Rationalism and Necessitarianism

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1986

The principle of sufficient reason (P S R) is probably the most important but the least understood of Leibniz's principles. References t o the principle in Leibniz's work tend to be ambiguous, and commentators have, as a result, differed regarding its interpretation and its role in Leibniz's thought. A proper understanding of the PSR is essential to a proper comprehension of the roles of and connections between Leibniz's logic and metaphysics. Leibniz sometimes gives the impression that the principle is a purely logical one, derived from or identified with the principle that all truth is analytic (i.e. explicitly or 'virtually'reducible to first truths or identities). At other times, he gives the impression that it is a metaphysical principle: For example, in the letters to Clarke and elsewhere, Leibniz formulates the PSR as the principle that God does nothing without a reason.1 The PSR is also used as a principle of (efficient) causation: that nothing can exist, nor event occur, nor state of affairs obtain, without a cause. In fact, as we shall see, the logical and metaphysical interpretations all involve legitimate formulation of the principle. Nevertheless, Leibniz treats the PSR a s a single principle, and it is important to see how, despite the diverse formulations, he can d o so. To that end, I will show how God and the system of pre-established harmony play central roles in the unification of the PSR. During this century, reflecting the prominence of logic in contemporary philosophy, logical formulations of Leibniz's PSR, under which it is part of his definition of truth as containment of the predicate concept in the subject concept, have come to the forefront of discussion. Indeed it is accepted by many commentators as the primary or "deep" version of the principle. For some commentators (e.g. Couturat2 and Russell3)), this focus resulted in an attempt to reduce what they take to Lois Frankef(Ph. D. Universiry of Cal$urnia, Berkeley. 1980)has written on Descarfes, Leibniz, and Anne Conuay. and is currenr1.v researching [he evolurivn of the concepr of causarion in the sevenreenlh and eighreenrh cenruries. 31 This is not to deny that there are a number of passages, especially in Leibniz's later writing, which suggested that for contingent truths, the deductioncannever becompleted. Nevertheless, he still holds that each contingent truth has a deductiveprocess converging to an identity. 32 NE IV xvii 3: G v 457/RB 475 33 See Benson Mates, "Leibniz on the Phaedo", Akren des [I. Infernationalen Leibniz-j4 See also, Of the Radical Originarion of Things: G vii 302/ L 486 3) New System of Nature 14: G iv 484/ W I 14f 36 Specimen Dynamicum: G M vi 242/ W I3 I 37 Specimen Dynamicum: GM vi 242/ W 132 38 On Nature Ilself3: G iv 505/ L 499 39 G iv 5231 L 496 40G iv 518/L 493

Nicholás, Juan A. (ed.): Leibniz und die Entstehung der Modernität, Studia Leibnitiana SH 37, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010, 111-120. This is a slightly modified and reworked version. Please do not quote

2022

In this short paper, I present an informal introduction to modality, accompanied by a brief survey of the three classical rationalists’ modal views. After a general introduction and a presentation of basic modal concepts, I expose some of the most common kinds of modality. This is followed by a basic introduction to modal epistemology. I then examine briefly the modal views of the classical rationalists. I conclude that commonalities emerge, while each one of them retains his distinctive unique features. Modality remains a vibrant area of research, both contemporary and historical. KEYWORDS classical rationalism, contingency, modal epistemology, modality, necessity, possibility

"Roczniki Filozoficzne" , 2017

The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate metho­do­logical and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology.

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2015

in a stimulating recent paper, "violations of the principle of Sufficient Reason (in leibniz and Spinoza)," Michael Della Rocca argues that rationalists face a daunting dilemma: either abandon the principle of Sufficient Reason or embrace a radical, parmenidian-style monism. The present paper argues that neither historical nor contemporary rationalists need be afraid of Della Rocca's dilemma. The second section reconstructs Della Rocca's argument in five steps. The third section argues that leibniz's treatment of relations undermines one of those steps in particular and thus provides him-as well as contemporary rationalists-with a way out. The fourth section argues that a similar way out is available to Spinoza, and that it's a better way out than either of the two options Della Rocca offers on Spinoza's behalf. The essay concludes with an historically-minded suggestion for those eager to revitalize the once-again popular notion of grounding.

Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, 2012

Faith and Philosophy, 1993

Oxford Handbook of Spinoza

This chapter investigates Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and its role in his system. What sorts of things does Spinoza think require a cause or explanation? What counts, for him, as a cause or explanation? The PSR is often associated with doctrines such as necessitarianism, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the Principle of Plenitude, and the existence of God. Some commentators have alleged that Spinoza's commitment to the PSR leads him to accept all of these doctrines. This paper examines each of these doctrines as they pertain to Spinoza's commitment to the PSR and his metaphysics more generally.

HUMBLING THE RATIONAL: A HUMEAN CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ'S PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON, 2018

"Why is there something rather than nothing?" asked 17th-century polymath and philosopher G.W. Leibniz. Indeed, it is this query which still looms over metaphysics today. To Leibniz, the fact that every effect has a cause led to his commitment to what philosophers refer to as the principle of sufficient reason. However, does every derivative genuinely derive from some derivation? If not, what ramifications would this error have on the Leibnizian project? This piece will begin with an explication concerning some main instances in the Leibnizian corpus, where Leibniz gives argumentative support for the principle of sufficient reason. Next, this article will enter the perspective of 18th-century philosopher David Hume, who by denying the sturdiness of causal relations, assisted in jeopardizing this backbone of Leibnizian thought. Lastly, this essay will close with support for Hume's account of causality over Leibniz's, by drawing the reader to consider the problems uncovered by Hume, and their impact on Leibnizian metaphysics, via discrediting the principle of sufficient reason.