A more substantive neuron doctrine

Behavioral and brain sciences, 1999

Among those who reflect on the nature of neuroscience, there is a view about its scope and limits which we will call, with a certain amount of historical license, the neuron doc-trine.1 Roughly, the neuron doctrine is the view that the framework within which the science of ...

The neuron doctrine is the dominant theory of the structure and function of the nervous system. Standard histories of neuroscience celebrate Cajal, who first formulated this theory, and overlook Golgi, who resisted adopting it. A few historians have turned up evidence that challenges this story, suggesting that Golgi accepted the main claim that defines the neuron doctrine. The revised history says that Golgi and Cajal agreed on the facts, but differed in their theoretical preconceptions. I add further details to this revised history. First, I show that the standard history was largely manufactured by Cajal. Second, I argue that Golgi and Cajal agreed only on the fact of there not being anastomosis between cells, but not on anatomical independence. Third, I investigate the reasons why Golgi refused to accept anatomical independence, while Cajal did. I show how the particular brain areas Golgi and Cajal each took as their model system played a part in the construction of their theories.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 1999, 850-851, 1999

According to Gold and Stoljar, one cannot both consistently be reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then I reject their characterization of reductionism: reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the argument from unification-as-reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical, but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine.

Science, 2005

Information processing, past and present.The Neuron Doctrine transformed the 19th-century view of the nervous system which saw the brain as a network of interconnected nerve fibers (upper left). A century later, the modern view (lower right) holds the neuron as a discrete cell that processes information in more ways than original envisaged: Intercellular communication by gap junctions, slow electrical potentials, action potentials initiated in dendrites, neuromodulatory effects, extrasynaptic release of neurotransmitters, and information flow between neurons and glia all contribute to information processing. ]. (Right) T. thermophilus ribosome at 5.5 Å resolution [from (7, 9)]. Both are oriented such that the small subunit [ribosomal RNA (light blue) and protein (dark blue)] is in the front.

Theory & Psychology, 2007

This paper explores three connected claims about the interrelation of psychology and neuroscience that occur in discussions within theoretical psychology. The first and second claims are that neuroscience cannot offer a complete account of human psychology because it can show only correlations between neural events and cognitive or behavioral events. The third claim is that neuroscience ultimately is incomplete or irrelevant to psychological accounts since it is silent on crucial cultural and historical issues relevant to human knowledge and action. We argue that all of these claims are false, not because neuroscience can replace psychology, but because each discipline should be seen to complement and support the other.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999

Two radical neuron doctrines must be distinguished, strong and weak. Gold & Stoljar direct much of their attack at the former, but the Churchlands hold only the latter. The weak radical neuron doctrine remains a serious possibility.

2003

In this tome of wide ranging scope the authors continue to be interested in the philosophical analysis of non-philosophical disciplines. Some of the topics discussed technically in Max Bennett's 1997 book The idea of consciousness are now philosophically situated. For Peter Hacker, the present volume is the second comprehensive critique of a whole field of inquiry, after Language, sense and nonsense published in 1985 with Gordon Baker. Two decades ago intellectual opportunism was seen as pervasive in the modern theories of language; today transgressions of the bounds of sense are found to be ubiquitous in the theories of mind inspired by neuroscience.

Mind and Language, 1998

Francis Crick has identified a doctrine-the neuron doctrine-which he apparently regards as both true and astonishing. I begin by carefully articulating Crick's doctrine, arguing that whilst plausible it is certainly not astonishing. I then consider a related doctrine, the biological neuroscience thesis (BNT). According to BNT, mental science is biological neuroscience, where biological neuroscience is pretty much exhausted by neuroanatomy, neurophysiology and neurochemistry. Stoljar and Gold argue that BNT is unsupported by current scientific developments. I argue that well-established results in the cognitive sciences show that it is false.

Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly "local." Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest ways that "naturalistic" programs might develop in detail, beyond the abstract philosophical considerations in their favor. The literature distinguishes "philosophy of neuroscience" and "neurophilosophy." The former concerns foundational issues within the neurosciences. The latter concerns application of neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions. Exploring various concepts of representation employed in neuroscientific theories is an example of the former. Examining implications of neurological syndromes for the concept of a unified self is an example of the latter. In this entry, we will assume this distinction and discuss examples of both.