Messy Morality: The Challenge of Politics * By C. A. J. COADY

Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2005

A common trait of all realistic political theories is the rejection of a conception of political theory as applied moral philosophy and an attempt to preserve some form of distinctively political thinking. Yet the reasons for favouring such an account of political theory can vary, a point that has often been overlooked in recent discussions by realism's friends and critics alike. While a picture of realism as first-and-foremost an attempt to develop a more practical political theory which does not reduce morality to politics is often cited, in this paper we present an alternative understanding in which the motivation to embrace realism is grounded in a set of critiques of or attitudes towards moral philosophy which then feed into a series of political positions. Political realism, in this account, is driven by a set of philosophical concerns about the nature of ethics and the place of ethical thinking in our lives. We argue that this impulse is precisely what motivated Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss to their versions of distinctively realist political thought. This is important to emphasise, we argue, as it demonstrates that realism does not set politics against ethics (a misunderstanding typically endorsed by realism's critics) but is rather an attempt to philosophise about politics without relying on understandings of morality which we have little reason to endorse.

Bamberg University Press, 2015

Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, are not much discussed. This collection includes essay which address from different and complementary points of view the issue of the social and political relevance of philosophical debates on realism.

TOPOI, 2024

One of the foremost methodological debates in contemporary political theory pits ‘political realists’ against ‘political moralists.’ This debate has proved nebulous, however, in part due its origins: moralism was largely a term coined by realists for the kind of political theory they reject, not a self-identifying tradition. Most of the realism-moralism debate has consisted of (a) realist critiques of so-called moralism, (b) critiques of realism by theorists who we might label as moralists, or (c) positive efforts to flesh out realism. Despite realist portrayals of moralism as the ‘dominant’ and ‘mainstream’ stance of contemporary political theory, this leaves the actual positive content of political moralism unclear. In this paper, I address this gap: clarifying what ‘political moralism’ might mean for those who adhere to it, distinguishing it from some possible positions that moralists are not committed to, and offering a moderate defence of moralism as a methodological approach to political theory. I also argue that this clarification of political moralism can help explicate two key ways in which political moralism might be taken too far – i.e., in which we might criticise political theories for being excessively ‘moralistic’. Most importantly, I argue that political moralism – properly understood – is not dichotomous with political realism, and that the differences between them are not technical, such that one camp can be dismissed as making some kind of methodological mistake, but substantive and ethical. The upshot is that the integration of moralism and at least many forms of realism is both possible and desirable.

European Journal of Political Theory, 2016

Political realism is frequently criticised as a theoretical tradition that amounts to little more than a rationalisation of the status quo and an apology for power. This paper responds to this criticism by defending three connected claims. First, it acknowledges the moral seriousness of rationalisation, but argues that the problem is hardly particular to political realists. Second, it argues that classical International Relations realists like EH Carr and Hans Morgenthau have a profound awareness of the corrupting effects of rationalisation and see realism as an antidote to this problem. Third, it proposes that Carr and Morgenthau can help us to recognise the particular ways in which realist arguments may nonetheless rationalise existing power relations and affirm the status quo by default, if not by design.

Philosophia, 2019

The realist complaint that contemporary political philosophy is detached from political reality is well-worn. Yet, whilst the general contours of the realist charge against what is termed 'political moralism' (Williams, 2002), 'the ethics first' or 'applied ethics' approach (Geuss, 2008; Sleat & Rossi, 2014), appear to be well understood, there exists confusion about what, exactly, is distinctive of realist thought (Galston, 2010; Horton, 2010; Sabl & Sagar, 2017). This much, Matt Sleat (2014) and Ed Hall (2015) suggest, is apparent in moralist accounts which elide realism with the ideal/non-ideal theory debate. But such confusion is also perpetuated by realists themselves who conflate realism with philosophical positions which are highly moralistic. This paper seeks to explore a neglected manifestation of this tendency and, in so doing, to go some way toward untangling the aforementioned problems. Specifically, it draws on the underappreciated realist thought of Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire and Judith Shklar 1 , rehearses their critique of moralism and extends it to a position which seems far from obvious a target: the standard dirty hands (DH) thesis, mostly owed to Michael Walzer 2 , which a number of contemporary realists, such as Mark Philp (2007), Duncan Bell (2010), and Hans-Jörg Sigwart (2013), have appealed to in their endeavour to challenge moralism and/or tackle the insufficiently addressed question of what a more affirmative, realist public ethic might involve. In illustrating that the DH thesis is a disguised brand of moralism, I shall not merely put some flesh on the bones of Shklar's scattered, unsystematic objections to Walzer's thoughtthe only realist who explicitly criticized his DH thesis. Rather,

2008

1. Morality, moralism, and realism 2. Moralistic strictures and political reality-further quandaries 3. Concerning ideals 4. Engagement in evil: politics, dirty hands, and corruption 5. Politics and lying

According to a particular view of political realism, political expediency must always override moral considerations. Perhaps the strongest defense of such a theory is offered by Carl Schmitt in The Concept of the Political. A close examination of Schmitt’s main presuppositions can therefore help to shed light on the tenuous relation between politics and morality. Schmitt’s theory rests on two keystones. First, the political is seen as independent of and prior to morality. Second, genuine political theory depends on a view of human beings as evil by nature. I will argue that both claims are incomplete. Just as the political sometimes demands that morality be overridden, so morality can demand the overriding of political expediency. Moreover, the view of human beings as evil, which serves as the foundation of political realism, itself depends on affirming that human nature must also be, in some sense, good. Political realism is thus shown to have its theoretical foundation within a normative framework that demands the political pursuit of at least some moral aims.