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2007, Law in the Age of Pluralism
Liberalism may not have won the global victory that some commentators predicted, but constitutionalism certainly has. The vast majority of countries in the world, democratic and non-democratic alike, have written constitutions that are designed to entrench the basic legal structure of their regime. Most constitutions also enumerate a list of rights and general principles that purport to have a higher legal standing than ordinary law, and most countries entrust the interpretation of their constitution to a court of law. I will not try to speculate here about why this is the case. My aim is to scrutinize the idea of constitutionalism from a moral point of view, arguing that constitutionalism does not quite deserve the celebration that it has occasioned. The argument proceeds as follows: after a preliminary outline of the main features of constitutionalism, I will present what I take to be the main moral concerns about its legitimacy. I will then consider a number of arguments that have been offered to answer those concerns, arguing that the arguments fail to meet the challenge. I will conclude with a few words about the moral implications of this failure and some suggestions for reform.
A constitutional framework, built on a prudent regard for human beings, must enable the government to control the governed. No less important, however, is the auxiliary precaution of checking and balancing within government itself. If human law departs from the law of nature, it is no longer law but a perversion of the law. The general idea is captured in James Otis ' Rights of British Colonies, Asserted and Proved (1764), wherein he stipulates: The Law of nature was not man's making, nor is it in his power to mend or alter its course. He can only perform and keep or disobey and break it. The last is never done with impunity, even in this life, if it is any punishment for a man to feel himself depraved, to find himself degraded by his own folly and wickedness from the rank of a virtuous and good man to that of a brute, or to be transformed from the friends, perhaps father, of his country to a devouring lion and tiger. Under constitutional theory, however, government must be just and reasonable, not only from the viewpoint of majority sentiment but also in conformity with higher law, what the Declaration of Independence Act of 1977 refers to as "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God". Constitutionalism means that the power of government and Leaders should be defined and Limited by the dictates of the body of the fundamental laws of the land known as the constitution. As a body of political and legal doctrine, it refers to government that is, in the first instance, devoted both to the good of the entire community and to the preservation of the rights of individual persons. Problems of constitutional governance in the 21 st century will likely be problems within government recognized as democratic. The modern day phenomenon of "illiberal democracies" gains legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that these regimes seem reasonably democratic. Illiberal democracy, that is, nominally democratic government shorn of constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate but dangerous, bringing within the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war. This paper examines the nexus of constitutionalism and democracy. It is argued that the spread of democracy around the world has not always been accompanied by a corresponding spread of constitutional liberty.
A critical reading of the above comment indeed affirms the contention between the concept of constitutionalism and the concept of philosophical foundation of the state leading to a host of vexing questions, including how a government can be legally limited if law is the creation of government? I will attempt to discuss this dichotomy in the two concepts by looking at the nature, identity and authority of constitutions, what constitutionalism is, the philosophical foundations of the state, the relationship between the two concepts in terms of situations where constitutionalism is practiced as against situations where constitutionalism is absent with examples and authorities from mainly Ghana and finally conclude this term paper with the position on whether or not this contention is a settled matter. A constitution is the blue print of a nation. It establishes the basic framework for the operation of the state and expresses its important social and political values. In many ways, it functions as the national conscience. The Free Dictionary defines constitution as " the fundamental law, written or unwritten, that establishes the character of a government by defining the basic principles to which a society must conform; by describing the organization of the government and regulation, distribution, and limitations on the functions of different government departments; and by prescribing the extent and manner of the exercise of its sovereign powers. " In modern Europe, written constitutions came into greater use during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Constitutions such as that of the United States, created in 1787, were influenced by the ancient Greek models. During the twentieth century, an increasing number of countries around the world concluded that constitutions are a necessary part of democratic or republican government. Many thus adopted their own constitutions. In its ideal form, a constitution emanates from the consent and will of the people whom it governs. Besides establishing the institutions of government and the manner in which they function toward each other and toward the people, a constitution may also set forth the rights of the individual and a government's responsibility to honor those rights. Constitutions, whether written or unwritten, typically function as an evolving body of legal custom and opinion. Their evolution generally involves changes in judicial interpretation or in themselves, the latter usually through a process called amendment. Amendment of a constitution is usually designed to be a difficult process in order to give the constitution greater stability. On the other hand, if a constitution is extremely difficult to amend, it might be too inflexible to survive over time. In a truly constitutional form of government, the three basic forms of governmental power: namely legislative power (making new laws), executive power (implementing laws) and judicial power (adjudicating disputes under law) are all subject to constitutional rules and provisions and may not violate them without punishment. Such constitutional governments are also called limited governments because the constitution restricts the scope of their power over the people. However, some governments that have constitutions do not practice true constitutionalism, the mere existence of a constitution of a state does not mean it is a constitutional government. The former
This paper critically examines the assertion that "Constitutionalism is more important than the Constitution" by exploring the practical and philosophical distinctions between having a Constitution and upholding Constitutionalism as a governing principle. By engaging with definitions, historical origins, and core elements of a national Constitution, the study highlights Constitutionalism’s emphasis on the rule of law, separation of powers, judicial independence, and the protection of fundamental rights. The discussion draws on comparative insights, particularly the distinction between rule by law and rule of law, to argue that a Constitution alone is insufficient if not actively upheld by Constitutional ideals. By contrasting countries with formal Constitutions to those with unwritten but functional Constitutional frameworks, the paper underscores that adherence to Constitutionalism is essential for safeguarding democracy and human rights. Ultimately, the study posits that while a Constitution embodies supreme legal authority, its true worth is realized only through consistent respect for Constitutional principles, suggesting that Constitutionalism provides a more reliable foundation for governance than the text of the Constitution itself.
Uncodified Constitution and the Question of Political Legitimacy, 2022
Unwritten or uncodifiable aspects of constitutionalism are examined in the theoretical and empirical frameworks. The common ground for all research presented in this book is the question of political legitimacy. As we believe, by asking about legitimacy (not merely about legality), one can reach a full spectrum of the constitutional order
This article is founded on disillusionment with a dominant approach to justifying the legitimacy of constitutions and of judicial review. In the prevailing tradition, constitutionalism is justified by its desirable consequences, e.g., the promotion of justice or democracy. This article disputes this methodological starting point and defends robust constitutionalism. Robust constitutionalism refers to a mode of justification that does not rest on contingent facts. Instead robust constitutionalism defends constitutionalism on the basis of values that are embedded in the very concept of a constitution and in the very essence of judicial review. Constitutional entrenchment of rights is valuable because it constitutes public recognition that the protection of rights is the state's duty, rather than a mere discretionary gesture on its part.
Political Studies, 1996
Constitutions play a vital role in politics. With a few honourable exceptions, however, contemporary political scientists and theorists have paid them remarkably little attention. Apart from a periodic interest in electoral laws, voting systems and the relative merits of parliamentarism and presidentialism, the profession has treated the study of constitutions as at best an irrelevance and at worst misleading, providing no guide to the genuine operations of politics. Amongst British academics, this lack of interest has often been attributed to the peculiarity of the country's own unwritten constitution. But this attitude is equally common in countries with a strong constitutionalist traditionone need only think of the American behaviourist school. This relative indifference to constitutional issues amongst the political studies community would appear to result from a number of more general factors, therefore, that derive from certain prevailing conceptions of the discipline. By and large, political scientists view constitutions as idealistic and, as a consequence, insignificant. They have regarded them as formal legal frameworks bearing little or no relation to the real workings of the political system such as the influence of government and the administrative machine, or the clash of interests and political cultures within a nation. After all, they point out, many repressive regimes have had written constitutions offering all kinds of formal protection for individual and collective rights. But these provisions proved totally worthless because the constitutional documents within which they appeared had no influence on, and largely misdescribed, the actual exercise of power in those countries. Seen in this light, constitutions appear to be either the unnecessary adornments of good regimes that work well for totally unrelated reasons, or the means whereby bad regimes are provided with a spurious legitimacy. Political theorists, in contrast, have often ignored constitutions because they have considered them too empirical and the preserve of mainly legal, historical and sociological scholars. They have found the institutional, cultural and positive characteristics of constitutions difficult to integrate into their more abstract discussions of justice and power, self-interest and collective choice. This volume challenges these rather narrow conceptions of the discipline of politics, revealing in the process the political significance of constitutions. Constitutionalism offers not only a mutually beneficial point of contact between the descriptive and the prescriptive branches of political studies, it also relates politics to other fields of enquiry. To this end, the editors have invited contributions from jurists, sociologists and economists as well as from political scientists and theorists and historians of political thought. This interdisciplinary endeavour illuminates how politics requires certain normative and social preconditions that constitutions strive, with varying degrees of success, to
Uncodified Constitutions and the Question of Political Legitimacy, 2022
https://wydawnictwo.umk.pl/pl/products/5844/uncodified-constitutions-and-the-question-of-political-legitimacy This book seeks to examine and explore an issue within the study of constitutionalism that is an extensive phenomenon that cannot be easily reduced merely to the written legal document. Now this claim is a quite obvious truth, yet the scope of uncodifiable – that is to say, those aspects of law and constitutionalism that escape or avoid being framed in codified or written form are hard to embrace by legal science. Hence, our intention in this volume was to explore the issue from many different points of view and provide a useful reflection on this topic.
This paper is the introduction to the special issue of the Journal of Constitutional History / Giornale di storia costituzionale, 32, II, 2016, focused on different aspects of the constitutionalism considered by a global point of view. It is a reflection on the different meanings of constitution and constitutionalism now and on the future of the "classic" constitutonalism.
Global Constitutionalism
What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and r...
SSRN Electronic Journal
It is well known that constitutions, which are valorized as national statements of unity, values, and purpose, are not conceived of nor written by domestic actors alone. Constitution-making relies heavily on international legal traditions and archetypical imageries of the source and purpose of law (Arjomand
Global Jurist, 2009
The idea of limited government is the key to constitutionalism in the traditional understanding of the relationship between the constitution and political power. In contrast to the traditionalist view that the constitution is aimed to constrain political power, this essay aims to explore a new understanding of constitutionalism. By way of analyzing the multiple functions of the constitution and taking up the concept of total constitution" associated with the growing horizontal effect of constitutional rights, this essay argues that the relationship between the constitution and political power needs to be recast on complementary rather than opposing terms. The aspiration to total constitution" in the sense of a fulfilled constitutionalism is substantiated by the omnipotent constitutional state. Taking account of constitutional omnipotence, political power is instrumental rather than antagonistic to the normative implementation of constitutionalism. Recasting the constitut...
Jan, 2023
This chapter retrospectively records the sudden change of wind and the event following Yang’s article and introduces the main academic schools that formed before and around 2013, in hopes to leave an as authentic as possible record of this glorious, although short-lived, academic history of constitutional studies. I want to make a disclaimer here that in view of the length limit, it is not possible for me to include every single representative author and his/her works in this record. Roughly speaking, constitutionalism is a thing of the past after 2013.
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2005
The use of constitutional language and concepts has enjoyed a widespread expansion in recent decades. From the relatively narrow confinement within national constitutional law discourses it has, in the wake of globalisation, crept into almost all legal sub-disciplines as well as into political science, international relations and sociology. Does this development mark the triumph of constitutionalism or is it rather an indication of its demise taking the form of an increasingly desperate attempt to maintain the constitutional outlook in the face of structural developments which threaten to undermine state-based constitutional orders? This crucial question, which goes to the core of the future of democracy and the rule of law, is the topic of this brilliantly edited volume.
Jus Cogens, 2019
What makes a constitution democratically legitimate? What kind of constitution making process is more likely to yield democratic and constitutionalist outcomes? These are two of the central questions guiding the work of Andrew Arato. With the recent publication of Post Sovereign Constitution Making and The Adventures of the Constituent Power, Arato significantly advances his decades long project of a normatively informed sociology of constitutional change. His main argument is historical in character: a post sovereign model of constitution making has emerged "out of the adventures of the revolutionary and populist idea of the sovereign constituent power" 1 . However, this is also an argument with normative implications: the fundamental weakness of sovereign constitution making is its elective affinity to dictatorship 2 , a political danger made evident by the history of modern revolutions. To the contrary, the post sovereign paradigm's transcendence of the revolutionary and populist logics of political action offers an alternative conception of the constituent power that is "more faithful to the values of both democracy and constitutionalism" 3 . For Arato, the study of these two models of constitution making is highly relevant: "constitution making and remaking pertains to the highest level of law making, the political design and allocation of power within a polity.
Int'l J. Const. L., 2005
South African Constitutional Law, 2024
In Chapter 2 on ‘Constitutionalism’, the editors – Jason Brickhill, Adila Hassim, Michael Bishop and Tembeka Ngcukaitobi – stake out the terrain on which all the chapters of the work are ultimately situated. The chapter situates constitutionalism in South Africa’s history and its geo-political position in Africa and the Global South. It traces the evolution of our constitutional law and discourse in broad terms. We advance a conception of constitutionalism – as grounded in the constitutional text, jurisprudence and scholarship – that includes six principles. These are the rule of law and the principle of legality; the separation of powers; democracy; human rights; transformative constitutionalism; and the founding values of freedom, dignity and equality.
Queen's Law Journal (forthcoming)
In the world of constitutional law, theory and practice are moving in opposite directions. As a matter of legal practice, since the end of the Second World War an extensive and growing literature produced by lawyers, judges and political scientists acknowledges the emergence of a ground-breaking constitutional paradigm. In states as diverse as Germany, South Africa, and Canada, this modern constitutional paradigm integrates (1) a written constitution that exhaustively establishes the conditions for the valid exercise of all public authority, (2) a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights that delineates the right of persons, by virtue of their dignity, to just governance, and (3) a politically independent judicial body to which any individual can bring a constitutional complaint challenging the validity of any exercise of public authority that violates a constitutional right. As a matter of theoretical justification, however, this phenomenon remains enigmatic. Its leading defenders, such as Ronald Dworkin, argue that modern constitutionalism is justified because it contributes to the realization of some morally desirable outcome, for example, elevated levels of public debate or just decisions. Such justifications are open to a devastating skeptical challenge. As Jeremy Waldron has observed, the various benefits that constitutionalism is purported to bring may be realized in its absence, while the presence of constitutional arrangements provide no guarantee that the benefits will accrue. This essay formulates an original justification of modern constitutionalism that is not vulnerable to this line of objection. Instead of justifying modern constitutionalism by appealing to benefits that could, in principle, be achieved in its absence, the author argues that modern constitutionalism is a systematic response to a moral problem involving public authority that every legal system must address, but that cannot be addressed apart from the legal and institutional structure of a modern constitutional state. The problem – common to all precursors of modern constitutionalism – is not that the government necessarily exercises public authority in a manner that violates the inherent dignity and fundamental rights of the ruled, but that in the event of a violation one or more persons are left without legal recourse. When one suffers a public wrong at the hands of the government, the government is both a party to the dispute and judge in its own cause. Accordingly, the government might ignore one’s grievance, deny that the grievance amounts to a wrong, or even concede the commission of a wrong but withhold a corresponding remedy. To address this problem, one requires a legal and institutional structure that enables any individual to challenge the validity of any exercise of public authority by raising a constitutional complaint. This is exactly what the modern constitutional state – and only the modern constitutional state –provides.
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