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Moral and Political Conceptions of Human Rights
AI
This paper examines the role of philosophical theories in shaping international legal human rights (ILHR) standards and assessments. It distinguishes between "Orthodox" theories, which suggest a unitary notion of moral human rights as foundational for ILHR, and institutional theories that advocate for a broader set of relevant interests reflecting the complexities of these rights in the context of international bodies. The author argues for a nuanced understanding of how human rights ought to be interpreted and applied, highlighting the necessity for philosophical frameworks to balance authority and legitimacy within human rights regimes.
One of the major sins of lawyers and legislators is pride. It is often reflected in a widely shared belief that the law as a normative system is omnipotent. The conviction that every aspect of social life can be regulated by law, as well as the assumption that such a regulation will be effective, is not only false but also harmful. It leads to the phenomenon of the inflation of law and renders law ineffective and oppressive. It also results in the loss of trust within the society towards the law as an institution. In the first part of my paper, I would like to present a theoretical and socio-legal analysis of the model of various normative systems in the society and the relations that can occur between the norms originating from them. In this sociological and theoretical part, I will analyze the position of a subject being in a normatively and legally relevant situation to which you could apply the norms originating from more than one normative system, including systems other than the law. The analysis of the circumstances affecting the decision of the acting subject will be the base to understanding the dilemmas of the subject judging their actions. The matter of judgments will be dealt with in relation to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its jurisprudence based on Article 10 of the European Councils Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms relating to the freedom of expression (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1953). A Socio-legal outlook on the ECHR’s achievements will help showing the role of this type of court in the application of not only the purely legal norms but also the norms originating from other normative systems, such as religion, customs or morality. My further considerations should provide the answers to the following questions: - What are the boundaries of law as a normative system in the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg based on Article 10 of the European Councils Convention? - What is the scope and effectiveness of such a normative system? - How do the judges of the Court refer in their judgments to the normative systems other than the actual law? It is an important analysis regarding the autonomy of the legal system from the other social systems. My paper is suppose to show that the application of norms by the ECHR is not limited only to the legal ones. It is often very important to determine which norms and from which system are competent to regulate a given field. The social life is complicated. A social order is maintained not only by law but also by morals, customs, religion or even fashion. In the midst of this melting pot, there are the judges at the moment of delivering their verdict. It is important that with such a variety of normative systems, we should recognize and be aware of the relations which occur between such systems and the results that such relations may cause.
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021, 2021
Interpretation, or the judicial understanding of the legal acts in the process of protection of the human rights, is becoming increasingly interesting and controversial, both from an aspect of the applied interpretation technique (which interpretation method is applied by the judge in a specific case and why), as well as from an aspect of the legal opportunism/legitimacy of the interpretation. It is a fact that so far, neither the European, nor the national legal theories and practice have offered coordinated systematic approach regarding the application of the legal interpretation methods, which often leads to different interpretation of the legal norms by the national and the European courts when applied in similar or identical legal situations for protection of the human rights. It is considered that the different interpretation of the legal documents by the judges endangers the protection of the human rights, but also the legal security of the citizens. Judicial discretion in choosing an interpretive method in a particular case by the national, or by the courts in Luxembourg and Strasbourg further complicates the already complex procedure of protection of human rights, which directly creates new problems instead of solving the existing ones. The “pluralistic interpretive box” is continuously filled with new and new cases from different approaches by different courts in the process of protection of human rights, which leads to increased scientific interest for a more detailed consideration of this issue. The growing scientific interest in the impact of the legal interpretation on the (non) equality of the human rights protection is the main reason for writing this paper, in which I will try to explain the connection between the three different, but still related issues encountered in the multilevel system of human rights protection in Europe. The first issue addressed in the paper concerns the most common methods of legal interpretation applied in the national and European court proceedings. The second issue concerns the search for a consistent answer to whether and how much legitimacy and legality the court decisions made by applying judicial discretion have when the interpretive method in judicial decision-making is chosen, and the third issue refers to finding an answer to the impact of such court decisions on the functionality and efficiency of the multi-level system of protection of human rights, that is, to what extent such court decisions have a positive or negative effect on the human rights protection. Given that each national court has its own instruments and techniques of interpretation by which the judges make their decisions, the need to study their causality and effectiveness is more than evident
Archiv des Völkerrechts, 2022
European consensus is one of the most controversial tools invoked by the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR or the Court) in its reasoning. Despite the contrary connotations of the concept itself, both its employment in the Court's jurisprudence and the ways in which it is used or not used have spurred considerable debate, leading scholars to produce works with titles such as "No consensus on consensus?" 1 or Building Consensus on European Consensus. 2 Even though its use is limited to a relatively small number of cases, 3 the reason why it attracts so much attention and controversy is related to the fact that these usually constitute high-profile cases, decisive for defining where Europe is, who belongs, under what conditions and to what extent. Despite the surrounding controversies, however, it is widely accepted as a necessary component of the Court's interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR or the Convention). This sense of necessity derives, on the one hand, from the central role that it played in the development of the Convention system and the establishment of the Court's legitimacy in its early formative years, 4 and, on the other hand, the constant need for the Court to retain its legitimacy and effectiveness. 5 Increasing governmental criticism and opposition to the Court seem to have further increased this sense of necessity. 6 In European Consensus between Strategy and Principle, Jens T. Theilen questions this sense of necessity by addressing different perspectives on European consensus and its functions in the Court's reasoning. Drawing from critical international legal theory and human rights theorya rare combination in the legal commentary on the ECHR-Theilen delineates and analyses tensions surrounding European consensus, aiming to unearth how indeterminacy operates in the legal reasoning of the ECtHR.
The European Convention Human Rights system, despite being the most effective system in providing individual protection of civil and political rights, is currently facing numerous problems. One of the biggest problems is the European Court of Human Rights overload. The expansion of the Court's caseload can be attributed to a combination of several factors one of which is the extensive judicial interpretation of Convention rights to a variety of claims, which at the inception of the system states were not initially intent upon addressing. As a human rights treaty where numerous provisions have been drafted with a lack of precision the Convention is subject to interpretation that is done by the Court since the judges have to interpret and define law in concrete situations, and not just apply it. For that reason the Court has developed numerous principles of interpretation of the Convention and this paper looks at the most important ones. The interpretative principles of the Court can be divided in two groups, related to the direction in which the judicial creativity led. The first group represents judicial self-restraint principles of interpretation where the judges used one of the four following principles: intentionalism, textualism, margin of appreciation or the doctrine of fourth instance. On the other side, the judicial activist methods of interpretation, as used by the judges’ of the Court are the living instrument doctrine or evolutive interpretation, the doctrine of effectiveness or innovative interpretation, and the doctrine of an autonomous concept. This paper will look at all those principles as well as at the negative consequences of the inconsistency of their use.
It is interesting to note that highest regional or national courts may focus on consensus within their legal system when interpreting human rights provisions, while at times they also consider the conformity with other legal systems. This paper discusses the use of consensus arguments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the US Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, and explores whether this use supports and confirms or jeopardises the universality of human rights. Firstly, the paper outlines the conceptual framework for the analysis, addressing the context in which the three courts operate as well as the connection between the ideas of universality and consensus and the judicial use of comparative law. Secondly, the paper exposes and discusses seemingly conflicting signals concerning the value of ‘consensus’ and ‘universality of human rights’ in the jurisprudence of these influential Courts. The ECtHR’s acknowledgement that it needs to consider international law and the related consensus supports universality of human rights, while granting the contracting states a margin of appreciation seems to jeopardise it. Furthermore, linking strict scrutiny to a strong consensus arguably strengthens universality of rights, while coupling weak scrutiny to low consensus further undermines it. In the Supreme Courts of the US and Canada, the optional reference to international opinion and foreign law (including the ECtHR judgments) can inform domestic judicial decision-making, thus confirming the universality of human rights. However, the controversy in the US Supreme Court clarifies that the use of foreign sources can induce a defence of national fundamental values, thus strengthening the argument against universal human rights. A close analysis of selected leading judgments will enable identifying the degree to which the overall jurisprudence of the three Courts confirms or jeopardises the universality of human rights.
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2019
The International Journal of Human Rights, 2020
2003
Many of the chapters in this collection see "global governance" as a reference to the way the globe as a whole global system is governed-in other words, as the way that so-called "international," or interstate systems are ordered the world over. This chapter, by contrast, fits into that group of the chapters (which includes those by Rosenau, Young, and O'Brien) that see "global governance" as about saying and seeing that governance takes place on the globe to an increasing degree (not only by state and interstate actors, but also) by suprastate, non-state, and substate actors. This chapter in particular examines the strengthening of one of these "disaggregated spheres of authority" (in the phrase of James Rosenau), one of the arenas where modes of regulating human behavior that were previously monopolized by state sovereigns has been taken over by a trans-state actor, the European Court of Human Rights. We see the "structure" of global governance as in fact an absence of structure among these disaggregated spheres, and the process of global governance as varying from one to another sphere. Within traditional international organizations, governance is exercised with the range of traditional tools of international relations, although these tools are now often wielded by a number of non-traditional agents, such as NGOs. In addition, trans-state regimes of governance have moved recently into prominence: some, in the realm of political economy (e.g., those of the World Bank and the IMF); others, in the realm of trans-state law, enforced by trans-state courts. political forces exogenous to the judicial systems (such as, in our study, trans-state political mood, at least among elected member-state leaders during the mid-to late-1980s).
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets the rules of treaty interpretation in articles 31-33. Yet these rules are quite vague, and they leave a lot of room for judicial discretion. The European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR" or "the Court") has developed its own version of these rules of interpretation-a version that tracks the three traditional approaches to treaty interpretation: the textual approach, the subjective approach, and the teleological approach. Looking at the practice of the ECHR through the lens of these three traditional approaches highlights the logic of some of the court's interpretive choices, including its doctrine of deference: the Margin of Appreciation.
Towards Convergence in International Human Rights Law
when operationalising their activities. Such flexibility has led to a diversity of methodologies, and to the progressive expansion of the competences of special procedures through practice, adding to the complexity of the functions they have come to fulfil. Today, most special procedures cover not only the examination of situations of gross violations of human rights, but also extend to the consideration of complaints from individuals; the use of 'urgent appeals' to protect the life and/or physical integrity of people allegedly under imminent risk; the conduct of fact-finding missions; the provision of technical assistance; and the codification of emerging norms of international human rights norms[1]. 4 This latter activity will form the prime focus of this chapter. This chapter explores the contribution of mandate holders of special procedures to the coherence of international human rights standards using as a paradigm their diverse interpretation of the legal framework, which serves as the basis of their operations. It evaluates the extent to which the human rights norms developed by the special procedures are consonant with other international efforts to regulate the same matters. The chapter is divided into four sections. Sections 1 to 3 provide an overview of the role of special procedures in the creation and/or consolidation of new norms of international human rights in the context of clarifying their own scope of competences. Special attention is paid, in the final section, to the most salient human rights instruments drafted by mandate holders, understanding as such, those that have received approval or endorsement by their parent body, the Commission on Human Rights and, sometimes, also the General Assembly. Whether these efforts contribute to the strengthening of emerging trends in international law (for example, the recognition of the right to water, or sexual orientation as human rights issues), or whether they add a layer of complexity to the quest for supporting the universality of human rights on the basis of the existence of uniform norms on a given topic, remains an open question, as will be demonstrated.
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 2020
The European Convention Human Rights system, despite being the most effective system in providing individual protection of civil and political rights, is currently facing numerous problems. One of the biggest problems is the European Court of Human Rights overload. The expansion of the Court's caseload can be attributed to a combination of several factors one of which is the extensive judicial interpretation of Convention rights to a variety of claims, which at the inception of the system states were not initially intent upon addressing. As a human rights treaty where numerous provisions have been drafted with a lack of precision the Convention is subject to interpretation that is done by the Court since the judges have to interpret and define law in concrete situations, and not just apply it. For that reason the Court has developed numerous principles of interpretation of the Convention and this paper looks at the most important ones. The interpretative principles of the Court can be divided in two groups, related to the direction in which the judicial creativity led. The first group represents judicial self-restraint principles of interpretation where the judges used one of the four following principles: intentionalism, textualism, margin of appreciation or the doctrine of fourth instance. On the other side, the judicial activist methods of interpretation, as used by the judges' of the Court are the living instrument doctrine or evolutive interpretation, the doctrine of effectiveness or innovative interpretation, and the doctrine of an autonomous concept. This paper will look at all those principles as well as at the negative consequences of the inconsistency of their use.
Krytyka Prawa, 2022
The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative con cepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the appli cation of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity's own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evalua tive norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR's judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementa tion of ECtHR judgments at the national level.
In: New Developments in Constitutional Law. Liber Amicorum for András Sajó. Eds. Iulia Motoc, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, The Hague, Eleven, 2018
Human Rights Quarterly, 2019
18(1) Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2019, (Oxford University Press: 2020), 2020
Academic analysis of pronouncements of human rights treaty monitoring bodies has tended to focus on their contribution to the promotion of human rights in domestic jurisdictions, particularly to convey the desire of scholars to see more use of these pronouncements by domestic courts. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the issue of their legal status in light of the supervisory function of human rights monitoring bodies. The following paper starts with a thorough analysis of a few recent cases by national courts, which commented on the legal value of the work of these bodies. The paper then challenges two recurring arguments in the legal scholarship: their assimilation to judicial bodies, and the existence of a procedural obligation on States to consider their views. Next, it focuses on the interpretive weight of the pronouncements of these treaty bodies in international law, and, accordingly, in national jurisdictions. The paper argues that the alleged existence of a general procedural obligation on States to consider the pronouncements of human rights treaty monitoring bodies is controversial, and that their work does not have a specific, or privileged, legal position in defining the ordinary meaning of a treaty. The conclusions point out that supervisory bodies have a specific and important role in the international legal order, different from that of courts, which bears preserving.
Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2018
This article offers a new take on the diagnosis of the crisis of the European human rights system by focusing on the diversification of the attitudes towards the European Court of Human Rights by national compliance audiences, namely domestic executives, parliaments, and judiciaries. This diagnosis holds that national compliance audiences of the European Court of Human Rights can no longer be characterized as lending overall support to the human rights acquis of Europe, that centers around the European Court of Human Rights as the ultimate authoritative interpreter of the Convention. Instead, alongside states that continue to lend overall support to the Court’s authority over the interpretation of the Convention, two new attitudes have developed towards the Convention across the Council of Europe. First, there are now national compliance audiences that demand co-sharing of the interpretation task with the European Court of Human Rights. Second, there are national compliance audiences that flaunt well-established Convention standards, not merely by error, or lack of knowledge of adequate application, but with suspect grounds of intentionality and lack of respect for the overall Convention acquis. Following this diagnosis, I argue that instead of holding on to a business as usual attitude, the Court has also developed coping strategies in order to handle this fragmentation by investing in a human rights jurisprudence of a variable geometry, recognizing differentiation in the individual circumstances of states as a basis for human rights review.
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights (Vol. 11, No. 1), 2013
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