A Safety Index and Method for Flightdeck Evaluation
Kara Latorella
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Abstract
If our goal is to improve safety through machine, interface, and training design, then we must define a metric of flightdeck safety that is usable in the design process. Current measures associated with our notions of "good" pilot performance and ultimate safety of flightdeck performance fail to provide an adequate index of safe flightdeck performance for design evaluation purposes. The goal of this research effort is to devise a safety index and method that allows us to evaluate flightdeck performance holistically and in a naturalistic experiment. This paper uses Reason's model of accident causation (1990) as a basis for measuring safety, and proposes a relational database system and method for 1) defining a safety index of flightdeck performance, and 2) evaluating the "safety" afforded by flightdeck performance for the purpose of design iteration. Methodological considerations, limitations, and benefits are discussed as well as extensions to this work. INTR...
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