Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: A Morality of Immoralism

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) presents a radical and enigmatic approach to existentialism by over emphasizing the attributes of subjectivity of the individual over the group, community and God, especially the Christian God. This essays takes a critical appraisal of the major presuppositions of Nietzsche, especially as contained in his work Beyond Good and Evil (1886) which is a major amalgam of Nietzsche's works on existentialism. The essay concludes that notwithstanding the empowerment Nietzsche's gives to man through the Will to power and the concept Superman, his perspective on the absolute freedom and supremacy of man over human institutions which serve regulatory functions are counter-functional to social order as they obscure our thorough sense of morality.

Philosophy in Review, 2010

Sutanoc, 2025

This study examines morality as the underlying element running across Nietzsche's philosophic enterprise. It also critiques Nietzsche's idea of morality, with a view to showing that irrespective of his radical attempts to exonerate mankind from moral absolutism, he fails in disuniting humanity from such a tradition. Morality for Nietzsche is the standard of value which exists in an individual interpretation. Hence, an idea is merely a perspective and the possibility of moral absolutism should be set aside. For him, 'one morality for all' is detrimental to higher men. It is anti-nature and a threat to human excellence. Attempts are made, in this study, to critique Nietzsche's approach to undermine moral absolutism, especially the metaphysical foundation on which moral absolutism is established. This study adopts the method of historical hermeneutics and textual analysis.

Journal of Nietzsche Studies

This is a contribution to a symposium on Clark and Dudrick’s The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. I focus on three aspects of their book. First, I critique Clark and Dudrick’s claim that Nietzsche recognizes a discrete “will to value.” Second, I argue that Clark and Dudrick’s reading of Nietzschean drives (Triebe) as homunculi is indefensible. Third, I raise questions about their claim that Nietzsche understands the self as a “normative ordering” of drives, which they distinguish from a “causal ordering”; I suggest that Nietzsche would reject this causal/normative distinction.

This article examines the intrinsic relationship between Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of ‘beyond good and evil’ and his distinct view of the self. First, it focuses on Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of morality, and by scrutinising this historical account of moral valuations the article then endeavours to present Nietzsche’s concrete philosophical standpoint on the fundamental necessity of value judgments which are constantly realised by individuals in their interactions with each other and with life. In this regard, it discusses the strong need to differentiate Nietzsche’s dismissal of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals, as good and evil, from his firm advocacy for creatively and only personally actualised valuations of good and bad. After delineating this essential distinction, the article portrays how Nietzsche’s view of the becoming self is interconnected with his proposal of the formation of moral valuations beyond good and evil. Finally, it conclusively elucidates how Nietzsche considers the self’s endless revaluation of morals beyond good and evil for the affirmation of life as its primary means to attain the unity of its selfhood, and it further illuminates his comprehension of this process as the prerequisite step for the self to realise the unity of its selfhood in its endless becoming.

Dialogue, 2005

After publishing at his own expense the fourth and final part of his Thus Spake Zarathustra in May of 1885, Nietzsche faced a quite unprecedented literaryphilosophical task. What does one who has just published, in his considered opinion, the greatest thing ever written in German, or indeed in any language, a book that puts the Vedas, the Divine Comedy, and the works of Shakespeare and Goethe entirely in the shade, do for an encore? What does he write next, supposing he is bold, or foolish, enough to write anything? In the event, Nietzsche was surprisingly quick to provide the few dozen illuminati who thought well, or at all, of his work with Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) in 1886. And now, fifteen years after the publication of his much admired Zarathustra's Teaching (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), Laurence Lampert presents us with its natural follow-up, an interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil. Beyond Good and Evilis probably the most widely read and taught of Nietzsche's works. Less gnomic and bombastic than Zarathustra, more compact and accessibly organized than the great middle works (Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science), less dense and self-involved than the pamphlet-sized quintet from 1888 (Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, and Ecce Homo), and more comprehensive than either the blistering "supplement" to it, On the Genealogy of Morality, or the writings of the Basel period, The Birth of Tragedy, and the Untimely Meditations, BGE is the obvious answer to questions such as: "Which work of Nietzsche's should we put on the PhD qualifying exam list?" or "What should I read to get a sense of what Nietzsche's philosophy is all about?" So, a book-length treatment of the work ought to be an especially welcome addition to the Nietzsche section of the library. Of this booklength treatment, however, the best I can say is that people who like this sort of thing will no doubt like it. By "this sort of thing," I mean "philosophical work in thrall to the ideas of Leo Strauss." In the spirit of Peter Cook's miner-who would have preferred a career in the judiciary and shows a positively Moorean fastidiousness in his concern to distinguish the sweeping generalization that "you get a load of riff raff down the mine" (to which he will not commit himself) from the singular proposition that "I had a load of riff raff down my mine," for which he claims to have ample empirical evidence-let me say at the outset that, while I am unqualified to speak of the soundness, truth, or interest of the thought of Leo Strauss, I find that it has not in the present case proven very helpful. Nietzsche's task, according to Lampert, was twofold, encompassing the achievement of "a comprehensive perspective on the world and on the human disposition toward the world" (p. 1), the task of philosophy, and the securing of "a place for that perspective in the lived world of human culture" (ibid.), the task of political philosophy. Following the master, Lampert sees this distinction of tasks reflected in the organization of BGE, which, on the Strauss-Lampert model, begins with three sections-on the prejudices of philosophers, the free mind or spirit (derfreie Geist), and the religious life or nature (das religiose Wesen)-devoted to articulating the comprehensive perspective constitutive of philosophy, and ends with five

First published in print format ISBN-13 978-0-521-77078-1 hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-77913-5 paperback ISBN-13 978-0-511-06877-5 eBook (EBL)

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2008

Introduction In an ideal, ordered world, answering metaethical questions (such as " what is goodness? " and " how can we tell the good from the bad ") would lead to statements about morality (principles set out for making decisions, having intentions and taking actions). However, the world is not ideal or ordered, and in life principles for moral action are based on various beliefs, religions and cultures and most of all by the background of the actor him/herself. Those big words “should” and "ought" in ethics are not related to any ultimate standards. This corresponds to the view of the great German philosopher, Nietzsche. This paper summarises his view in detail.

2014