Hume’s Argument Concerning Induction – Skeptical or Explanatory?

Hume Studies, 1977

The Heythrop Journal, 2013

This article is a section drawn from a wider study (still in progress) on David Hume's epistemology. Its chapter on induction contains an argument against Hume's critique of this intellectual process that is different than any I have come across in my researches. The closest would be Peter J. R. Millican's article 'Hume, Induction and Reason' wherein he charges Hume for holding 'apparently contradictory positions which he appears to adopt in different places' and specifically notes how 'Hume argues, forcefully and repeatedly, that 'we have no reason' whatever to make inductive inferences; while on the other he continues to make such inferences himself, treats them as varying in force, presents rules for assessing them, describes some as 'just' and 'true', and criticizes natural theologians and others (including 'the vulgar') for failing to conform to the appropriate standards.' 1 Certain of what Millican writes could have led on to make the point of this article, but he does not take it there. The bulk of his article attempts to resolve Hume's induction problem by identifying three different notion of 'reason' as used by Hume. My approach is more straightforward-analyzing how Hume's argument against induction results in a self-defeating conclusion. As the larger study is still at least a year away from completion, I make this part available separately for those interested in this issue. * * * If one were to draw an arch of the major parts of Hume's epistemological theory, without question his antithetical position on induction would be the keystone of the entire design. Hume's dispute with the psychological and epistemological knowledge theories of his predecessors is made especially acute by his critique of the very kind of methodology advanced by many of them, including his philosophical forebear Francis Bacon, for the gaining of scientific understanding-the process of induction. According to the author of The Great Instauration, it was through induction that advances in learning such as the re-charting of the universe 2 from a geocentric to a heliocentric one were brought about. This postulation of Copernicus was expanded and corrected in suite by the laws of motion of Kepler and those of Galileo, Bacon's close contemporary, culminating in the theory of gravity of Isaac Newton about a half-century after Bacon's passing. Bacon's analysis as to how induction ensues within the investigative mind is open to serious question, but his overall trust in its final outcomes would have been amply rewarded by the future discoveries of persons like Newton although many of his arguments are also deductive in nature, a process which Bacon tended to disparage. Truth to tell, in any extensive theoretical system, induction and deduction are both used as inferential tools. Such matters not withstanding, science was clearly on a roll. Hume, oddly enough, does not join the bandwagon but rather raises serious objections not only as to the certitude of the natural laws bs_bs_banner

Philosophia, 1998

2015

De Pierris has argued that Hume is what she calls an inductivist about the proper method of scientific inquiry: science proceeds by formulating inductively-established empirical generalizations that subsume an increasing number of observable phenomena in their scope. De Pierris thus limits Hume's understanding of scientific inquiry, including his own science of human nature, to observable phenomena. By contrast, I argue that Hume's conception of science allows for the positing of, and belief in, unobservable theoretical entities on purely explanatory grounds. I present the details of De Pierris' interpretation of Hume, and the reasons and means for rejecting it. I then consider Hume's explicit statements on his science of human nature to show that all of these are compatible with Hume's accepting a more expansive understanding of scientific explanation. Finally, I briefly consider some examples from the Treatise of Hume's employing just such a methodology.

Hume Studies, 1989

2011

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, eds M. Bruce and S. Barbone, Blackwell, 2011

Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come from? “Why [do] we conclude that … particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?” (Hume 2002, 1.3.2.15) In 1.3.6 of the Treatise, Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason. However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists of Hume’s “negative” argument concerning induction. This argument has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention. How could causal inferences be justified if they are not justified by reason? If we believe that p causes q, isn’t it reason that allows us to conclude q when we see p with some assurance, i.e. with some necessity?

Synthese, 1998

This paper presents a new account of Hume’s “probability of causes”. There are two main results attained in this investigation. The first, and perhaps the most significant, is that Hume developed – albeit informally – an essentially sound system of probabilistic inductive logic that turns out to be a powerful forerunner of Carnap’s systems. The Humean set of principles include,

2014