Half-Hearted Humeanism
Aaron Segal2015, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
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Abstract
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The paper explores Humeanism in metaphysics, particularly the idea that concrete entities are fundamentally independent and loosely connected. It discusses four key theses that align with Hume's views, emphasizing the absence of necessary relations among distinct objects and events. The concluding argument presents a choice for Half-Hearted Humeans between accepting a full Humean position or abandoning the framework altogether, highlighting the implications of their metaphysical stance.
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