Ukraine and Putin's Post-Soviet Imperialism

Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" directed the world's attention to a nation formally brushed off as a Russian satellite state. The international press portrayed Victor Yushchenko's democratic challenge to the fraudulently elected Victor Yanukovych as the birth of Ukrainian independence. But though there's no doubt that Ukrainian civil society has come of age, is the independence movement as young as all that? The author gives a historical overview of Ukrainian relations with Russia, and argues that talk of an East-West divide along pro- and anti-Russian lines simplifies the reality of a culturally and ideologically eclectic nation.

Ukraine Analytica, 2021

In a realistic analysis of the status of national sovereignty of Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, the author argues that Russian aggression against Ukraine, post-Soviet frozen conflicts, and the U.S.-Russia antagonism have established the political, legal and military macrocontext in which Ukraine can develop for the foreseeable future. In this context, Ukraine can maintain its existing and even regain its pre-2014 level of sovereignty if it develops either as a buffer zone between the EU/West and Russia, or as NATO’s battering ram. The author concludes that the new Eastern Europe will remain a region of damaged national sovereignties with a high chance for new conflicts and poor chances for stable peace and socio-economic prosperity.

Revista de Științe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques, 2018

The current borders of Ukraine arose during the Soviet ruling of the country, different regions were incorporated into their territory from the 20s to the 50s of the last century due to the annexations and territorial transfers, that were made by the different leaders of Moscow. Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine achieved independence with a territorial extension that reaches all regions inhabited mostly by ethnically Ukrainian population. At the moment of independence most of its citizens put their regional problems aside to show themselves as a united country and so that Ukraine achieves international recognition as a new independent State. However, as time goes by the disagreements have resurfaced, which shows that these tensions continued existing although they seemed hidden for years. We need to keep in mind that to understand all these issues it is necessary to analyze how the historical evolution of the Ukrainian territory has been, yet it is not only about climatic differences or economic issues. For this reason, this paper aims to study the differences that have historically existed in Ukraine. These differences were caused by territories that once were part of other powers and now are integrated in Ukraine and by the influences received by external actors. It should be considered that most of the current conflicts come from there. Therefore, this contribution intends to show how, from the historical formation of the Ukrainian territory, the conflicts are taking place in the Slavic country. To carry out this study we will focus on a historical reconstruction of the national question.

Czasopismo Geograficzne, 2022

The Russian side often talks about the special ties between Russia and Ukraine. This assumption underlies the Russian geopolitical doctrine. Nevertheless, Ukraine does not share this view, wishing to be a sovereign and independent state. Russia cannot understand that, however, being stuck in its imperial myth and one-sided interpretation of former and today's determinants. Meanwhile, Russians and Ukrainians were moulded by different historical circumstances, which was manifested in the emergence of two distinct languages and national traditions. In addition, historical processes tied Ukrainians more closely to the freedom traditions of the West, while the Russians were much more exposed to the impact of the despotic East, which was one of the main factors behind the distinctive features of both nations. The existence within the borders of one state for 200-300 years did not erase these differences. The emancipation of people's masses that took place from the mid-19th century made the distinctive features more visible and had to lead to political divisions. For this reason, even the USSR was constituted as a union. This fact, however, did not prevent its dissolution. As a result, Ukraine has been an independent country for three decades. Russian actions counteracting these tendencies, strengthened even more the sense of distinctiveness of Ukrainians and their western civilisational and geopolitical orientation. Owing to this fact, Russia's integrative actions against Ukraine, carried out by imperial and despotic methods, are doomed to failure.

Abs t r a c t. The article determines the meaning of confrontation between the leading centers of international pressure. According to the geographical status, Ukraine can be the main confrontation object between the USA, Russia, and the EU in order to show their presence in the Eurasian region. Nowadays Ukraine is considered to be one of the key countries that can transform the world order. Ke ywords: Ukraine, Russia, the USA, EU, world order, world geopolitical centers, confrontation of great powers

Deleted Journal, 2023

Pax post-Sovietica? The Final end of Post-sovietness RAsA ČePAITIeNė The Ricochet of Leninopad and the second Wave of Desovietization of Lithuanian Public space TOMAs sNIeGON From state Terror to International conflict OLeKsANDRA GAIDAI 'eternal Russian-ukrainian friendship'-a case study of how a political concept was memorialized and is dememorialized yANA PRyMAcheNKO The twentieth-century colonialism within ukrainian Academic and Public Discourse in the era of Independence TesTIMONIes INTeRVIeW WITh JAKuB KuMOch how the Russian-ukrainian war broke out INTeRVIeW WITh ALexANDRu BuRIAN Moldova is a Multifaceted state in Terms of National Identity INTeRVIeW WITh seRGey TsyPLyAeV We are Aspiring Republicans ReVIeWs OLeKsANDR zAITseV history of ukrainian Nationalism Through the eyes of a czech historian ANDRzeJ GRAJeWsKI An Incomplete synthesis TABLe OF cONTeNTs arei issue 4 1 2023 9 FAREWELL TO IMAGINED POST-SOVIETNESS in bodies like the eurasian economic union, which is effectively about bilateral trade between the member states and Russia, but not actually between, let's say, Armenia and Belarus. so, there is a sort of very soviet tradition of Moscow and Russia acting as the gatekeeper to the post-soviet space. This is another aspect of what we regard as post-sovietness, but it is perhaps the most interesting one, and the war has really challenged it. Wojciech Konończuk: The Russian aggression against ukraine is actually a crucial moment in the discussion about post-sovietness because the disintegration of the post-soviet area is ongoing before our eyes. I would argue that notions such as a post-soviet area, a post-soviet region, or post-soviet states raise more questions than they answer. These are very misleading terms because we are talking about huge regions that had not been under Russian rule for long. Let's remember that some lands that belonged to the Russian empire before the First World War were united or conquered by the Russian empire only in the late nineteenth century. I'm talking about, e.g., part of Tajikistan. For most of the history of these regions of these countries, they were not part of the Russian empire or the soviet union. so, what we are actually observing is that, since 1991, the territory of the former soviet union has transformed into historical macro-regions that are completely different. We see a very different story in central Asia, in the caucasus, and in eastern europe. Another interesting argument we started to hear from ukrainian decision-makers and intellectuals-even before the full-scale Russian aggression-is that ukraine should be treated as part of central europe rather than eastern europe. For example, in October or september 2021, Dmytro Kuleba, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of ukraine, made a program statement that argued: "do not treat us as part of the eastern europe region, because our tradition, our history, our political culture is part of the central european region rather than something that is perceived as part of the traditional Russian security sphere of influence". so, why is there actually a widespread perception of the region (which for some decades was part of the soviet union) as a post-soviet area? I would respond that this is a consequence of a lack of knowledge. however, there is a broader problem. When we look at Western historiography on Russia and the Russian empire, we discover thatat least until recent times-it has been very much focused on Russia (the history of Russia, the history of the soviet union, the history of Russians). I have many arguments for why we should not use the term 'post-sovietness'. Let me present some of them, starting with political systems. arei issue arei issue 12 Łukasz adamski academia that there are, let's say, post-soviet countries or lands of historic Russia. Botakoz Kassymbekova: Although I'm not a political scientist, in the context of the January 2022 uprising in Kazakhstan I had to give a lot of interviews for the German-speaking media, simply because nobody in Germany or switzerland knew anything about Kazakhstan. The term 'post-sovietness' invites you to not pay attention to other countries except Russia. however, it is not enough to know the Russian language to understand the region. studying the region with only the help of the Russian language means that one will have a Russocentric view of it because the huge narrative that is available only in its native languages would be missed. We need to learn other languages (Kazakh, uzbek, Georgian, etc.), which is a huge challenge. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz: I don't believe Russians consider themselves post-soviet, especially younger generations. But this notion is useful for the regime, and this usefulness has been changing over time. In the 1990s, the cIs-the commonwealth of Independent states-was seen in Moscow as a method to control former soviet republics. At the same time, in the 1990s cIs was already a tool for peaceful divorce between central Asia and ukraine. so, the people knew they could not emancipate quickly, therefore they looked at cIs as a way to move away from each other in a gradual and orderly manner. Although Moscow used to perceive cIs as a consolidation tool, now Putin and his regime seem to be sort of postmodern when it comes reconstructing something that cannot be the soviet union as it was, but the Kremlin can make political use of soviet legacy. I don't believe that Putin wants to recreate the soviet union. It is something else. And he no longer thinks about the post-soviet area as something that can be re-established as a homogeneous thing. I believe that the concept of Ruski Mir is sort of his response to this concept; however, it actually contradicts the post-soviet concept because it emphasizes the role of Russian-speaking people, and the Russian ethnic space (as seen by him) is considered something that should be under Russian control, for historical or other reasons. Łukasz Adamski: The croatians hate this concept, of course. Kataryna Wolczuk: exactly. so, while I'm trying to differentiate the post-soviet space, I'm replicating those biases and generalizations. Voice from the audience. I was surprised that there is still a question about whether we should use this whole post-soviet concept. It is a legacy of a certain perception of the soviet union. And it's an easy and arei issue 14 Łukasz adamski lazy concept. It's obvious that we shouldn't use the concept of post-soviet. Let me talk about Kazakhstan or Georgia, or ukraine. But should we use post-socialism? For Poland, for hungary? Łukasz Adamski: What I can add on my side is that we have a problem with the terms 'post-communist country' and 'new eu member states'. Poland, for example, has 18 years in the eu; Finland, I think 27; but Finland is a mature eu member, and Poland is a new eu member state. And there are lots of similar examples of inertial thinking, both in the academic community and in political discourse. Kataryna Wolczuk: When we talked about the commonwealth of Independent states, for example, as the organizing framework in the 1990s, very few people registered that ukraine was never a fully-fledged member of cIs because it never ratified it. There is one more aspect which I found very, very interesting. The post-soviet space concept includes the Baltic countries, where-from the Russian perspective-international law doesn't operate and doesn't apply. These countries are perceived as being outside of international law, not only in terms of multilateral uN agreements, but also in terms of actual bilateral agreements. Wojciech Konończuk: yes. One of the many paradoxes regarding post-sovietness is that nations that are now called post-soviet didn't want to be part of soviet Russia, the soviet union. The soviets conquered them. Now they don't want to be called post-soviet, but they're called post-soviet. so, for me, this is like an explanation of the Russian special right, the Russian special role. I don't think that if the Russian Federation collapsed, the nations which would emerge would be called post-Russian. Because what unites Poland and Finland is that they were part of the same state for more than a century, but nobody called Poland or Finland post-Russian states after 1918, right? Rather, they are post-imperial states. so, we should be careful in using this concept. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz: I believe the huge challenge for intellectuals and scholars is to leave their ivory towers. It is important to publish books and deconstruct or reconstruct the notion of post-sovietness, but it is equally or even more important to reach out to the public and explain that terms and frames matter. The public needs to be aware that 9 Pavlo Batycʹkyj (1910-1983): soviet military leader, hero of the soviet union (1965), Marshal of the soviet union (1968). he was born in Kharkiv and graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1938) and the Academy of General staff (1948). During World War II, he commanded the 1st and 2nd corps of the ukrainian front, and the 1st and 3rd corps of the Belorussian front. After the war, he occupied leading positions in the soviet Army. From 1965 to 1966, Batytskyi was Deputy chief of the General staff of the ussR Armed Forces; from 1966 to 1978 , he was commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, Deputy of the Minister of Defense. he died in Moscow. For more details, see EIU, I (2003), 200. 10 This refers to the events of so-called ʻBlack saturdayʼ (27 October 1962) when the u-2 American reconnaissance aircraft was shot down. arei issue 24 IntervIew wIth Prof. SerhII PlokhII last names: harbuz 11 and hrečko. 12 Let us have a look at the Red Army commanders' last names: we see not Malynovsʹkyj, 13 but hrečko! 14 All of them were ukrainian. There is nothing unique here. stalin had the same story with his own people from the caucasus. Khrushchev's pool consisted of ukrainian natives. since Putin came to power, positions of Russian power have been occupied...

On 26 August 1991, shortly after the failure of the communist putsch in Moscow and Ukraine's declaration of independence, Russian President Boris Yel'tsin's press secretary Pavel Voschanov announced on the president's behalf that Russia reserved the right to review existing borders among republics of the USSR (excluding the Baltic republics). It became apparent later that this statement, which was repudiated in short order, was neither an expression of short-term political ambitions nor a political gaffe.

Studies in Comparative Communism, 1992

In Ukraine, as in the other former Soviet republics, the failed August, 1991, putsch resulted in a sudden and dramatic change in the political situation. On August '24, 1991, the Supreme Soviet in Kiev proclaimed Ukraine an independent state subject to a referendum on December 1, 1991. The communist party was first suspended and then banned altogether on the basis of evidence that its leadership supported the putschists in Moscow. Several days later, the communist-dominated majority in the Supreme Soviet dissolved itself, shifting the balance of power to the democratic forces which, although often divided over tactics, have been united on the fundamental question of full independence and statehood. The Ukrainian referendum yielded an astounding 90.32 per cent vote in favor of independence, thereby sealing the fate of the Soviet Union. The new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was formed in December and is seen by many as the successor state to the Soviet Union, remains an unknown quantity. As Li&raturnaya ga:eta commcntcd in its first issue for 1992, the CIS lcadcrs are beginning to realize that thus far the Commonwealth does not cvcn exist on paper. The resignation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, argues the writers' weekly, in no way signifies the destruction of the center, but rathct "the transfer of lhc idea of central power into other I1ca&" l'ltc key issue, it continues, is the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. This is a polite way of saying that Russia has yet to come to terms with the loss of empire and that Ukraine, as in the past, continues to play a pre-eminent role in the search for Russia's identity. The Ukrainian-Russian Nexus Among the factors that have distinguished Ukraine from the other former republics is its size, economic potential, and geopolitical position. With a population of nearly 52 million, it is the second largest of the former republics after the RSFSR. Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, has almost double the population of ail of Estonia and equals that of Latvia, while Donetsk, one of the 25 oblasts, is considerably larger than Lithuania. The Ukrainian economy, ranked highest in a recent Deutschc Bank study of former republics,2 accounts for about one-fifth of the Soviet gross national income. Moreover, Ukraine occupied a strategic geopolitical position in the Soviet West that provided the Soviet Union with a "European" identity. In short, without

Routledge, 2017

This book is a unique contribution to scholarship on the sources of the conflict in Ukraine. Bringing together writers from Russia, Ukraine, Canada, the United States, Europe and Australia, it was provoked by a gathering of scholars and activists from all over Ukraine, held in Yalta, Crimea just after the conflict in Eastern Ukraine erupted. Challenging both the demonization of Russia which has become standard for Western writing on the topic, and the simplistic discourse of official Russian sources, this book scrutinizes the events of the conflict and the motives of the agents, bringing to the fore the underlying causes of the most critical flashpoints of the post-Soviet world order. This volume offers a refreshing, profound perspective on the Ukraine conflict, and will be an indispensable source for any student or researcher. I am uploading the Table of Contents and the Introduction