Explaining coincidences

2004

Can different material objects have the same parts at all times at which they exist? This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against the main argument to the contrary, the ‘Indiscernibility Argument’. According to this argument, the modal supervenes on the nonmodal, since, after all, the non-modal is what grounds the modal; hence, it would be utterly mysterious if two objects sharing all parts had different essential properties. The weakness of the argument becomes apparent once we understand how the modal is grounded in the nonmodal. By extending the ideas of combinatorialism so that we recombine haecceities as well as fundamental properties, we see how modal properties can be grounded in non-modal properties in a way that allows coincidence and yet also explains why there are differences in the modal properties of coinciding objects. Despite this, some de re modal facts are not grounded in the non-modal but instead are brute. However, although we cannot explain why ...

Axiomathes, 2022

It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called ''coincidences.'' The present paper takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, starting from Hart and Honoré's view of coincidental events (Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), this paper furnishes a more detailed account on the nature of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, that is the intersections between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects; where by ''epistemic'' we mean what is related, in some sense, to knowledge: for example, access to information, but also expectations , relevance, significance, that is psychological aspects. In particular, this paper investigates the role of the epistemic aspects in our understanding of what coincidences are. In fact, although the independence between the causal lines involved plays a crucial role in understanding coincidental events, that condition results to be insufficient to give a satisfactory definition of coincidences. The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. Many examples are offered throughout this paper to enforce this idea. This conception, despite-for example-Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod's view, entails that a pure objectivist view about coincidences is not tenable.

EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, 2011

I draw a distinction between coinciding observations and coincidence explanations. The naïve often see the former as evidence for denying the latter; sophisticates often disagree, pointing out that coincidence explanations are often perfectly sensible. Although the two parties diverge in how they interpret coinciding observations, they often implicitly agree that probabilistic modus tollens is a valid form of inference. I criticize this shared assumption and argue that model selection theory furnishes a better epistemology for reasoning about coincidences. A Familiar Dialectic The naïve see causal connections everywhere. Consider the fact that Evelyn Marie Adams won the New Jersey lottery twice. The naïve find it irresistible to think that this cannot be a coincidence. Maybe the lottery was rigged or perhaps some uncanny higher power placed its hand upon her brow. Sophisticates respond with an indulgent smile and ask the naïve to view Adams' double win within a larger perspective. Given all the lotteries there have been, it isn't at all surprising that someone would win one of them twice. No need to invent conspiracy theories or invoke the paranormal-the double win was a mere coincidence.

Nous, 2017

According to the traditional view of the causal structure of a coincidence , the several parts of a coincidence are produced by independent causes. I argue that the traditional view is mistaken; even the several parts of a coincidence may have a common cause. This has important implications for how we think about the relationship between causation and causal explanation—and in particular, for why coincidences cannot be explained.

Believers tend to view the experience of coincidences as evidence for a variety of paranormal beliefs in mind and mysterious causal mechanisms out in the world. On the other hand, skeptics (e.g. most psychologists) tend to dismiss the psychological experience of coincidences as just yet one more demonstration of how irrational people can be. Irrationality in this context means an association between the experience of coincidences and biased cognition in terms of poor probabilistic reasoning and a propensity for paranormal beliefs. In this article, we present a third way: the rationalist perspective on the psychology of coincidence occurrence. We develop this new emphasis, including a new definition of coincidence, out of reviewing and synthesizing the extant literature on coincidences. We then propose a new three stage model to describe the psychological experience of coincidence, the 3C's model: 1. (C)oincidence detection, 2. (C)ausal mechanism search 3. (C)oincidence versus cause judgment. The core principles in this model are that people use the same properties relevant for causal reasoning when detecting and evaluating events that are ultimately judged to be coincidental, and we describe how the model can account for the key prior research on coincidences. Crucially, rather than just being examples of irrationality, we argue that the experience of coincidences is a necessary consequence of rational causal learning mechanisms and provides a widely ignored approach to evaluating the mechanisms of causal reasoning.

Synthese, 2019

There are three families of solutions to the traditional Amputation Paradox: Eliminativism, Contingent Identity Theories, and Theories of Coincident Entities. Theories of Coincident Entities challenge our common understanding of the relation between identity and parthood, since they accept that two things can be mereologically coincident without being identical. The contemporary discussion of the Amputation Paradox tends to mention only one theory of Coincident Entities, namely the Constitution View, which violates the mereological principle of Extensionality. But in fact, there is another theory, namely the Unique Part View, which violates another mereological principle (the Weak Supplementation Principle). In this paper, I argue that the contemporary focus on the Constitution View is unmotivated, at least when we are confronted with the Amputation Paradox, and that a balanced comparison of the two views (as solutions to this specific paradox) should favour the Unique Part View.

Qualitative Research, 2019

In this article we develop an approach to coincidences as discursive activities. To illustrate the range of empirical questions that can be explored in the analysis of coincidence accounts, we examine one single written account, which was submitted to a website of a research project to investigate the statistical dimensions of coincidence experiences. Our analysis is broadly ethnomethodological in that we examine this single case to identify how structural and narrative components work to constitute the recognizably coincidental quality of the events so described. The analysis identifies a mirror structure that resembles chiasmus, a figurative device found in classical texts. The analysis also describes how the account is designed to address inferential matters related to the site to which it was submitted. In the discussion we reflect on the implications of this approach for other approaches to coincidence.

New Blackfriars, 1991

's piece in New Bfuckfriars, March 1991, raised a number of fascinating themes. In this article, inspired by his, I would like to bring together two areas of thought not usually connected: the study of chance and coincidence and the study of the function of the human mind in the construction of its own perceptions. The link between the two will be a consideration of the metaphysical status of literature. McDermott quotes Jacques Monod on coincidence: 'The convergence of two totally-independent causal chains of events, the convergence itself being causeless.' There is nothing unusual about either chain considered in itself. It is in the bringing together of the two chains that the coincidence lies. A coincidence only springs into existence when perceived by an appropriate, a 'skilled' observer. For example Leicester's Moslems were recently excited by the discovery of the word 'Allah', in Arabic script, formed by the seeds on the inside of an aubergine. Many were the speculations about what this article portended. Had that aubergine instead been opened in the Leicester of 1931, few would have realised that they were in the presence of wonders. Coincidence is a subject which many find fascinating and delightful. Arthur Koestler was overwhelmed with responses when he requested examples of coincidence stories from the public. Countless articles on coincidence have been written. Jung even attempted to establish a principle of acausal causation for coincidences, which he called synchronicity. Coincidence is a grey area of human experience. Obviously coincidences happen. Yet they are unpredictable in their

1997

We give a simple way of demonstrating that coincidences really are "out there", as probability theory predicts, if we take the trouble to look

Four dimensionalism is the philosophical theory that every object that exists has a temporal part at each moment it exists. Temporal parts are analogous to spatial parts: just as my hand is a (spatial) part of my body, the first year of my life is a temporal part of my whole life. Among the philosophers who endorse four dimensionalism, there is disagreement over how objects persist, or survive over a period of time. Some philosophers think that objects persist by having temporal parts at each moment they exist. The object is properly considered to be the sum of all those temporal parts. This is the view of perdurantism, which I defend in this paper. Some other philosophers believe that objects simply are the temporal parts themselves, rather than sums, or fusions of temporal parts. They persist by being related to other temporal parts in specific ways. This is the view known as the stage theory. My goal is to show that the stage theory requires us to accept too many philosophically problematic claims. Most of the discussion in this paper deals with the "puzzles of coincidence." Coincidence is said to occur when two distinct objects seem to be located in precisely the same place. There are actually two problems presented by these puzzles: (1) that ordinary physical objects seem to be prohibited by the laws of nature from being co-located, and (2) that the seemingly distinct co-located objects are composed of all the same physical parts. Both perdurantism and the stage theory offer solutions to these puzzles. I argue that perdurantism offers the better solution. Later in the paper, I offer other reasons not to accept the stage theory.