Financial crises. Where do we stand

Rivista Trimestrale Di Diritto Pubblico, 2012

CONTENTS: 1. The historical foundations of public law and their erosion in a globalized world.-2. New trends in public law from the financial to sovereign debt crisis.-3. Multilateralism and cooperation among governments.-4. EU and Member States.-5. Executives and parliaments.-6. «Politicians» and «experts».-7. Central and local governments.-8. Public and private sector.-9. «More» and «less» state at the same time: beyond the zero-sum game narrative.

SSRN Electronic Journal

To make the no-bailout clause credible and enhance the effectiveness of crisis assistance, a consistent institutional and legal framework is needed to ensure that private creditors contribute to crisis resolution. Getting activated as part of ESM crisis assistance, we propose a novel two-stage mechanism that allows for postponing the fateful distinction between liquidity and solvency crises: At the onset of a ESM program, the framework demands an immediate maturity extension if the debt burden is high, followed by deeper debt restructuring if postcrisis debt proves unsustainable. The mechanism can be easily implemented by amending ESM guidelines and compelling countries to issue debt with Creditor Participation Clauses (CPCs). As debt is rolled over, the mechanism gradually phases in, leaving countries time to reduce debt. Given that private sector involvement reduces financing needs, the ESM could provide longer programs and more time for reforms.

Journal of International Money and Finance, 2013

This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and sharing with colleagues. Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party websites are prohibited. In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or institutional repository. Authors requiring further information regarding Elsevier's archiving and manuscript policies are encouraged to visit: http://www.elsevier.com/copyright Author's personal copy Editorial The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Background and perspectives, overview of the special issue

Review of International Political Economy, 2015

This special issue has two main aims: to examine the contribution of political economy analyses of the sovereign debt crisis and to relate these findings to longstanding debates in the sub-disciplines of comparative political economy, international political economy and European economic governance. This introduction begins by reviewing the comparative political economy literature on national financial systems in order to account for the playing out of the crisis. It then examines the international political economy literature on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and financial (sovereign debt) markets that played such a key role in the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, it outlines longstanding academic debates on the main 'asymmetries'; in European economic governance, and provides a critical overview of the three main policy and institutional reforms adopted by European Union governments in response to the crisis.

2015

Finance and Society

European financial regulation consistently gives governments privileged access to private investors, reflecting the anchor role assigned to sovereign securities as safe and liquid assets for the financial system. Legislative reforms after the financial crisis of 2008 further expanded the preferential treatment of sovereign securities as zero-risk claims, introduced portfolio requirements in favour of public debt, and constrained market speculation against governments. These sovereign privileges appear counterproductive for fiscal discipline and financial stability: they encourage excessive public debt issuance and make financial institutions holding government bonds – in particular from euro area countries with a variable risk profile – vulnerable to fiscal turbulence. Governments seem to have a conflict of interest. On the one hand, they are prudential regulators of financial risk-taking, on the other hand, they tend to overlook the financial sector’s exposure to sovereign risk. Th...

Working Papers, 2012

Fordham Journal of International Law , 2019

This paper discusses the legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area – both de lege lata and de lege ferenda. Sovereign debt restructurings remain exceptional events that come with profound implications for financial stability and monetary policy transmission. However, they may be necessary as part of a financial assistance program to a euro area Member State, as was the case for Greece in 2012. This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion on how to enhance the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by exploring the legal aspects of sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area. This includes an analysis on whether and how the procedures for sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area can be made more orderly, fair, and predictable by establishing a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework (ESDRF). Drawing upon international standards for sovereign bond documentation, one may consider the inclusion of enhanced Collective Action Clauses (CACs) as well as certain technical amendment clauses. In addition, two options for a sovereign debt dispute resolution mechanism are discussed: (i) a separate chamber at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and (ii) a sovereign debt arbitration mechanism. The paper makes no judgement on the economic or political feasibility and necessity for such changes, but seeks to shed some light on the legal aspects to be taken into account in the context of reforming the euro area's framework for sovereign debt restructuring.

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This article argues that the public-private distinction is essential for safeguarding individual autonomy and democracy. As the article shows at the example of sovereign debt restructuring, global governance has blurred the distinction between public and private actors, instruments, and processes, and this causes immediate risks for human rights and democracy. This raises the question how the public-private distinction can be maintained under the structural conditions of global governance. For that purpose, the article ventures to propose a definition of publicness for global governance inspired by discourse theory. It argues that whenever a community, defined by the prevalence of communicative action, exercises authority over its members, there is an act of public authority that needs to respect standards of human rights protection and democratic self-determination. The article applies this framework to sovereign debt restructuring and identifies exercises of public authority in current sovereign debt restructuring practice, which need to, but often do not, meet these standards. The public-private distinction is thus an important tool for criticizing global governance.