Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress
Anders Schinkel2016, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
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Abstract
At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by 'progress'? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person's identity; both children and adults can progress morally-even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children-but adults' moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.
Key takeaways
- And what constitutes moral progress?
- To clarify the notion of moral progress we will distinguish (1) a strong and a weak concept, (2) different levels on which progress may take place, and (3) formal and substantial criteria of moral progress.
- Are there such criteria available to us when it comes to moral progress, and if so, what kind of criteria are they?
- Until then moral progress is both progress within the moral domain and, other things being equal, progress as a person as a whole.
- We have argued that: moral progress is a coherent notion; moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person's identity; both children and adults can progress morallyeven though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of childrenbut adults' moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.
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