Hume and the problem of induction

Hume Studies, 1989

Synthese, 1998

This paper presents a new account of Hume's "probability of causes". There are two main results attained in this investigation. The first, and perhaps the most significant, is that Hume developed -albeit informally -an essentially sound system of probabilistic inductive logic that turns out to be a powerful forerunner of Carnap's systems. The Humean set of principles include, along with rules that turn out to be new for us, well known Carnapian principles, such as the axioms of semiregularity, symmetry with respect to individuals (exchangeability), predictive irrelevance and positive instantial relevance. The second result is that Hume developed an original conception of probability, which is subjective in character, although it differs from contemporary personalistic views because it includes constraints that are additional to simple consistency and do not vary between different persons. The final section is a response to Gower's thesis, by which Hume's probability of causes is essentially non-Bayesian in character. It is argued that, on closer examination, Gower's reading of the relevant passages is untenable and that, on the contrary, they are in accordance with the Bayesian reconstruction presented in this paper.

Hume Studies, 1977

Hume Studies, 1998

2012

Hume’s problem of induction has played a major role in modern epistemology and in the philosophy of science. It has provided an inspiration for various philosophers who intend to refute the allegedly skeptical conclusion included in the Hume’s works. Interestingly, though, in contemporary Hume research the claim that Hume was skeptical about induction is vigorously challenged. It is claimed that he meant his argument to be only an explanation of causes of our inductive reasoning. Hume appears to be, on that reading, a kind of naturalistic epistemologist who inquired into the mechanisms of our inductive reasoning. He assumed that some mechanisms of our mind are producing beliefs about causal links and he posed the question: how do we come to have that kind of beliefs? What is the source of our beliefs about causal links? His research led him to discover that the beliefs about causal links are not determined by any piece of abstract reasoning but by nature, custom and imagination. It ...

2011

Dialogue, 2009

In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues strongly against our intuitions about induction. In his view, the justification of induction relies upon the principle of the uniformity of nature, a principle that we can only justify by an appeal to induction. Thus, a non-circular justification of induction is impossible. This argument has troubled philosophers ever since, especially philosophers interested in the philosophy of science. One prominent solution to this problem comes from Karl Popper, who posited a deductivist solution to the problem. In this paper, I will briefly summarize Hume's argument as well as Popper's response to it. I will then argue that Popper's account twice fails to solve the problem of induction: first, as A. J. Ayer pointed out, his account appears to contain a built-in inductive assumption, and second, by shifting his discussion from induction to deduction, Popper begs Hume's question, merely shifting from a problem of induction to a problem of deduction.