Liability of Ordinary Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression, The
David Rodin2007, Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev.
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Abstract
Aggression has long been considered the preeminent international crime. Yet, the vast majority of agents involved in perpetrating this crime-the individual officers and soldiers who fight in aggressive warsare never held to account either in law or in broader moral terms. At Nuremburg, a decision was made to concentrate prosecutions on only the most senior leadership of the Nazi party and military. There was no attempt to prosecute lower ranking officers, ordinary soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had not themselves committed atrocities nor breaches of jus in bello.
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