Zukifehi

Forming part of a ‘new neighbourhood’ and at the same time caught in a proximity/distance paradox, the Black Sea region is one of the very few regions where greater EU involvement in conflict resolution has been both sought and opposed. Overall, the EU involvement in the region so far typifies a capability-expectations gap case. However, the current significance of the region for the EU outweighs any considerations of geography or its institutional timetable since the region presents a number of significant security challenges that characterise the post-Cold War period and constitute a threat for the stability and prosperity of Europe, including, among others, the conundrum of energy security and separatist movements. If the question that arose before the Georgian crisis of August 2008 was whether the EU could play a significant role, the crucial question now is how to play that enhanced role. Strengthening the Union’s position is of vital importance and it requires a coherent strategy entailing a number of key characteristics such as: a single voice, an enhanced Black Sea Synergy, physical presence, creation of a Contact Group, working with Russia (‘soft power’ diplomacy), drafting a strategy with the US and last but not least strengthening the ‘Europeanisation’ project in the region.

The political and economic transformations witnessed by Georgia favor a very positive attitude on the part of the European Union. The satisfaction with Georgia is fueled to a certain extent by the reticence or the disappointment of the European institutions with the real speed of reforms in the other two countries with Association Agreements, Moldova and Ukraine. The European sympathies have multiple motivations, but most of all these result from the authorities' capacity to ensure functional anti-corruption policies that were instituted during the time of Mikhel Saakashvili. A diametrically opposed result in fighting corruption is typical for Moldova and Ukraine, which according to Transparency International, in 2017 were among the top 65 most corrupt states in the world. This generates a substantial proportion of the negative comments coming from Brussels. The positive pace of reforms delivered by the Georgian authorities seems to be diverting the interference of oligarchs in the decision-making process away from the center of attention (IPN, February 26, 2018).

The European Union posture towards the war in Georgia in 2008 The assessment, implications and the aftermath, 2013

EU was the only actor which could influence Russia. Neither the United States NATO nor OSCE could do it. Russia signed a ceasefire because it was afraid of the EU sanctions which could have a devastating impact on Moscow. Russia was convinced not by the military power of the EU but by their whole potential which embraced: limits in trade and other dimensions of bilateral cooperation ( culture, research) or even political sanctions aimed at some Russian diplomats.

The decision to accept France as an interlocutor conformed to Russia’s overall approach toward the EU as a counterweight to the USA, as Moscow suffers from a security deficit in relations with NATO and the United States, considering the EU a potential pole in the new multipolar order1. Furthermore, the Mistral deal demonstrates that Russia has opened a new phase in relations with Western Europe. The cost of the Mistral ships seems to be a low price that Russia is willing to pay for its political success, in the context of the atmosphere of mistrust in its relations with the West2. The question that remains is: how far is Russia willing to go in terms of improving its relations with the EU?

The main purpose of this paper is to present the institutional dynamics and political developments of the European Union regarding its Eastern neighbours. This research is important in the field of European Construction because it studies how the continental organization approached the question of foreign relations towards countries that belonged to a different system of values. This paper wants to bring a deeper approach regarding the activity of the European Union towards the Republic of Georgia. The method used was a case study of the EU institutions and politics created towards the Georgian state.

2014

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed agreements with the EU on 27 June aimed at facilitating closer co-operation. Sebastian Schaffer writes on the impact the agreements will have for the economy of each state, the wider foreign policy issues, and for EU-Russian relations. He suggests that European governments should not seek to marginalise Russian influence over neighbouring states, but that they should nevertheless be prepared to defend their interests if the Russian government seeks to impede each state’s co-operation with the EU.

2011

This background brief examines the relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours through a case study of Georgia. What are the underpinnings and factors driving EU policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)? Is EU membership for these eastern countries the end goal? Georgia, a small country in the South Caucasus, has been thrust into the limelight in the wake of its 2003 Rose Revolution and its 2008 war with Russia, with implications for EU-Georgia relations. This relationship is fraught with asymmetric expectations – Georgia has been more than won over as part of the EU’s ‘ring of friends’, evident in how its leaders and people have expressed a desire to join the EU. However there is currently little if any reciprocal desire on the EU’s part, and understandably so, given the persistence of Georgia’s territorial conflicts.