After virtue: A study in moral theory

History of European Ideas, 1985

Educational Theory, 1982

Educational Theory, 1982

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87, A Centenary Celebration: Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch, 2019

Among all the works of Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue is arguably the richest of interesting points. Too often it has been interpreted just as a plain defence of the Aristotelian- Thomistic tradition in the contemporary moral debate or, in other similar words, as a recommendation in favour of virtue ethics. It will be argued that this traditional outlook to After Virtue overshadowed some very prominent features of the work, e.g. its peculiar value from an historical and historiographical standpoint and its precious analysis of the philosophical culture of the Enlightenment. The main aim of the paper is indeed providing a clear account of MacIntyre's interpretation of the Enlightenment, its culture and its moral philosophy with a particular focus upon the notion of the ʻEnlightenment Projectʼ, the features he spotted in it, and eventually evaluating this historiographical interpretation with an eye on the most recent trends developed in the historiography of the Enlightenment from historians of philosophy and historians of ideas. The point defended will be that MacIntyre's account of the Enlightenment was very close to the approach shared by historians at present, even though After Virtue was published in 1981, perhaps pioneering a new trend of enquiry in history of philosophy.

With fifty-four chapters charting the development of moral philosophy in the Western world, this volume examines the key thinkers and texts and their influence on the history of moral thought from the pre-Socratics to the present day. Topics including Epicureanism, humanism, Jewish and Arabic thought, perfectionism, pragmatism, idealism and intuitionism are all explored, as are figures including Aristotle, Boethius, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Mill, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Rawls, as well as numerous key ideas and schools of thought. Chapters are written by leading experts in the field, drawing on the latest research to offer rigorous analysis of the canonical figures and movements of this branch of philosophy. The volume provides a comprehensive yet philosophically advanced resource for students and teachers alike as they approach, and refine their understanding of, the central issues in moral thought. Read more at http://www.cambridge.org/it/academic/subjects/philosophy/history-philosophy/cambridge-history-moral-philosophy#SKuHy5AdTDKYDw3K.99

MA, University of Illinois, 2015

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze MacIntyre’s solution to the problem of modern morality; it is a critical evaluation of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism. The thesis of the project is that MacIntyre’s Aristotelian ethics in After Virtue is conceived in such a way that it does not land in a very different place than that of his emotivist partners in the debate. Aristotle’s ethics has a metaphysical grounding in that the Unmoved Mover, as the external main factor in the world around us, is the ultimate good and aim of the whole universe and the human race. If the human good is understood only in terms of practice, narrative unity, and tradition, the backbone of Aristotle’s ethics is dismantled in such a way that it will not lead to the solution MacIntyre claims. Because of the pure actuality, in the unmoved mover, the potentiality in every human being can be realized. If this framework of thought is dismantled there is no movement or change in human morality, as Aristotle understood it. The ultimate end in human lives is happiness realized. This is reasonable only if these lives follow the function of man, if they practice virtue, and embrace contemplation which brings us closer to the gods. This upward movement of the inquiry is lost if the human end is redefined in social terms.

Indian Journal of Legal Philosophy - Volume 2, Issue 3 - ISSN: 2347-4963, 2014

Kant's moral theory arises from the belief that man is free, and that his moral conviction is brought about by inner reasoning rather than by external forces. He viewed morals as, consequently, independent of the world around us, the world that we experience, which he viewed as morally neutral.

2017

In this paper, I seek to explain the similarity and disparity between MacIntyre's moral theory and moral relativism. I will argue that MacIntyre's moral theory can escape the charge of moral relativism because both his earlier social and his later metaphysical approaches appeal to some criteria, the human <em>telos</em> or universal human qualities respectively. The notion of <em>telos</em> is wider than the notion of function which is defined in social contexts. If there is a context-transcending notion of <em>telos </em>or essence and the good for human beings <em>qua</em> human beings, it will provide some independent measures for dismissing the charge of moral relativism.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1986

Alasdair Maclntyre's A.fier Virtue' conveys good news and bad news. The bad news is that contemporary moral theory is mired in emotivism, subjectivism and relativism and the moral consensus needed to make objectively grounded value judgments is long gone. Our current situation is one of interminable moral debate, in which issues vital to our concerns can never be non-arbitrarily decided. The good news is that a solution is possible. If we move away from ethical theories which focus primarily on acts and the rightness and toward an Aristotlean theory of character and its virtues and vices. then we might be able to enjoy more objective moral judgments once again. The bad news about Maclntyre's good news is that his approach as it stands does not work. Maclntyre's own account of the virtues falls prey t o the same sort of relativism in moral judgments that he criticizes in other moral theories. I will suggest that, for Maclntyre, relativism can be avoided only by falling back onto a version of an ideal observer theory, and that Maclntyre has implicitly adopted some such view. This paper falls into three parts. I n the first section, I briefly describe Maclntyre's account of virtues. The second section shows how this account is subject to the charge of relativism. The final part describes the elements of the ideal observer view implicit in Maclntyre's work. I Emotivism is Maclntyre's all-embracing term for the bulk of twentieth century Anglo-American moral philosophy. Maclntyre almost casually dismisses contemporary attempts to provide rational foundations for moral judgments.' He also glosses over the differences in various non-cognitivist theories. There is nothing but theory of language which separates these theories. What they share is relativism: the view that for each ethical claim C, there is an apparent contradictory C', and there is no neutral objective manner by which the conflict Susan Feldman receivedher Ph. D. from the University u/Rochester in 1980; since that time she has been teaching in the Phi1osoph.v Department at Dickinson College. Her current area of research involves the problem of relativism.