organize, mobilize and to express their views and to challenge the State and the Egyptian political system on issues of political and constitutional reform. While youth has recreated those new channels and spaces of expression and mobilization, their multi-faceted forms of exclusion threatens to radicalize them.
Like a storm wind that will ring the freedom bell…"
Mediterranean Politics
The story of the 'Arab Spring' as a revolt of young people against autocracy does not stand up to survey analysis at country level. Data from the Arab Transformations Survey show that young people were over-represented as participants, but it is necessary to stretch the concept of 'youth' into middle age in some countries to say this, there were plenty of older participants, and the protests were aimed less at political rights and more at social justice. Fundamental political changes have been expected in MENA which would sweep away autocratic rule in favour of democratisation, as the values successive younger generations became individualised, liberalised and secularised under the influence of economic and market development and the spread of education, but there is very little evidence that this is what occurred in the Arab Uprisings. Whether young or older, protestors were looking for regime change, an end to corruption and a reduction in IMF-inspired austerity, but political freedoms and democratic governance do not appear to have been at the top of their agenda.
Struggles for Political Change in the Arab World: Regimes, Oppositions, and External Actors after the Spring. Edited by Lisa Blaydes, Amr Hamzawy, and Hesham Sallam. University of Michigan Press, 2022
Jordan has experienced a historically contentious decade since the Arab Spring. Youth activists in hirak groups have been demonstrating, marching, and protesting more than ever. Yet such mobilization has not generated a nationally organized movement, one with permanent leadership and mass structure. This chapter explains why by inverting the moral economy and normative expectations of normalized protest in an era of uprising. The new generation of activism prefers horizontal and informal modes of resistance that shy away from the ideological ideals of traditional opposition actors--a preference borne from the adaptive learning and social origins of activist youths. They seek to avoid the exigencies of repression and identity politics, but also find social meaning in the fluidity and formlessness of grassroots networks. By contrast, they avoid the bureaucratic formalization of more established actors like civil society associations and political parties, which lack credibility as effective vehicles for collective dissent.
The Pardee Papers, 2013
Many scholars have focused on the political factors (in particular, the desire for regime change and democratization) as central motivations for the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011. However, the Arab world is currently experiencing massive demographic crises, and policy makers must acknowledge the cultural pressures that have left this young generation trapped in a pre-adulthood phase of social status that prevents them from becoming fully engaged with Arab society. The inability of youth to access the opportunities promised in the social contract of adulthood—including quality education, viable employment, and marriage and family formation—has led to massive resentment motivating youth to actively seek change within their country and region. Countries which do not begin to address the cultural sources of youth frustration will find themselves vulnerable to continued unrest long after the Arab Spring dissipates, while the current youth generation runs the risk of becoming socially displaced in a region experiencing rapid economic and cultural development.
The Middle East Journal, 2018
Abstract:This article examines Bahrain's February 14 Coalition, an anonymous and decentralized youth movement that was formed during the small Gulf state's 2011 Arab Spring–inspired uprising. Drawing on fieldwork interviews and a content analysis study of the group's Facebook page, this article explores how the group uses its opaque organizational structure and strong social media presence to promote its off-line activities. In providing empirical data on the ideology, aims, and approach to activism of this important yet understudied group, this article questions prevailing sectarian narratives and makes the case for a more nuanced understanding of Bahrain's ongoing civil unrest.
2015
STRUCTURE OF MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION: YOUTH ACTIVISM IN TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND JORDAN AS CASE STUDIES Mohammad Yaghi Advisors: Professor Janine A. Clark University of Guelph, 2015 Professor Jordi Diez Professor Francesco Cavatorta This dissertation argues for a correlation between the dynamics of the protests at their climax and the processes of democratization in case these protests succeed. Using youth activism in Tunisia and Egypt where the protests succeeded, and in Jordan where they failed as a contrasting case study, this research shows that youth activism leads to democratization if three conditions are met at the protests’ apex: domination of autonomous youth movements, an inclusive master frame (MF), and a decentralized leadership. In doing so, the research provides an atypical narrative about the role of activists during the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. The primary sources that informed this research are not only based on the activists themselves, but also...
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