Rationality and the Good

1999

Ethical theory and moral practice, 1999

Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges to Audi's intuitionism. It becomes harder to argue that there are any self-evident propositions at all, or more than just a few such propositions. It is questionable whether all moral propositions that we take an interest in are evidentially connected to self-evident propositions. It is difficult to understand what could guide the sort conceptual revision that is likely to take place in our moral theorising. It is hard to account for the epistemic value of the sort of systematicity usually praised in moral theorising. Finally, it is difficult to see what difference the truth of Audi's ethical intuitionism would make to the way in which we (fail to) handle moral disagreement.

The Hilltop Review, 2015

In the present thesis my purpose is to investigate whether contemporary intuitionism can rebut recent criticism that builds on the phenomenon of moral disagreement. I argue that it can. In chapter one I specify in what sense do I use the terms ‘intuitionism’ and ‘intuition’. In chapter two I describe the intuitionists’ theories of how intuitions are justified. In chapter three I explain how present-day intuitionists answered some problems coming from disagreement. Having presented the intuitionist theory, I turn to new criticisms in chapter four and five. Firstly, I introduce Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge. He argues that since moral beliefs are often subjects to various defeaters, including being subject to disagreements, moral intuitions cannot enjoy the justification that intuitionists claim they do. I point out that Sinnott-Armstrong’s characterization of intuitionism is misleading. I argue that using a more appropriate characterization and the theories about justification that intuitionists put forward his challenge can be answered satisfactorily, and even without these since it cannot fulfil its own requirements. Secondly, I introduce Roger Crisp’s challenge. He argues that in case of peer disagreement regarding a moral belief the believer who does not suspend that particular belief is in error. I argue in the contrary and show that the one who does suspend belief can just as well be in error. In the concluding chapter I summarize the results of my investigations and point out what kind of significance they ascribe to moral disagreement.

Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology

In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi's account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of " adequate understanding. " I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which is based on the seeming account of intuition. Finally, I show how the seeming account of self-evidence can make the moral intuitionist epistemology more tenable.

Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 2012

The notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and non-argumentative) forms of judgment. Recently, the notion of intuition has also played a leading role in cognitive studies on morality with the rise of so-called social intuitionism, according to which people's moral stances are culturally driven intuitions -i.e. they are quick, involuntary and automatic responses driven by culturally and socially acquired principles (see e.g. , [41] and [22]). Usually, intuitionism is presented as radically opposed to rationalistic views of morality according to which moral judgments are the outcome of explicit reasoning. In this work we compare two different hypotheses concerning the possible relationship between reasoning and intuition: a 'continuist interpretation' (maintaining that intuitions and judgments based on reasoning are produced by the same cognitive process) and a 'discontinuist interpretation' (supporting the view that they are produced by two different cognitive processes). We argue that a continuist interpretation appears more plausible than a discontinuist one and that the concepts of 'intuition' and 'reasoning' are two facets of the same process which spans from fast, immediate, and certain answer to slow, conscious and elaborate judgments. According to this interpretation, moral judgments are produced by the same kinds of inferences reasoning relies on, i.e. mostly deduction, induction and abduction. Our analysis will show that to opt for a continuist interpretation has many consequences for the way morality is explained from a psychological point of view. Mainly, it challenges the idea of morality

T he notion of 'intuition' is usually contrasted with rational thought, thus motivating a differentiation between two kinds of processes that are supposed to characterize human thinking, i.e. rational and 'intuitive' (immediate and non-argumentative) forms of judgment. Recently, the notion of intuition has also played a leading role in cognitive studies on morality with the rise of so-called social intuitionism, according to which people's moral stances are culturally driven intuitions -i.e. they are quick, involuntary and automatic responses driven by culturally and socially acquired principles (see e.g.

2018

The first part of this introductory chapter introduces and discusses four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason, (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. We sketch different ¬– stronger and weaker – versions of each thesis, and tentatively examine whether specific versions of the different theses can be recombined into attractive rationalist packages, in which the various strands are mutually supporting. The chapter’s second part provides an overview of the contributions included in this volume.

The present essay takes issue with the idea of moral supervenience. It is argued that this idea is subject to fatal objections that can be brought to light by utilizing the resources of a phenomenological approach guided by demands of descriptive authenticity and rational principles. This critical project is carried out by focusing on Robert Audi's sophisticated moderate ethical intuitionism which has rightly gained prominence recently. The relevant problems are addressed by comparing Audi's notion of supervenience with Edmund Husserl's account of foundation. The latter refers to different types of (intentional) contents and their relatedness in terms of ontological dependence. Husserl's notion of foundation challenges the view that higher-order complex intentional unities like evaluative acts could be analyzed in terms of 'adding up' purely descriptive and nondescriptive contents. Or (choosing the current language of supervenience debates): in terms of anchoring moral properties in natural properties. My main thesis is that applying the idea of supervenience to the field of morality involves a circularity problem that undermines the taken-for-granted presupposition of a clear-cut distinguishability of natural and moral properties. Appropriately specifying one's duties in situations of moral conflicts, according to the idea of supervenience, calls for identifying all those natural properties or facts that are relevant for morally assessing the situation in the first place. This practical task of solving the problem of moral salience, however, cannot be met by referring to pure facts that could be determined in an independent manner, that is, as uninfluenced by those moral perceptions or moral assessments whose appropriateness or permissibility, as assumed, is under consideration. Though we may grant that supervenience delivers a plausible general or abstract picture of how morality (as well as aesthetics, religion and other normative aspects) can be part of the world we experience, it does not help us properly assessing (or explaining how to properly assess) moral issues in concrete situations. Rather, from a moral-practical point of view, it is a thoroughly suspicious idea. * The present essay greatly benefited from comments of audiences at the Universities of Heidelberg, Helsinki, Amsterdam and Krákow. I am especially grateful to Robert Audi for his critical response to my Krákow presentation. Special thanks go to Paul Weingartner, Michael Wallner and Harald Wiltsche who extensively commented on earlier drafts. It goes without saying that I am responsible for all unclarities or errors that may have remained.