Introduction: Systematicity, the Nature of Science?

Philosophia, Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 36: 167-180 (2008) , 2008

Mind (forthcoming)

De Gruyter eBooks, 2020

This paper addresses the question of what the heart (or the "nature") of science is. After a short introduction, I will first make a few preliminary historical and systematic remarks. Next, in answering the main question, I shall propose the following thesis: Scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially from everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. This thesis has to be qualified, clarified, developed and justified. In particular, I will develop the thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than everyday knowledge: regarding descriptions, explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation and the structure and representation of knowledge. Finally, I will compare my answer with alternative answers. In diesem Aufsatz wird die Frage gestellt und beantwortet, was Wissenschaft ist. Dazu mache ich zunächst einige historische und systematische Vorbemerkungen, worauf folgende These vorgeschlagen wird: Wissenschaftliches Wissen unterscheidet sich von anderen Wissensarten, besonders dem Alltagswissen, primär durch sein höheren Grad an Systematizität. Diese These muss erläutert und begründet sowie der Begriff der Systematizität geklärt werden. Die These wird schließlich in neun Dimensionen entwickelt, die jeweils zeigen, dass Wissenschaft systematischer als das Alltagswissen ist: dies sind Beschreibungen, Erklärungen, Vorhersagen, die Verteidigung von Wissensansprüchen, der kritische Diskurs, epistemische Vernetztheit, ein Ideal der Vollständigkeit, die Vermehrung von Wissen sowie die Strukturierung und Darstellung von Wissen. Abschließend vergleiche ich meinen Ansatz mit anderen Positionen.

Metascience, 2013

Hoyningen-Huene is rightly famous for his book on Thomas Kuhn's philosophy, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science. Indeed, to many North American philosophers of science, Hoyningen-Huene is known exclusively as a Kuhn scholar, explicating Kuhn's views and writing on Kuhnian themes, like incommensurability. Hoyningen-Huene's new book, Systematicity, is a departure from Kuhn scholarship, constituting a contribution to general philosophy of science. But this is not an altogether new project. In fact, Hoyningen-Huene reports that he has been working on this project off and on for decades. Systematicity deals with the issue of understanding what distinguishes scientific knowledge from everyday knowledge. This may sound like some version of the demarcation problem, a popular topic in philosophy of science from the 1930s to the 1970s, but the issue that concerns Hoyningen-Huene is different. The demarcation problem was concerned, principally, with distinguishing science from pseudoscience, the alleged bodies of belief that purport to be scientific but in fact are not. Karl Popper regarded the demarcation problem as a pressing issue when he wrote Logic of Scientific Discovery in the 1930s, regarding it as comparable in significance to the problem of induction. Just as the Vienna Circle logical positivists sought to undermine metaphysics with their verification principle, Popper sought to undermine Freudian and Adlerian psychology, and Marxist history by appeal to his demarcation criteria. But instead of accusing the proponents of these theories of indulging in metaphysical flights of fancy, and aspiring to have knowledge about things that exceed our capacity to know, Popper accused them of developing theories that were unfalsifiable, and thus unscientific. Pseudoscientific theories could be reconciled with any possible facts, and thus explained nothing.

in: World Conference on Science. Science for the Twenty-First Century: A New Commitment (ed. by A.M. Cetto), Paris: UNESCO, 2000, pp. 52-56, 2000

Synthese, 2016

Hoyningen-Huene (Systematicity: the nature of science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene's view to a view I refer to as the "Continuity Thesis." The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others. I argue that Hoyningen-Huene ultimately rejects the Continuity Thesis, and I present further evidence to show that the Continuity Thesis is false. I also argue that it is the systematicity of science that ultimately grounds the epistemic authority of science. Hoyningen-Huene thus draws attention to an important feature of science that explains the place of science in contemporary society. Keywords Systematicity • Continuity Thesis • Common sense • Scientific knowledge • Epistemic authority In Systematicity: The Nature of Science Paul Hoyningen-Huene aims to reinvigorate a central question in general philosophy of science: what is the nature of science? A crucial part of his argumentative strategy is to compare scientific inquiry and scientific knowledge to the layperson's approach to inquiry and everyday knowledge. My aim is to draw out some implications of Hoyningen-Huene's view, and in the process clarify his position on the nature of science. I want to contrast his view with

Springer eBooks, 2014

Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 1999

Metascience, 2019

Philosophy of Science, 1957

1. Argument. Questions that have arisen about the "existence" of elementary particles and other entities of physics have often been dismissed as unprofitable, with the tacit assumption that the categories suitable for the discussion of everyday knowledge are not suitable for the ...