Aristotle on Animal Locomotion (Handout)

Phronesis 58/1 (2013)

In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the ‘centralized incoming and outgoing motions’ (CIOM) model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are selfmovers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in Physics VIII. The CIOM model helps to elucidate Aristotle’s two central yet problematic claims, namely that the soul is the efficient cause of animal motion and that it is the internal supporting-point necessary for animal motion. Moreover, the CIOM model helps us to explain the difference between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary motions, and to square Aristotle’s cardiocentrism with his hylomorphism, but also, more generally, it provides an interesting way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the causal structure of the world.

Filosofia Unisinos, 2017

Two of the main controversies that have occupied specialists who dedicate themselves to the study of Aristotle's theory of animal locomotion are the controversy about the form of the cognition through which an animal apprehends an object as an object of desire, and the controversy about the function of cognition in Aristotle's explanation of the voluntary locomotion of animals. In this article, I present an interpretation about the ways in which desire and cognition are articulated in Aristotle's theory according to which an animal apprehends an object as an object of desire through an incidental perception of this object and, contrary to what most seem to think, this perception does not have the same function in the production of these movements. If what is said here is correct, in some cases this perception is responsible for the generation and the orientation of a desire, but in other cases it is only responsible for its orientation.

Classical Review, 2022

This fine volume is the first comprehensive philosophical engagement with what may be the most understudied authentic piece of the Corpus Aristotelicum. The nine interpretative essays work jointly as an unfailingly insightful vademecum to this difficult but fascinating treatise, and they thoroughly exploit its potential for providing fruitful case studies of larger topics of Aristotle's natural philosophy and theory of science. The essays are preceded by a critical edition of the Greek text with a congenial collective translation. Two introductory chapters by Andrea Falcon do an excellent job in providing a basic orientation concerning both the treatise and the essays. Falcon first sets the stage by introducing us to the explanatory agenda of IA. He offers a preliminary account of the key notions, including points of motion, feet, and limb-bending, and canvasses Aristotle's intricate strategy, involving some familiar principles (such as the explanatory priority of blooded over bloodless animals), but also exhibiting features less prominent elsewhere, such as unceasing attention to exceptions as a way of comprising as fully as possible the complexity of phenomena. Then Falcon takes us on a tour through some modern attempts at locating IA within the corpus, directly connected to the larger question of the overall structure of Aristotle's natural philosophy. Bekker's order (DA, PN, …, PA, MA, IA), followed by most modern translations, seems inspired by (a) the foundational role of DA with respect to the study of life; (b) indications suggesting that IA further develops the inquiry offered in PA; and (c) the thematic proximity between IA and MA (although the opening of MA would suggest the reverse order). Yet, what is overlooked here (unlike in earlier orderings) is (d) the proximity of MA to the treatises of PN. Although the present volume does not solve this old riddle, it does offer valuable, fresh insights into it. The Greek text of IA established by Pantelis Golitsis brings no discoveries comparable to that of Berolinensis Philips 1507 which recently helped scholars achieve a more reliable reconstruction of MA and is likely to play a similar role with respect to a considerable part of PN (when it comes to IA, the manuscript is virtually identical to Vaticanus gr. 1339). Nevertheless, drawing on previous work of Friederike Berger, Golitsis provides a new critical edition which not only considers more manuscripts than Bekker and Jaeger did, but, more importantly, claims to have found in Vaticanus gr. 261 and 1339 traces of the archetype, independent from both established families; that leads to dozens of (mostly minor) divergences from Jaeger. Golitsis' edition should no doubt be taken from now on as the text of IA. In his concise essay on IA 1-3, Falcon helpfully identifies one rationale behind the uncertain position of IA within the corpus: it is a study of the locomotive parts of animals (and so a kind of appendix to PA), but it is a study of these parts insofar as they are useful for locomotion, and so locomotion, and especially different kinds of it (which fall outside the scope of MA), need to be treated, too; hence the external references to IA as an inquiry into the progression of animals. Moreover, Falcon demonstrates the potential for IA to become a case study of Aristotle's explanatory commitments that have been intensively studied by scholars for decades: explanatory principles (most prominently the teleological principle "nature does nothing in vain") are not only formulated here: Aristotle draws on them relentlessly when offering his explanations. Panos Dimas tackles the relation between Aristotle's two, seemingly incompatible, accounts of dimensions (up-down, right-left, front-back): the "positional" account ascribing

Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Zoology , 2021

Intro to the basics of Aristotle's theory of animal agency, to the problem that his theory faces and how he gives a resolution to the problem on the basis of his biological conception of the animal body.

Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 47.1, 2014

Aristotle had a developed theory of animal motion with an elaborate physiological component. In this paper we present the physiological component in which the main role is assigned to structures called neura that operate on the bones to which they are attached. We demonstrate that neura exclude muscles and we propose an explanation for Aristotle’s curious failure to observe the actual role of muscles in producing limb motion. Also, we try to identify the main neura specified by Aristotle, we show that he conceived of their operation on the bones in producing limb motion in much the same way as we conceive of the operation of muscles, and we point out the main difficulties for his account.

Apeiron, 2020

I explain what Aristotle means when, after puzzling about the matter of motion in incomplete animals (those without sight, smell, hearing), he suggests in De Anima III 11.433b31-434a5 that just as incomplete animals are moved indeterminately, desire and phantasia are present in those animals, but present indeterminately. I argue that self-motion and its directing faculties in incomplete animals differ in degree but not in kind from those of complete animals. I examine how an object of desire differs for an incomplete animal. Using a comparison with Aristotle's account of recollection, especially in unfavorable circumstances, I describe indeterminate self-motion. Finally, I discuss implications for our understanding of Aristotle's accounts of the faculties of the soul and incomplete animals.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2008

O. Primavesi and C. Rapp (eds.), Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium. Proceedings of the XIXth Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2020, 2020

2014

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

2012

This project sets out to answer the following question: what does movement contribute to or change about being according to Aristotle? The first part works through the argument for the existence of movement in the Physics. This argument includes distinctive innovations in the structure of being, notably the simultaneous unity and manyness of being: while material and form are one thing, they are two in being. This makes it possible for Aristotle to argue that movement is not intrinsically related to what is not: what comes to be does not emerge from non-being, it comes from something that is in a different sense. The second part turns to the Metaphysics to show that and how the lineage of potency and activity the inquiry into movement. A central problem is that activity or actuality, energeia, does not at first seem to be intrinsically related to a completeness or end, telos. With the unity of different senses of being at stake, Aristotle establishes that it is by showing that activity or actuality is movement most of all, and that movement has and is a complete end. Thus, it is movement that leads Aristotle to conclude that substance and form are energeia, and that unity of being is possible.