220225 Georgia 2008 Ukraine 2022 what about Israel?

Cuestiones Políticas

The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is an unusual geopolitical event that puts the security of Western Europe at risk and, at the same time, erodes the norms of international law that regulate, at least in theory, relations between civilized countries. Indeed, it is a tragic event that has cost the lives of thousands of civilians who have been victims of war crimes and serious violations of their fundamental rights. In this sense, the objective of this editorial is twofold, on the one hand, to present volume 40, number 73 of Political Questions and, on the other, to briefly explain the causes and geopolitical consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is concluded that the invasion of Putin’s Russia in Ukraine can trigger a prolonged and extensive conflict that can even confront NATO directly with Russia. Ideologically, it is a conflict that means a clash between different political models such as the liberal democracies of the West (ensuring human...

Abstract. The article gives a detailed analysis of the confrontation between the leading centers of global influence – the EU, the US and Russia, which led to the aggravation of the situation in two countries at once. It was found that both Ukraine and Syria face the risk of becoming a major geopolitical struggle springboard between Russia and the West. Russia’s military presence in Syria in particular is to build military bases in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, by supporting the regime in Damascus. Expanding the strategic impact of Russia is also in supervising oil and gas market and transit of energy resources to the EU. Continuation of military intervention in Syria and Ukraine had a profound impact on the security situation in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East. This reality makes all members of the settlement of these conflicts reconsider their foreign policy strategy and future plans regarding Ukraine and Syria. EU and US support only peaceful diplomatic solution to the crisis in eastern Ukraine through the allocation opposing sides of the contact line and holding democratic elections. Meanwhile, Syria’s main task for the West is fighting against ISIS and removing the current authoritarian regime from power. Russia does not show much interest in resolving these regional crises and intends to maintain instability in Eurasia and the Middle East. Key words: Russian, Ukrainian conflict, Syrian conflict, the Middle East, the interests of the great powers, geopolitics, ISIS.

Geopolitics of the War in Ukraine, 2022

In this 25,000-word monograph we present an analysis of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as part of Russian revisionism and its implications for regional and global international order. We examine Russian interests and strategic objectives; the geopolitical impact of the invasion and we analyze in detail the military and strategic lessons of the war in Ukraine. Finally, we provide three possible military scenarios about the continuation of the war addressing also the issue of the possible use of nuclear weapons and conclude with some policy recommendations.

Fedorenko V., Fedorenko M. Russia’s Military Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Aim, Reasons, and Implications. Krytyka Prawa, Niezależne studia nad prawem. tom 14, nr 1/2022. S. 7-42, 2022

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia's military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to postwar international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature. Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since the 17th century the theoretical foundations of the law of war have been laid, which enshrined in international laws and customs of warfare (Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention, etc.) since the 19th century, thus forming the international humanitarian law.

Russia’s engagement in the crisis in Ukraine, as well as its previous aggression against Georgia in 2008 are the two concrete examples that reveal in the foreseeable future Russia will not hesitate to use its muscles to realize its geopolitical ambitions that have grown since Putin’s ascendance to power. In fact, it would not be wrong to conclude that recent events that are taking place are the indicators of a new era of ‘post-soviet cold war’; what is happening is the ‘return of the reel politik', the footsteps of which was already heard in 2008 in Georgia. Both the 2008 August War in Georgia and the recent strife in Ukraine reveal that the West...is not prepared enough for the ‘post-soviet cold war’. Not only the absence of vigor and hard-power, but also the lack of an accurate understanding of the developments, coherent and convincing discourse, and implementation of such a discourse into articulate policies are the weaknesses of the West. Given that against Russia’s hard-power the West asserts its soft-powers, failure to realistically analyze the developments, to construct a coherent discourse and to actualize such a discourse in practice are more consequential defects than not having enough muscles.

When he took office in early 2009, President Barack Obama made improvement of the United States’ relations with Russia – the so-called “reset” policy – one of his signature foreign policy initiatives. That hope lies now in tatters, shattered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of south-eastern Ukraine. The goal of turning US-Russia cooperation – and, by extension, West-Russia cooperation – into a building block of international governance looks now as distant as it was during the Cold War. The best one can hope instead is that relations between Moscow and Western capitals do not further deteriorate to the point of a complete breakdown. The rationale for the “reset” policy was the pragmatic recognition that the recurring tensions with Russia – prompted by issues ranging from Kosovo’s independence to the US plan to install a ballistic missile defence system in Eastern Europe and Georgia’s and Ukraine’s prospective membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – were thwarting US and Western interests in Afghanistan and the management of Iran’s nuclear issue as well as creating new fault lines on the European continent. Tellingly, after reaching a low point in relations in the wake of Russia’s short and victorious war against Georgia in August 2008, both Russia and Western powers took steps to avoid a scenario of full confrontation. Several member states of the European Union (EU), particularly Western European countries with little memory of recent Soviet domination, viewed the new US course as being more in keeping with their interest in establishing a constructive relationship with Russia, a key player on the European stage and the Union’s main energy provider. While some EU member states, particularly in Eastern Europe, felt the United States was too prone to seek cooperation with an unreliable Russian government, the whole European Union eventually signed WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 12 off on Obama’s policy. The election of Dmitry Medvedev as Russia’s president, who depicted himself as more liberal-minded than his patron and predecessor, Vladimir Putin, had in fact helped create an atmosphere more forthcoming for dialogue and cooperation. The “reset” policy did produce some important results, most notably the US-Russian agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons known as the New START (the only relevant nuclear disarmament agreement struck in twenty years); Russia’s greater cooperation on curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, particularly thanks to its agreeing to tough sanctions against Tehran in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in June 2010; and Russia’s agreement to let key military supplies for the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan transit its airspace, an important development given the growing difficulty NATO was experiencing in keeping open its supply lines through Pakistan. While significant, these achievements did not pave the way for what many had hoped the “reset” policy would eventually produce: a renewed West-Russia relationship based on mutual respect and cooperation on issues of common concern. In fact, relations between the West and Russia continued to be fraught with problems of mistrust, rhetorical competition, and fundamentally different views of how security issues should be managed internationally. In hindsight, the “reset” policy seems to have been just a lull in a process started in the early 2000s which has seen West-Russia relations steadily deteriorate. While none of the “reset” policy achievements has thus far been reversed, a succession of events, including the re-election of Putin as Russia’s president in 2012 and culminating in Russia’s forced takeover of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine, have plunged the West-Russia relationship to its lowest point in twenty-five years. For many in the West, the crisis over Ukraine has laid bare the most unsettling features of President Putin’s government: lack of any appreciation for political pluralism; readiness to dispense with opposition forces by de-legitimisation through state-controlled propaganda and possibly forceful repression; and resolve to defend what Putin perceives as Russia’s vital interests with any means, including the use of force, land grabs, and destabilising practices such as fomenting and directing pro-Russian nationalist protests in other countries. INTRODUCTION 13 Ukraine is a special case because influence over Kiev is of paramount importance to Russia’s security strategy and national pride. However, it should not be seen in isolation. It is part of a broader design by President Putin to re-establish as much influence as possible over the former Soviet space. Central to this objective is Putin’s plan for a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) including most of the former republics of the Soviet Union, be them in East Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia. The problem with the Eurasian Economic Union is that the Russian president sees it as incompatible with any significant form of integration of its members into Euro-Atlantic frameworks, notably NATO but also the European Union. The crisis in Ukraine has also made it clear that the West is now confronted with the problem of handling the revanchist instincts of a former superpower. The West faces an intractable regime centred on the personal power of President Putin, who has increasingly tied his legitimacy to a pledge to embody and defend an exceptionalist Russian identity, mostly defined in opposition to Western values and norms. In other words, the conflict between the West and Russia is framed by Putin himself not only as a conflict of interests, but of identity too. This narrative has been used by Putin to rebut any sort of criticism coming from the West, be it directed at Russia’s takeover of Crimea or at Putin’s increasingly strict control over Russia’s media and marginalisation and repression of political dissent. Signs of growing competition between the West and Russia were visible long before unrest in Ukraine escalated into a full-blown crisis. The Arab uprisings are a case in point. From the start, Russia and the West have held different views of the cycle of revolutions and counterrevolutions which has engulfed the most part of the Arab world. While the United States and the European Union initially insisted on the antiauthoritarian and pro-democracy nature of popular protests, Russia has consistently seen the so-called Arab Spring as a bearer of instability and, more worryingly, as an opportunity for Islamic fundamentalism to find new ways to gain influence. Moscow opted for a cautious approach in the beginning, even letting the Security Council authorise the use of force to protect endangered civilians in the prolonged conflict between Libya’s longstanding ruler, Muammar Qaddafi, and a West-backed rebel WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 14 coalition. Russia came to regret its choice in a matter of months if not weeks, as it became clear that NATO’s intervention in defence of civilians rapidly “crept” into what the Russians perceived as an open policy of regime change by force. Bruised by the Libya case, Russia has ever since been adamant in refusing any form of UNSC support for rebels fighting against established rulers in the Arab world, irrespective of how brutal such rulers could be. This has been most evident in Syria, where Russia has steadfastly protected its ally Bashar al-Assad from any form of UN action. West-Russia relations have so dramatically deteriorated that talk of a new Cold War has become routine. NATO’s role in Europe is again in the spotlight, with experts and policymakers alike pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical roots, re-calibrating itself as an instrument of defence from and containment of Russia. However, it is important to notice that cooperation has not collapsed altogether. Russia has continued to be a committed member of the P5+1, the group of nations (including also the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and China plus the European Union) dealing with Iran’s nuclear dispute. It has also continued to assist NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. And it has agreed with the United States upon a plan for the removal of all chemical weapons from Syria, forcing the Assad regime to deliver. Thus, while competition has increased in strategic areas – most notably in the former Soviet space and the Middle East – the need for cooperation has not vanished. Clearly, this is far from an ideal scenario. Tensions over Ukraine are so strong that the risk of a breakdown in relations is certainly present. Yet neither party would benefit from it. It was with the goal of exploring ways by which Russia and the West can contain tensions, manage competition, and keep cooperating on issues of mutual concern, that the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome and the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institution of Washington co-organised an international conference on West-Russia relations. The conference was the seventh edition of the Transatlantic Security Symposium, the IAI-run annual forum in which experts from America, Europe and other countries convene to discuss the main topics in the transatlantic security agenda. The event, sponsored by Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and InternaINTRODUCTION 15 tional Development, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Rome Office) and Unicredit Bank, saw the participation of over forty senior experts from think tanks and other institutions from a number of EU member states (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria), the United States, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Russia took part. This volume collects a revised version of the papers that were presented at the event as well as a summary of the main points that were discussed. (R.A.)

Krytyka Prawa

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia’s military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to post-war international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature. Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since...

Proceedings of the 25th Workshop of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes’ Study Group: Regional Stability in the South Caucasus – Discussing a South Caucasus Short of Russian Dominance. Republic of Austria & Germany. N17, 2023

Journal of European Studies (JES)

The security-insecurity paradox in a geopolitical struggle between Russia and its ex-territory; Ukraine along with the politics of the influences between great powers has made the Russian invasion a reality. Russian intervention in its periphery in February 2022 has sent shockwaves to the European Union and NATO members, and posed various challenges to the Eurasian states. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a protracted one, but this new phase is more complex and multi-layered. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014, and support to the militant separatists in Donbas, undermined Ukrainian sovereignty. A series of border skirmishes occurred during 2014-2021, which led to thousands of people dead and injured.[1] The tension converted into a humanitarian crisis with millions of refugees and collateral damages after the 2022 war. This recent situation can be termed as a geopolitical warfare, which is based on the politics of security to assert political advantages i...