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Smart Card Security

Profile image of Damien SauveronDamien Sauveron

2007

Abstract
sparkles

AI

This paper discusses the security of smart cards, focusing on cryptographic protocols and algorithms, as well as vulnerabilities that arise from their physical implementation. It highlights different types of attacks, particularly man-in-the-middle and side channel attacks, detailing how attackers can exploit timing and power consumption characteristics to deduce sensitive information. The effectiveness of these attacks and the necessary countermeasures are examined, emphasizing the critical need for heightened security protocols in smart card applications.

Figures (7)
3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS
3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS
This is not a secure implementation due to the conditional test present in step 3. The setting on one bit in buffer Y will take a certain amount of time when the tested bit in buffer X is equal to 1. If a power consumption trace for this function is compared to a known key, for example all zeros, the point where the two traces differ will reveal the first manipulated bit that is not equal to the known key. In the case where the known key is all zeros where the power consumption diverges the manipulated bit of the unknown key is equal to one, and all previous bits were equal to 0. The power consumption trace can then be shifted to take into account the time difference due to this bit and the process repeated for the rest of the key. This can be avoided by implementing the bitwise permutation as shown in Al-
This is not a secure implementation due to the conditional test present in step 3. The setting on one bit in buffer Y will take a certain amount of time when the tested bit in buffer X is equal to 1. If a power consumption trace for this function is compared to a known key, for example all zeros, the point where the two traces differ will reveal the first manipulated bit that is not equal to the known key. In the case where the known key is all zeros where the power consumption diverges the manipulated bit of the unknown key is equal to one, and all previous bits were equal to 0. The power consumption trace can then be shifted to take into account the time difference due to this bit and the process repeated for the rest of the key. This can be avoided by implementing the bitwise permutation as shown in Al-
Figure I.2. Power consumption during the execution of a DES implementation. key (PC1) permutations have also been identified. The initial permutations can be distinguished due to the fact that they manipulate different amounts of data, i.e. the initial permutation will have 8 sets of patterns with 8 features and the initial key permutation will have 8 sets of patterns with 7 features (or 7 sets of 8 depending on the implementation).
Figure I.2. Power consumption during the execution of a DES implementation. key (PC1) permutations have also been identified. The initial permutations can be distinguished due to the fact that they manipulate different amounts of data, i.e. the initial permutation will have 8 sets of patterns with 8 features and the initial key permutation will have 8 sets of patterns with 7 features (or 7 sets of 8 depending on the implementation).
gorithm I.2, where each bit is taken separately for buffer X and assigned to buffer Y. This is usually more time consuming than Algorithm I.1 as each bit needs to taken from the relevant machine word. It is not always possible to change an algorithm in this manner. The modu- lar exponentiation used RSA is an example of an algorithm that it is exceedingly difficult to secure against this type of attack as branches in the algorithm cannot be avoided. An example of a power consumption trace that shows the square-and- multiply algorithm is shown in [15]. difficult to secure against this type of attack as branches in the algorithm cannot
gorithm I.2, where each bit is taken separately for buffer X and assigned to buffer Y. This is usually more time consuming than Algorithm I.1 as each bit needs to taken from the relevant machine word. It is not always possible to change an algorithm in this manner. The modu- lar exponentiation used RSA is an example of an algorithm that it is exceedingly difficult to secure against this type of attack as branches in the algorithm cannot be avoided. An example of a power consumption trace that shows the square-and- multiply algorithm is shown in [15]. difficult to secure against this type of attack as branches in the algorithm cannot
1.3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS Figure I.3. Superimposed acquisitions of one clock cycle showing the data depen- dence of the power consumption.
1.3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS Figure I.3. Superimposed acquisitions of one clock cycle showing the data depen- dence of the power consumption.
Figure I.4. White and laser light fault injection equipment. I.3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS These three types of attack cover everything that an attacker could hope to do to an algorithm. In most cases it is not usually possible for an attacker to create all of these possible faults. Nevertheless, it is important that algorithms are able to tolerate all types of fault, as the fault injection methods that may be realisable on a given platform are unpredictable. While an attacker might only ever have a subset of the above attacks available, if that attack is not taken into account it may have catastrophic consequences the security of a protocol or algorithm.
Figure I.4. White and laser light fault injection equipment. I.3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS These three types of attack cover everything that an attacker could hope to do to an algorithm. In most cases it is not usually possible for an attacker to create all of these possible faults. Nevertheless, it is important that algorithms are able to tolerate all types of fault, as the fault injection methods that may be realisable on a given platform are unpredictable. While an attacker might only ever have a subset of the above attacks available, if that attack is not taken into account it may have catastrophic consequences the security of a protocol or algorithm.
Figure I.5. The DES round function for round n. 1.3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS
Figure I.5. The DES round function for round n. 1.3. SMART CARD SPECIFIC ATTACKS

Key takeaways

  • Smart cards can also be attacked by inducing a fault during their normal processing to change the chips behaviour.
  • This attack was conducted against a PC implementation but a similar analysis can be applied to smart card implementations.
  • possible combinations an attack by simple power analysis would be extremely difficult.
  • The first example of a theoretical fault attack was presented in 1997 [7] as a method of injecting faults in to RSA signature generation when using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
  • This implies a significant overhead when implementing cryptographic algorithms for smart cards but is necessary to defend against modern attack techniques.

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