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2000, Hsi Lai Journal of Humanistic Buddhism
Humanistic Buddhism may be viewed as Mahayanist interpretation and understanding of the original teachings of the Buddha and the early teachings of Buddhism, not from a sectarian perspective but from the perspective of a teaching that grows and develops in a manner that is integrative and organic. One may come to the opinion, quite correctly in my view, that Humanistic Buddhism derives both from the Buddhist experience in China - what Jonathan Z. Smith terms locative religion - and from the universal or timeless Buddhist experience as derived in the Pali texts - what Smith terms utopian religion. It is to the universal and timeless portion of Humanistic Buddhism that the rest of the paper turns its attention: ethics. The paper compares Judea-Christian ethics with those of the Buddhist tradition and concludes that although the ethics of both traditions are remarkably similar, there are fundamentally different paths and interpretation s that lead to these similarities . The remainder of the paper will discuss these differences, with special emphasis on the significance of Dependent Origination and karma.
A survey of social issues and challenges with a description and appraisal of some responses from Buddhist institutions
Journal of Religious Ethics, 2011
I argue that three recent studies (Imagining the Life Course, by Nancy Eberhardt; Sensory Biographies, by Robert Desjarlais; and How to Behave, by Anne Hansen) advance the field of Buddhist Ethics in the direction of the empirical study of morality. I situate their work within a larger context of moral anthropology, that is, the study of human nature in its limits and capacities for moral agency. Each of these books offers a finely grained account of particular and local Buddhist ways of interpreting human life and morality, and each explores complex conceptions of moral agency. I suggest that these three studies share similar interests in moral psychology, the human being across time, the intersubjective dimensions of moral experience, and what life within a karmic framework looks like. I propose that their contributions offer some of the most refreshing and interesting work generated in Buddhist ethics in the last decade.
In this paper the author tries to understand the character of Buddhist ethics, with its individual and social aspects and bring out the implications of Buddhist ethics to Buddhist meditation. Having tried to bring out the anti-dogmatic rational character of Buddhist ethics, he argues that the latter can be called consequentialist and utilitarian. Since Buddhism emphasises the roots of ethical and unethical actions in mind and hence accepts purification of mind as the moral goal, Buddhist theory of meditation can be understood as an extension of the Buddhist moral psychology, as an important aid to moral purification of mind rather than as a means to the achievement of a metaphysical goal. Similarly the arhat ideal as well as the bodhisattva ideal can be understood as the forms of moral perfection with meditative realisation of the goal as one of its dimensions.
Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna, 2018
The article attempts to illuminate the ethical perspectives of Buddhism (dividing into four sections) by exploring the true nature of moral elements, which form the foundation of Buddhist philosophy. The ethical concerns of Buddhism give more emphasis on renunciation and a selfless attitude towards constructive and spiritual moral development. All its concerns are related with the problem of human suffering. Only human being's sincere effort can remove human suffering and can attain to a life totally free from all miserable conditions. Human being is enough to become master of all. To understand our action and conduct in every phase of our life is the core element of Buddhist moral principles. Buddhism is a system found wholly characterized by the ethical principle seeking the meaning of life in life itself. It is mainly based on the ethical way of living and prescribes rigorous codes to promote the living of a virtuous life.
Digital copies of this work may be made and distributed provided no change is made and no alteration is made to the content. Reproduction in any other format, with the exception of a single copy for private study, requires the written permission of the author.
2017
Intentions and actions are basic elements in Buddhist ethical models. Yet, how are the values of those decided? This article asserts that some of the inherent qualities of lived experience are the basic factors that determine the value of ethical motives and ethical behavior. The examination of Buddhist descriptions of lived experience reveals two complementary types of inherent values-values that accompany individual phenomena and values that indicate structural aspects of human consciousness. Both types manifest certain inherent possibilities of awareness that are necessary for the appearance of ethical values. The first kind of inherent values consists of distinct feelings and volitions, while the second kind includes dualistic and non-dualistic aspects of awareness. By considering these two kinds, it becomes possible to understand how ethical
Normativity in Bioethics, 2020
This paper argues that normativity in Buddhism is constituted by a thorough going kind of naturalism and teleology. An action is good in Buddhism just in case it is conducive to the main goal of being a Buddhist, that is, becoming released from sufferings or dissatisfactory conditions (dukkha) thereby gaining a release from the bondage of the cycle of life, death and rebirth (saṃsāra). This is a sketch of an ethical theory which I call ethical teleological naturalism. The theory is also pragmatic in nature because the emphasis lies on how to achieve the desired goal. Buddhist ethics is also strongly connected to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology because in order to gain liberation from the cycle one needs to gain full knowledge of what ultimate reality is like. This interpretation of Buddhist ethical thought is thus akin to that of Damien Keown in one respect, namely that the Buddhist theory is comparable in many ways to ancient Greek ethical theory, but Keown sees Buddhist theory to be similar to virtue ethics whereas I see the theory to be more akin to Stoicism as well as Spinoza's ethical theory. The latter half of the paper discusses how this pragmatic and teleological nature of Buddhist normative theory plays out in bioethics. §
Journal of Religious Ethics, 2023
This essay defends a Buddhist answer to the question of how a skeptical tradition might account for its moral position. Two domains in Buddhist thought and practice are often considered to be dissimilar, perhaps contradictory. On the one hand, there is an aspiration to nirvana and a philosophy that describes everything as "emptiness" and rejects, with apparent universality, "attachment to views." On the other hand, Buddhist traditions of practice recommend actions based in compassion and loving kindness, and the cultivation of contentment, introspective awareness, and peace of mind. It is argued that these arenas are not in conflict, but are linked through Buddhist psychology, wherein the proven limitations of concepts are quite explicitly leveraged to show that beings hampered by such limits ought to think and act with epistemic humility. The result is not nihilism, but a method for improving our perspectives on ourselves and our society-a method that may serve as a model for humanistic research.
Hsi Lai Journal of Humanistic Buddhism, 2002
Ethics is a subject that is taking on increased importance in various areas of human activity, especially with new challenges in the biological sciences, business, commerce, and trade. Like many fields of inquiry, the principles are clearly defined, but it is in the details that disagreements abound. This paper focuses on ethical action in Theravada Buddhism. To do so requires a definition of ethics and morals on the one hand, and ethic and moral on the other. It also requires a discussion of the difference, if any, between moral actions and other normative actions, such as law, rituals, customs, and etiquette. When applied to Theravada Buddhism, we find that some linguistic difficulty exists regarding a translation of ethical actions into the Pali or Sanskrit languages. Although terms exist, they are not informative in defining the range of actions that we expect such actions to encompass. In this regard, certain axiomatic statements are introduced that serve as a basis of moral ac...
Brodetskyi O. Axiological dominance of Buddhist humanistic ideas in terms of searching strategies of interreligious tolerance / O. Brodetskyi // International Journal of Economics and Society. – Memphis, USA: ICES Foundation, 2015. – Volume 1, Issue 1. – Pp. 160-164.
This article deals with the ethical ideas of classical Buddhism in terms of their semantic correlation with the humanistic values of other religious traditions and philosophical systems. The author synthesizes ideological heritage of the classical Buddhism (particularly guidelines of "Dhammapada" and a number of parables) as well as of modern ethical and philosophical discourses of the religion. The article gives a defi nition of the role of axiological resource in Buddhist ethics in terms of understanding and developing strategies to solve urgent problems and overcome the present crisis of spirituality, bring tolerance into interreligious phenomenon, proves denial of a number of stereotypes about the Buddhist ethical heritage to be rational. The author justifi es the thesis that Buddhism (both philosophical and anthropological doctrine) has an effective potential of moral enthusiasm and constructive interaction in social initiatives with other religious confessions and philosophical traditions, oriented towards practical humanism and its social implementation. That's the exact image of humanistic Buddhism that should be taught as primary at religious and moral education.
Religion Compass, 2007
This essay considers some of the important trends in comparative approaches to Buddhist moral thinking, including early reflections on how and where to place Buddhist thought. It argues that some of the formative gestures shaping the field of Buddhist ethics sprang from contested efforts by historians of religion and philosophical formalists to chart a comparative methodology. The essay describes the methodological holism that characterizes important work in the field and argues against it, pointing instead to more diffuse lines of inquiry that do not efface Buddhism's historical diversity and the distinctiveness of its moral discourses. The essay begins to develop a different orientation in ethics that centers on the ethical study of human nature. To this end, it offers a small exercise in comparative moral psychology to explore the moral sentiment "sympathetic joy."
Philosophy East and West, 2011
2004
This article surveys two sources of ethics in Therāvada Buddhism. Firstly, it briefly surveys the texts that record the process of the proclamation of training rules. Secondly, it investigates the main events which provoked proclamation. This process of setting down an ethical standard itself emerges from both an intuitive sense of ethics held by society and the realized ethics of the Buddha. Further, though the proclamation of the 227 vows is designed to restrain physical and verbal action, the underlying purpose of the vows is to control the mind’s motivating unethical action. This survey will show that of the three roots of ignorance, aversion, and attachment, the vows are primarily directed to eliminating the root of attachment. The Buddha’s declaration of ethical rules was seen as one of his two fundamental responsibilities. He states in the Suttavibhaṅga: “The enlightened ones, the lords, question the monks concerning two matters, either ‘Shall we teach dhamma?’ or ‘Shall we d...
The running debate whether or not puñña and kusala refer to the same class of actions evinces a lack of clarity over the meaning of puñña, accompanied by unwarranted assumptions about motivation and by a tendency to conflate “karmic” results with what we would today consider ordinary consequences, that is, roughly, those accruing through material, social or psychological processes. The present paper reviews the contributions of Keown, Velez de Cea, and Adam to the discussion, then argues that in the Nikāyas “puñña” almost always refers to the force of goodness generated by certain actions and issuing in pleasant karmic results, rather than to a class of actions; that in spite of the Buddhist belief that puñña is gained, such actions are not typically motivated by craving; and that conflating karmic results with ordinary consequences hampers our ability to understand Buddhist ethics. It is suggested that questions about the relations among the cluster of concepts that make up the mythology of kamma and vipāka, and their relationship to what we call morality or ethics, be asked anew.
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 2021
This article defends and develops the categorization of Buddhist ethics as moral phenomenology. It first examines the use of the term in Western philosophical settings and compares it to how the term is employed in Buddhist settings. After concluding that Western ethical comportment and Buddhist moral phenomenology are commensurate terms, it explores how moral phenomenology has been understood in Buddhist contexts and considers the evidence scholars have used to make this interpretation. The article then looks to the Tibetan Buddhist tradition for further evidence of a moral phenomenological approach to Buddhist ethics and analyzes further proof of this interpretation. Finally, issues that emerge from a moral phenomenological approach to ethics are addressed from a Tibetan Buddhist perspective to strengthen this interpretation and offer moral phenomenology as a viable alternative ethical system.
Keynote lecture delivered at conference on ‘Contemporary Perspectives on Buddhist Ethics’, Columbia University, New York, October 6th 2011.
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