A força oculta: um estudo sobre a causalidade em hume

The Humean Mind. Routledge (2018) , 2018

The last few decades have witnessed intense debates in Hume scholarship concerning Hume’s account of causation. At the core of the “old–new Hume” debate is the question of whether causation for Hume is more than mere regularity, in particular, whether Hume countenances necessary connections in mind-independent nature. This chapter assesses this debate against the background of Hume’s “foundational project” in the Treatise. The question of the role and import of Hume’s account of the idea of cause is examined and compared with Hume’s treatment of other ideas.

British Journal of Multidisciplinary and Advanced Studies, 2023

Hume's construal of causation historically lays out a philosophical puzzle towards realism and anti-realism; in fact, this scholarship deliberately offers a bit of thoughts for causal realism-in virtue of the Old Hume and New Hume debate, as well as its contextual language. Nevertheless, this dialectic is significantly underestimated by plenty of counterexamples such as empiricism, liberty and necessity, the immateriality of the soul, and copy principle. In response to these brainstorming facets, this research article intends to determine that Hume is a causal anti-realist; I have, in turn, explored three supporting arguments to defend the compelling idea: conventional manifestation of causality-Hume's advocacy of necessary connection-the idea of liberty and necessity. However, this critical study is restricted to examine other substantial reflections on those which are included in the compositions of Treatise and Enquiry.

Kriterion, Belo Horizonte, nº 124, Dez./2011, p. 355-364, 2011

Of the several theories of causation current in our days, Hume is said to be the inspiration of two of the most influential and accepted: the regularity theory, first clearly formulated by Thomas Brown in 1822, and the counterfactual theory, proposed by David Lewis in 1973. After a brief outline of the comparative merits and difficulties of these two views, I proceed to examine whether Hume’s own treatment of causation actually corresponds to any of them. I will show that his first definition of cause, coupled with his rules by which to judge about causes and effects, contains elements that, properly developed, allow us to address successfully some traditional difficulties of the regularity view of causation, without resorting to the conceptual resources employed in the counterfactual approach. Therefore, we can properly classify Hume as an advocate of the conception of causation as regularity, noting however that his primary goal in his research and definitions of the concept was to provide not so much an analysis of causation as such, but of causation as we apprehend it, in the form of our ability to make causal inferences and refine them to reach the more sophisticated causal reasonings that are required in the theoretical and practical issues of life. Das diversas teorias da causação existentes em nossos dias, Hume pode ser considerado o precursor de duas das mais influentes e aceitas: a teoria regularista, formulada claramente pela primeira vez por Thomas Brown, em 1822, e a teoria contrafatualista, proposta por David Lewis em 1973. Depois de um breve resumo dos méritos e dificuldades comparativos dessas duas perspectivas, passo a examinar se o tratamento de Hume da causação corresponde, na verdade a algum deles. Mostro que a sua primeira definição de causa, juntamente com suas regras para julgar sobre as causas e efeitos, contém elementos que, devidamente desenvolvidos, permitem-nos abordar com sucesso algumas dificuldades tradicionais da visão de regularista da causação sem recorrer aos recursos conceituais empregados na abordagem contrafatualista. Podemos, portanto, classificar corretamente Hume como um defensor da maneira de conceber a causação como regularidade, observando, porém, que o principal objetivo de sua pesquisa e definições do conceito foi o de fornecer, não tanto uma análise de causação, como tal, mas da causação tal como nós a apreendemos, como nossa capacidade de fazer inferências causais e refiná-las para alcançar os raciocínios causais mais sofisticados que são necessárias nas questões teóricas e práticas da vida.

A specter is haunting Hume scholarship: the specter of the “New Hume.” Contrary to more traditional interpretations, according to which Hume rejects belief in any conception of causation that invokes (metaphysically) necessary connections between distinct existences, proponents of the New Hume hold that Hume at the least allowed for the possibility of such connections—it’s just that he thought we couldn’t know much, if anything, about them, if we assume that they do exist. I will argue that the views of the “New Humers” (as I shall call them) are mistaken. I will begin by discussing their reading of Hume on causation, using Galen Strawson as a foil. I then examine the relation between Hume’s view of relations (pun intended) and his account of “necessary connexions”. Next, I argue that this account, once properly understood, shows that he did not believe in what we would think of as necessary connections while at the same time explaining why, as the New Humers point out, Hume sometimes writes in ways that can make it sound like he does, as well as reconciling Hume’s two definitions of causation. After that, I answer objections, and then raise some doubts about Hume’s account before finally concluding the paper.

We give a brief introduction of Hume’s epistemology and his penetrating analysis of causality. It is pointed out that there are some flaws in his epistemology and his theory of causation. Alternative theories of causation are then briefly introduced. Partly inspired by Hume’s analysis of necessary connexion, we present a new argument of causation. We argue that Hume’s removing necessary connexion from causality can help to provide a promising way to unify the law of causality and indeterminism. We then propose a generalized principle of causality, according to which there are two kinds of causes: concrete causes and universal causes, and correspondingly there are two kinds of effects: lawful events and random events. Each actual effect is composed of both lawful element and random element. A detailed analysis of the motion of objects is also given to support the new principle.

2000

Hume presents two definitions of cause in his Enquiry which correspond to his two definitions in his Treatise. The first of the definitions is ontological and the second is psychological; indeed, the definitions are extensionally and intensionally distinct. The critical mistake of the skeptical interpretation is the assumption that the two definitions are equivalent, and the critical mistake of the necessitarian is the assumption an association of ideas can be had from one experiment. This paper attempts to clarify Hume’s finally considered position of causality.

2018

One of the most important causes for comparative studying on philosophical systems is to find their commonalities for responding common questions and to emphasize on their differences for taking functional answers encountering modern philosophical challenges and problems. Here, causality is chosen as the case study. Causality is of the basic philosophical issues that have been continually considered by both Islamic and Western philosophical traditions, but the answers which have been rendered by modern western philosophers with empirical approach and Muslim philosophers, like Mulla Sadra, with intellectual and intuitive approach, is necessitated to compare such answers and clarify the efficacy of each one towards the other one. Mulla Sadra’s philosophical, intellectual and illuminative thought in Islamic tradition, in comparison to Hume’s modern empirical and phenomenal tendencies, is able to remove fundamental ahead problems concerning causality and to answer skepticism derived fro...