Article Is Consciousness a

2012

Colin McGinn has argued that consciousness is a nonspatial phenomenon. McGinn’s arguments for the nonspatiality of consciousness are presented and then criticized. It is concluded that consciousness may be as spatial as electric charge and different kinds of abilities.

Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy

Colin McGinn has argued that consciousness is a nonspatial phenomenon. McGinn's arguments for the nonspatiality of consciousness are presented and then criticized. It is concluded that consciousness may be as spatial as electric charge and different kinds of abilities.

Routledge eBooks, 2016

Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a "conscious process" is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of "consciousness" is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time." 1 I have given a detailed critique of this aspect of Dennett's position that I do not have space to repeat here (see Velmans, , 2009 chapter 5) chapter 5); see also Zahavi (2007), Beenfeldt (2008). 2 See Gallagher, 2007, Zahavi, 2007 for recent reviews of European phenomenological approaches. Note however that classical Indian conclusions about the nature of consciousness arise largely from altered conscious states consequent on prolonged periods of meditation, and this can be an additional source of confusion when comparing Eastern and Western understanding of everyday conscious phenomenology. The pure, contentless consciousness said to be experienced in such states is, in various writings, thought to underly all of Nature, which makes this a claim about what in the West is sometimes referred to as "the ground of being" or, in Kantian terms, "the thing in itself," rather than a claim about the forms of "phenomenal consciousness," that are more usually investigated in modern consciousness studies.

What is consciousness? Is it some kind of magic or the gift which god provided to us for inducing life? Is it a special quality which belongs to only certain living beings or is it spread across the whole universe uniformly? In this paper we travel across the Universe and our thoughts and fathom the Consciousness

Springer eBooks, 1988

Western philosophers since the time of Descartes and Locke, have struggled to comprehend the nature of consciousness. Starting in the 1980's, an expanding community of neuroscientists and psychologists have associated themselves with a field called "Consciousness studies". First, this paper will take a quick look to these approaches and we will underline that if consciousness is by essence subjective, it cannot be properly studied using the objective methodology of science. Then we will present our Theory of consciousness which's originality is to call into question the Postulate of objectivity on which science is based.

The present article, The Nature of Consciousness, relates consciousness to brain activity without assuming consciousness to be a brain process capable of affecting other brain processes. Consciousness is assumed to be a pure passively emergent epiphenomenon automatically accompanying certain neural brain processes and having no influence on those processes. Consciousness simply being how we perceive sensations from outside and inside our body, including brain processes like thinking. This is in contrast to existing theories of consciousness, which considers consciousness to be a brain process capable of affecting neural brain processes, and even orchestrating major functions of the brain. It is suggested that this notion of consciousness, being able to affect brain processes, is an illusion resulting from consciously and continuously perceiving brain thought processes and erroneously getting the impression that consciousness is governing those thought processes while all the time failing to distinguish brain generated constructs from the conscious perception of them. The present notion of consciousness, being a purely passive epiphenomenon, furthermore shows promise of throwing light on the Mind-Body problem, settling the question of free will, explaining the nature of a self, and showing its relation to evolution.

Auslegung: a Journal of Philosophy, 1992

A comment on Consciousness, 2022

The German-language interdisciplinary journal “Gehirn & Geist (G&G, Brain & Mind)” has chosen "consciousness" as its cover topic in the March 2022 issue. It is centered on a translation of an article by Emma Young and David Robson in the New Scientist and features also an interview with the neuroscientist Melanie Wilke and the philosopher Michael Pauen. From my point of view, a critical and progressive note should be warranted here. Below is the translation of a letter to the editors of G&G.

2002

Combs, A. (2015). The nature of consciousness. In Jennie A. Davis, and Daniel Pitchford (Eds.). Stanley Krippner: A Life of Dreams, Myths, and Visions; Essays on his Contributions and Influence (pp. 21-40). Colorado Springs, CO: University Professors Press.