The Psychology of Humanness

Central to Perceptual Dehumanization Theory is the claim that full engagement of a putative module for the visual analysis of faces is necessary in order to recognize the humanity or personhood of observed individuals. According to this view, the faces of outgroup members do not engage domain-specific face processing fully or typically and are instead processed in a manner akin to how the brain processes objects. Consequently, outgroup members are attributed less humanity than are ingroup members. To the extent that groups are perceptually dehumanized, they are hypothesised to be vulnerable to harm. In our article, we challenge several of the fundamental assumptions underlying this theory and question the empirical evidence in its favour. We begin by illustrating the extent to which the existence of domain-specific face processing is contested within the vision science literature. Next, we interrogate empirical evidence that appears to support Perceptual Dehumanization Theory and suggest that alternative explanations for prominent findings in the field are more likely. In the closing sections of the paper, we reflect on the broader logic of the theory and highlight some underlying inconsistencies.

We review early and recent psychological theories of dehumanization and survey the burgeoning empirical literature, focusing on six fundamental questions. First, we examine how people are dehumanized, exploring the range of ways in which perceptions of lesser humanness have been conceptualized and demonstrated. Second, we review who is dehumanized, examining the social targets that have been shown to be denied humanness and commonalities among them. Third, we investigate who dehumanizes, notably the personality, ideological, and other individual differences that increase the propensity to see others as less than human. Fourth, we explore when people dehumanize, focusing on transient situational and motivational factors that promote dehumanizing perceptions. Fifth, we examine the consequences of dehumanization, emphasizing its implications for prosocial and antisocial behavior and for moral judgment. Finally, we ask what can be done to reduce dehumanization. We conclude with a discussion of limitations of current scholarship and directions for future research.

Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2010

People conceive of wrathful gods, fickle computers, and selfish genes, attributing human characteristics to a variety of supernatural, technological, and biological agents. This tendency to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents figures prominently in domains ranging from religion to marketing to computer science. Perceiving an agent to be humanlike has important implications for whether the agent is capable of social influence, accountable for its actions, and worthy of moral care and consideration. Three primary factors-elicited agent knowledge, sociality motivation, and effectance motivation-appear to account for a significant amount of variability in anthropomorphism. Identifying these factors that lead people to see nonhuman agents as humanlike also sheds light on the inverse process of dehumanization, whereby people treat human agents as animals or objects. Understanding anthropomorphism can contribute to a more expansive view of social cognition that applies social psychological theory to a wide variety of both human and nonhuman agents.

in Kronfeldner, M.E. (2020) Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization, 2021

A large part of the contemporary literature on dehumanization is committed to three ideas: (a) dehumanization involves some degree of denial of humanness, (b) such denial is to be comprehended in mental terms, and (c) whatever exact mechanisms underlie the denial of humanness, they belong in the realm of post-perceptual processing. This chapter examines (c) and argues that the awareness of minds might belong to perceptual processing. This paves the way for the possibility that dehumanization might, at least in part, be a perceptual phenomenon, such that dehumanizers visually perceive the dehumanized as exhibiting lesser-than-human minds. It is perhaps unsurprising that the first systematic investigations of dehumanization approached the phenomenon as linked to contexts of war, genocide, extreme hatred, and violence. One guiding hypothesis was that dehumanizers exclude the dehumanized from a moral community of human beings, implicitly conceptualized as displaying distinct individualities and being embedded in caring interpersonal relations. By comprehending the dehumanized as deindividuated entities to which moral norms and considerations of fairness do not apply (Opotow 1990), dehumanizers are able to disengage from moral restrictions and self-sanctions (Bandura 1999).

Social Psychology

Across two studies, we tested the relationship between the stereotype dimensions of sociability, morality, and competence and the two dimensions of humanness (human nature and human uniqueness). Study 1 considered real groups and revealed that sociability had greater power than morality in predicting human nature. For some groups, sociability also trumped competence in predicting human nature. By contrast, the attribution of human uniqueness was predicted by competence and morality. In Study 2, participants read a scenario depicting an unfamiliar group in stereotypical terms. Results showed that competence and sociability were the strongest predictors of human uniqueness and human nature, respectively. Although with nuances, both studies revealed that sociability, morality, and competence relate differently to the two dimensions of humanness.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2006

The concept of dehumanization lacks a systematic theoretical basis, and research that addresses it has yet to be integrated. Manifestations and theories of dehumanization are reviewed, and a new model is developed. Two forms of dehumanization are proposed, involving the denial to others of 2 distinct senses of humanness: characteristics that are uniquely human and those that constitute human nature. Denying uniquely human attributes to others represents them as animal-like, and denying human nature to others represents them as objects or automata. Cognitive underpinnings of the "animalistic" and "mechanistic" forms of dehumanization are proposed. An expanded sense of dehumanization emerges, in which the phenomenon is not unitary, is not restricted to the intergroup context, and does not occur only under conditions of conflict or extreme negative evaluation. Instead, dehumanization becomes an everyday social phenomenon, rooted in ordinary social-cognitive processes.

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2009

Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2020

Over (2020; this issue) puts forth seven challenges for what she terms the dehumanization hypothesis (i.e., that outgroup members are viewed as nonhuman and that this underlies the harm inflicted on them). For the most part we do not disagree with her points, but we disagree that those points constitute a challenge. Previous research, by us and by others, leads to the expectation that dehumanization is conditional, which suggests that the real challenge for dehumanization researchers is to determine the conditions under which the hypothesis is correct.

The Spanish journal of psychology, 2012

The present research deals with two forms of dehumanization: 1) denying uniquely human attributes to others (seeing them as animals); 2) denying human nature to others (seeing them as machines or automata). Studies 1 and 2 explored these two forms of dehumanization, analyzing whether people associated their ingroup more with human-related words (vs. animal-vs. machinerelated words) than two different outgroups. A paper and pencil procedure was used to find out which words were associated with the surnames of the ingroup (Spaniards) or the outgroup (Germans, Gypsies). Results showed that participants were more ready to link ingroup than outgroup surnames to human words. They also linked more Gypsy surnames to animal-related words and German surnames with machine-related words. Studies 3 and 4 used the Implicit Association Test to analyze the same ideas and replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2.

Current Research in Ecological and Social Psychology, 2023

Recently, I presented evidence that there are two broad kinds of dehumanization: descriptive dehumanization and normative dehumanization. An individual is descriptively dehumanized when they are perceived as less than fully human in the biological-species sense; whereas an individual is normatively dehumanized when they are perceived as lacking a deep-seated commitment to good moral values. Here, I develop the concept of normative dehumanization by addressing skepticism about two hypotheses that are widely held by dehumanization researchers. The first hypothesis is that dehumanization is distinct from mere dislike and other non-dehumanizing attitudes. The second hypothesis is that dehumanization is an important predictor of intergroup hostility. Across four studies, I found evidence that normative dehumanization is distinct from mere dislike, and denials of ideal humanness. I also found that it is a unique predictor of intergroup hostility. These findings suggest that research into dehumanization and intergroup hostility will benefit from recognizing the distinction between descriptive and normative dehumanization.