Peircean Pragmatism and Inference to the Best Explanation

In the current literature about Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) it is usual to treat it both as a synonym of ‘Abduction’ (or at least, intimately related with peircean Abduction) and as encompassing non-deductive inference. However, Peirce not only distinguished between abduction, induction, and deduction, he did it in the framework of a very peculiar idea of experience, in which ‘experience’ is understood as future-action-oriented, rather than past-cumulative-data, more proper of the empiricist tradition. As a consequence, these two philosophical attitudes have a very different understanding on the role of evidence in the inferences. The purpose of this presentation is twofold. On one hand, to propose three criteria to distinguish between Peircean Abduction and Induction and to explain the role that Peirce’s ideas of experience and evidence have in them. On the other hand, to contrast these criteria and philosophical framework with those proposed by contemporary IBE’s theorists.

Erkenntnis, 2000

It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is driven by three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What is behind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identification of "abduction" with "Inference to the Best Explanation" (IBE) begs the question, since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction. Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded.

Chinese Semiotic Studies, 2024

Peirce's pragmatic maxim is closely related to his conception of abduction. The acquisition of the actual effect required by the method of scientific reasoning expressed by Peirce's maxim must be accomplished by resorting to abductive logic. Abductive logic starts from a surprising fact, derives a hypothetical explanation about that fact, and finally arrives at the possibility that the hypothesis is true. This is the process of abductive reasoning, as provided by Peirce, which is distinct from induction and deduction and generates explanatory views. Peirce opposed a unified and unchangeable concept of causality. He used different interpretations of causality to illustrate the considerable differences in people's understanding of cause and effect in different periods. The concept of pragmatism, as developed from the pragmatic maxim to abduction and then to scientific inference to the best explanation, is precisely what Peirce initially proposed, and inference to the best explanation is the starting point and the final result of the pragmatic maxim.

Semiotica, 2005

I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton’s thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference.

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2024

One of the best-known aspects of Peirce's philosophy, even outside the circle of specialists, is his identification of a particular kind of inference, namely abduction, the kind of inference that generates hypotheses to account for phenomena that need explanation. Peirce's concept of abduction is not isolated, however. It is embedded in a broader theory of inference, which in turn is part of what Peirce called "logical critic." Richard Atkins' book is a thorough study of Peirce's theory of inference with an eye to contemporary debates in logic, epistemology and philosophy of science. The book is based on very solid research and stands out for its clarity and analytical depth. It will serve as a reliable and highly accessible guide to anyone interested in Peirce's logical ideas, even without prior knowledge of the author. At the same time, Peirce specialists will find in this book a whole range of highly original, illuminating, and sometimes provocative theses. The book has two parts. In chapters 1-3, Atkins discusses the general terms of the Peircean conception of inference, the classification of the three types of inference, and the concept of logical validity. In chapters 4-7 he then addresses the three types of inference, devoting one chapter each to deduction and abduction, and two to induction. The key philosophical element of Atkins' book is his emphasis on Peirce's idea that the three types of inference should be distinguished on the basis of what kind of "truth-producing virtue" they exhibit. Deduction has the virtue of "truth-preservation": its conclusion will always be true if the premises are true (94). Induction does not necessarily preserve truth, but has the virtue of being "truth-approximating in the long run" (2). That is, a valid induction may well yield a false conclusion from true premises, but it ensures that, if we stick to the same inferential procedure, we will get closer to the truth. Finally, abduction is "truth-conducive, provided there is any truth to be ascertained" (ibid.). As Peirce repeatedly says in his later writings, abduction is the only type of inference that generates new knowledge, and Atkins' book has the merit of insisting on this point. As he says, the core of abduction is that it "invents, selects and entertains hypotheses [...] It does not eliminate, corroborate or confirm them" (4). The description of the differing truth-producing virtues of deduction, induction and abduction ties in with two more core concepts of Atkins' book: the concepts of validity and strength of an inference. In the case of deduction, these two concepts overlap, because deduction is always truth-preserving, therefore each valid deduction is equally strong. In the case of induction and deduction, however, it is possible to have a valid inference that is weak (e.g. an induction performed on a narrow statistical basis, or an abduction that is "merely conjured" (284) and deprived of any real explanatory power).

There is little serious doubt about the role of inductive inference in scientific inquiry, as it has proven to allow knowledge to grow. The concerning lack of agreement, however, is about the justification of induction itself: Induction has been associated with fallible reasoning and therefore its reliability has been brought into question. Philosophers, famously Hume and Popper, have been very harshly critical of inductions, for reasons that will be spelt out below. This paper presents the philosophical stance of the pragmatistic approach of induction, championed by many philosophers and scientists, but most notably and interestingly in the cases of Charles Peirce (1839–1914, the famous polymath founder of Pragmatism) and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963, a prominent member of the Polish logical movement and Lvov–Warsaw School). These two philosophers belong to different historical periods of philosophical development, but share a common interest of ascribing priority to the practical consequences of adopting beliefs, attitudes, methods and practices. Both Peirce and Ajdukiewicz were brilliant logicians and, last but not least, both were deeply involved in the science of their time, for which direct experience in scientific endeavours helped them to contrast the value of their theoretical constructs. These facts make the establishment of a connection between the two philosophers philosophically interesting and illuminating, as their considerations on the value of induction seem to converge in the priority of a self-controlled scientific practice. In the following lines I will introduce STUDIA METODOLOGICZNE NR 35 @BULLET 2015

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 2013

The term “abduction” has been used with different meanings since its introduction in C. S. Peirce’s writings. It has been used to refer to inference to the best explanation, hypothetical inference, inference to new explanations, and a guessing-instinct. These meanings converge to solve a central problem: how do new ideas emerge in inquiry? Different authors defend different meanings of “abduction” which, in their view, resolve this fundamental problem. This article seeks to displace the central question of abduction in order to account more coherently for its different meanings in Peirce’s thought. It is argued that abduction is not concerned with the emergence of new ideas in reasoning but instead with how ideas are made to fulfill their logical purpose. Since the logical goodness of abduction is most directly treated in Peirce’s 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, this article first examines the link between abduction, pragmatism, and logical goodness in those lectures. This initial examination leads us to displace the central question of abduction, from “how do new ideas emerge?” to “how do ideas fulfill their logical purpose?”

The Method of Scientific Discovery in Peirce’s Philosophy: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction, 2011

In this paper we will show Peirce’s distinction between deduction, induction and abduction. The aim of the paper is to show how Peirce changed his views on the subject, from an understanding of deduction, induction and hypotheses as types of reasoning to understanding them as stages of inquiry very tightly connected. In order to get a better understanding of Peirce’s originality on this, we show Peirce’s distinctions between qualitative and quantitative induction and between theorematical and corollarial deduction, passing then to the distinction between mathematics and logic. In the end, we propose a sketch of a comparison between Peirce and Whitehead concerning the two thinkers’ view of mathematics, hoping that this could point to further inquiries.