Strict Vegetarianism is Immoral

This paper discusses Peter Singer's strict ethical vegetarianism. I argue that utilitarianism does not provide sufficient grounds for vegetarianism to be presented as an ethical obligation. I argue that the boycott style of vegetarianism advocated by Singer is not an effective means of reducing the suffering experienced by animals and, finally, demonstrate that the proper application of the principle of utility to our dietary choices requires the consumption of both ethically sourced meats and roadkill.

2018

Human eating habits are widely distinguished between Vegetarianism and Non-Vegetarianism, where former presumes themselves to be holding no moral risk toward nature and animals as they do not eat animal meats. However, if we examine it closely and thoroughly, every eating habits hold some or other moral risk. My paper is an attempt to unfold different arguments made in support and against the moral concern of Vegetarianism. Although it is impalpable to answer ‘What is morally good to eat?’, our discourse helps to bring forth different arguments to understand the moral concern of our eating habits.

A Critique of the Moral Defense of Vegetarianism, 2016

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Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2009

This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals' moral status.

In Konstantinos Boudouris (Ed.) Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society, 2018

There is a teeth-biting debate between vegetarianism and non-vegetarianism on human obligations towards animals. Vegetarianism appeals for equal and ethical treatment for animals whereas non-vegetarianism simply denies any such treatments considering that animals do not have a sense of morality. Non-vegetarianism seems to be ignoring some obligatory duties towards animals and undermines ethical arguments for animal rights. It does not provide sound reason for why humans should deliberately kill animals, painlessly or with least harm, for their own sake. It also overlooks the world economic situation of global hunger in which the use of the total food resources and distribution in terms of nutrition would be much more equitable if everyone was a vegetarian. This paper argues against non-vegetarianism and defends vegetarianism by making a claim that we do have moral obligations of certain kinds towards animals same as we have moral obligations towards us in terms of natural right to survival.

Philosophy, 1978

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2016

In this essay, we argue for dietary veganism. 1 Our case has two steps. First, we argue that, in most circumstances, it is morally wrong to raise animals to produce meat, dairy products, most eggs (a possible exception we discuss is eggs from pet chickens) and most other animal food products. Turning animals into food, and using them for their byproducts, causes serious harms to animals that are morally unjustified: that is, the reasons given to justify causing these kinds of harmsgoods or alleged goods that result from animal farming and slaughterare inadequate to justify the bad done to animals. This is true for both conventional 'factory farming' methods of raising and killing animals and small-scale, boutique animal farming and slaughter: so-called 'humane' farming is actually inhumane and is wrong. Some will conclude from this argument that each individual has a moral obligation to be vegan because they are morally obligated to not support wrongdoing. Our second step supports that reasoning. It is often morally wrong to support those who act wrongly. So, when it is wrong to produce a particular product, it can be wrong to purchase or use that product or otherwise encourage the product's production. We develop a plausible general moral principle concerning when consumers are obligated not to purchase a product. This principle justifies a moral obligation to not support the wrongful treatment of animals by purchasing or consuming animal food products. Thus, it's wrong to not be a vegan. We discuss a variety of attempts to explain why these harms to animals are morally justified, that is, alleged good reasons to justify treating animals badly. Focusing on some of the most philosophically challenging justifications, we argue that none succeed: no defense points to goods that justify the serious harms done to animals, and so these harms are unjustified. Arguments for veganism often appeal to many other considerations, such as personal and public health, environmental protection, and world hunger, but our arguments do not appeal to them. Some of these concerns support steps toward veganism but, unlike harm-based concerns, 1 While the focus of our essay is on our dietary obligations, we believe our arguments can be extended to 'lifestyle veganism,' e.g., not buying and wearing leather and not buying and using personal care products tested on animals. Unlike arguments for veganism that appeal to 'equality' for animals, animal 'rights' or the 'moral status' or 'standing' of animals, 4 this argument depends on an uncontroversial moral principle that most people already accept: it is wrong to cause serious harms that are morally unjustified. 5,6 We use the concept of 'harm' in a regular, everyday sense. To harm someone is to make them worse off in some way. 7 Harms are bad for someone, at least when the harms are considered in themselves. We focus on harms because of their explanatory power in ethics. Imagine some of the worst ways that individuals can be treated. Why are these actions wrong? What is it about these actions that made them wrong? One fundamental answer is that the individuals affected by the action are harmed by them, it is bad for them to be treated those ways. 8 When we add that these harms lack justificationeither there was no benefit from the action, or too little of a benefit to justify the harm, or a benefit or good that otherwise does not

Between the Species, 2008

Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 1995