Rationality in Action: A Symposium

Frontiers in Psychology, 2014

Discusiones Filosóficas

In this paper, I shall attempt a characterization of Smith’s concept of ‘rationality’ in the practical sphere. My goal is to show that Smith’s requirements of rationality (as inspired by Williams) cannot provide a good and workable account of what it means to be a fully rational agent. To this end, I shall examine Williams’ internalist requirement on reason and discuss the main shortcomings of such account of rationality. I shall try to show, also, that Smith’s and Williams’ views on rationality are too restrictive and thus cannot be applied to ordinary agents who deliberate in real life.

Advocates of the theory of rational action are divided in regard to the version of the theory they accept. This paper distinguishes between a narrow version, claiming that the kinds of preferences and constraints to be used in explanations must be restricted, and a wide version imposing no such restrictions, and thus including beliefs, altruism, norms and social sanctions in explaining behavior. The paper begins by describing the major assump- tions of both versions and then discusses the key arguments that are adduced in favor of a narrow and against a wide version: (1) preferences and beliefs cannot be measured; (2) the wide version is tautological, circular, empty or trivial; (3) predictions with the wide version are difficult; (4) the assumptions of the narrow version are sufficient to explain behavior; (5) when problems are encountered, the narrow version should only be applied to situations where it works. It is argued that those arguments do not provide an adequate defense, and thus suggest that the narrow version is inadequate. The last part of the paper offers some methodological considerations, suggesting how different types of assumptions can be combined. KEY WORDS • bounded rationality • methodology • philosophy of social science • rational choice theory

Political Studies Review, 2018

Rationality is an enduring topic of interest across the disciplines and has become even more so, given the current crises that are unfolding in our society. The four books reviewed here, which are written by academics working in economics, political science, political theory and philosophy, provide an interdisciplinary engagement with the idea of rationality and the way it has shaped the institutional frameworks and global political economy of our time. Rational choice theory has certainly proved to be a useful analytic tool in certain contexts, and instrumental reason has been a key tenet of human progress in several periods of history, including the industrial revolution and the modernity that emerged in the nineteenth century. Given the complexity of our current challenges, however, is it time to ask whether this paradigm might be better complemented by more holistic and heterodox approaches? Hindmoor A and Taylor TY (2015) Rational Choice (Political Analysis), 2nd edn. London; N...

Deriving advice that can in fact be utilized by boundedly rational decision makers is a central function of modeling choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior of boundedly rational individuals. In view of such a causal role of theories we discuss how advice of a theory of boundedly rational behavior can become known, be followed among boundedly rational individuals and still be good advice. of explicating them an important one. Second, the actual use of the term "rational" varies so much that even the most careful description will not reveal a common conceptual core. Avoiding part of the challenge, traditional rational choice theorists have not paid much attention to the everyday or common use of the term "rational" or to actual behavior. They established their standards of rationality -thus fixing the meaning of the term "rational" -independently of or even counter to the facts. For instance, even if most individuals used the term "irrational" for characterizing polluting behavior in an n-person "public bads'" experiment, the typical rational choice theorist would tend to classify the participants' behavior as "rational". As a matter of fact, if many people should say that individuals who do not co-operate in a one-off classical two-person prisoners' dilemma situation are behaving "irrationally", this will not make the rational choice theorist think twice. If philosophers like Edward insist that "backward induction" in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma must be given up since it just cannot be rational not to co-operate at least to some extent in such situations, the adherent of theories of perfect rationality will remain unmoved. Her concept of "full rationality" is formed "deductively" rather than "inductively" and justified by a priori normative rather than a posteriori descriptive reasoning. Common usage of the terms "rational" and "irrational" as well as philosophical analyses starting from common intuitions seem simply misguided to the traditional rational choice theorist. She would claim that neither actual behavior nor actual usage of terms should determine the "proper" meaning of the term "rational" in a scientific or philosophical context. The "a priori" approach is clearly a possibility. But it must be noted, too, that by establishing standards of rationality independently of or counter to the facts, the rational choice theorist turns "rationality" into what may be called a "counterfactual concept". If we take such an approach to its extreme, we get a very refined rationality-concept that may be appealing to the theorist, in particular the decision and the game theorist. However, it neither relates directly to the understanding of real people, nor does it apply to their behavior, nor can it form

According to Popper’s rationality principle, agents act in the most adequate way according to the objective situation. I propose a new interpretation of the rationality principle as consisting of an idealization and two abstractions. Based on this new interpretation, I critically discuss the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it as an integral part of all social scientific models. I argue that as an idealization, the rationality principle may play an important role in the social sciences, but it also has inherent limitations that inhibit it from having the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it in all cases.

Philosophical Topics, 1993

Decision theory comprises, first, a mathematical formalization of the relations among value, belief, and preference; and second, a set of prescriptions for rational preference. Both aspects of the theory are embodied in a single mathematical proof. The problem in the foundations of decision theory is to explain how elements of one and the same proof can serve both functions.

2007

During the First World War a famous animal psycholo gist, Wolfgang Kohler, working on the island of Tenerife, showed that apes were capable of rational decision mak ing. In a typical experiment he put an ape in an environ ment containing a box, a stick, and a bunch of bananas high up out of reach. After a while the ape figured out how to get the bananas. He moved the box under the bananas, got the stick, climbed up on the box, reached up with the stick and brought down the bananas.1 Kohler was more interested in Gestalt psychology than in ratio nality, but his apes exemplified a form of rationality that has been paradigmatic in our theories. The idea is that rational decision making is a matter of selecting means that will enable us to achieve our ends. The ends are entirely a matter of what we desire. We come to the deci sion making situation with a prior inventory of desired ends, and rationality is entirely a matter of figuring out the means to our ends.

Noûs, 2019

In this paper, I propose that rationality consists in the rule of reason, where reason is understood in a quasi-Aristotelian sense as the set of capacities for recognizing favoring relations. To use John Broome's apt phrase, rationality is a matter of having one's mind in proper order. My claim is, roughly, that for our mind to be in proper order, we must form a competent take on reasons on the basis of available evidence and have the attitudes that correspond to it. I will focus here on practical rationality, though I believe the same model can be extended to theoretical rationality. The problem I'll address can be seen clearly by considering the following three familiar cases of practical irrationality together: Anna Anna must choose between having an operation today or tomorrow. She knows that an operation today would be mildly painful for five minutes, while an operation tomorrow would be mildly painful for seven minutes. Anna believes that she has most reason to choose to have operation today. Alas, she forms the intention to have the operation tomorrow. Beate Beate intends to buy new shoes today, and believes that to do so, she must leave right now. Alas, she doesn't intend to leave right now. Cecile 2 Cecile must choose between having an operation today or tomorrow. She knows that an operation today would be mildly painful for five minutes, while an operation tomorrow would involve an hour of agony. Alas, tomorrow is Tuesday, and Cecile believes that she has no reason to avoid pain on future Tuesdays. (She also knows that when tomorrow comes, she will wish she had chosen the less painful operation today.) Since she believes she does have reason to avoid pain today, she believes she ought to choose tomorrow's operation, and intends to do so. Neither this intention nor the underlying beliefs clash with her other attitudes. 1 Anna, Beate, and Cecile are all rationally criticizable for their intentions. Some might think that Cecile isn't irrational, but I agree with Derek Parfit (2011) that insofar as we use the term in its ordinary sense, we can't say that Anna is irrational but Cecile isn't-after all, her choice is much more foolish. The best kind of theory of rationality would give a unified explanation of all these cases. But it is not trivial to do so. The scenarios pull in different directions: Anna's case highlights the rational significance of our own take on reasons, Beate's suggests that it is a kind of formal coherence that matters for rationality, and Cecile's indicates that rationality requires some sensitivity to genuine reasons, at least when the pertinent facts are known. Different theorists of rationality take different intuitions as their starting point. Some hold that irrationality is a matter of going against one's beliefs about (right kind of) reasons for attitudes. That's what Anna does, but it seems we can judge Beate to be irrational whatever she believes about reasons, while Cecile's irrational intention actually matches her beliefs about reasons. Others hold that to be 1 The cases of Anna and Cecile are based on Derek Parfit's scenarios (2011, 120).