Eternal canary of the west, endless parties, Greek style

Society & Space, 2015

Syriza may well be the last chance for the salvation of Europe as a political project. Whereas most mainstream leaders within the EU have solidly backed the idea of financial markets as the best and final judges of political policy (the need to be ‘competitive’ from the standpoint of transnational capital) and most adversaries to this liberal dogma rely on nationalist fantasies as a response (to go back to a time before national purity was corrupted by EU attacks on sovereignty and by cosmopolitan values), it is Syriza that points to democratic European political efforts as the only response that can allow us to overcome the current political and economic impasses.

The openings produced by the Syriza phenomenon have been closed by Syriza itself. What, then, is the current state of the Greek political left with yet another national vote pending?

Rethinking Greece, 2016

Professor Gerassimos Moschonas spoke to Rethinking Greece about Εuropean Democracy, the Left’s prospects in Europe, Greek state building and political modernity as well as Syriza's capacity to promote progressive reforms in Greece.

This paper studies the position of the main currents of the Greek Left vis-à-vis the European integration project. The first part analyses the politico-economic nature of this project and the main phases of its evolution. Its main argument is that it is an attempt to create a European imperialist bloc in the beginning as an ally to the US versus the Eastern Bloc but – particularly after the collapse of the latter – as an increasingly aggressive competitor to the US for imperialist primacy. The second part studies the relationship of Greek capitalism with the European integration project. Its central thesis is that Greek capital (being a second generation, middle level one with limited imperialist abilities) found in the accession to the European integration project its modern ‘Big Idea’ : it considered that its partnership with the more developed western European capitalisms – however unequal maybe - would signify its ascent in the world imperialist hierarchy. This plan, which passed through several stages, is going completely astray today with Greece’s severe crisis and the imposition of the IMF-EU-ECB Memoranda. In order to substantiate this thesis, a concise presentation of the economic consequences of Greece’s accession first to the EEC and then to EU and EMU is being presented. The third part surveys the position of the three main currents of the Greek Left but also of the other political forces vis-à-vis the EU. It is shown that the majority of the Greek Left (orthodox communist, radical and anti-capitalist Left etc.) – together with PASOK and with the exception of the eurocommunists – opposed vehemently the accession to the EU. However, once it the latter took place, PASOK and parts of the Left accommodated – openly or silently – with it. This was related to several EU economic initiatives (aid packages, agricultural policy etc.) which – although terribly inefficient and ultimately disastrous for the Greek economy – created a popular appeal. However, the eruption of the 2007-8 economic crisis and the subsequent Greek crisis overturned all these as anti-EU feeling and positions prevailed in the Greek society despite the vociferous resistance of the Greek politico-economic establishment. This led to a return of the older Left anti-EU position which became dominant in the Greek Left. A survey is offered of the current politico-economic positions of the main currents and parties of the Greek Left vis-à-vis the EU. Their also a particular focus on the role of the Euro and the EMU is the current Greek politico-economic controversies. The last part concludes by presenting the argument for a Left opposition to the EU and an alternative to the IMF-EU-ECB Memoranda program founded on a strategy of disengagement from both the EU and the EMU. The main political and economic aspects of such a program are being analysed.

Dissent, pp. 33-37, fall, 2013

This paper examines how the radical left parties became the big winners of Greece's last elections in May and June 2012. The rise of the Greek radical left signaled the collapse of the country's two traditionally powerful parties (Panhellenic Socialist Movement -PASOK and New Democracy -ND), which have dominated the political life since the collapse of the Junta in 1974. As a result, the Greek party system seems to be just as volatile as it was in the early 1950s. The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) ended up as Greece's second strongest party with 16,8% of the popular vote in the May elections and 26,9% in the June elections, provoking an electoral earthquake and becoming the leading party of the Greek centre-left. The aim of this paper is to explore the causes that lie behind the electoral rise of SYRIZA in the last two elections in Greece as well as the flexible and unstable transformation of the

2013

First, because of the new flare-up of riots in Athens in December 2009 caused by the alienated youth of the country marking the first anniversary of the police killing of a 15-year old student a year before ―when an unprecedented social explosion took place, which, as I tried to show a few months ago, [1] had not been seen again since the student uprising in the early seventies that eventually led to the fall of the military junta in 1974. However, this was only a pretext and the new flare-up should be seen, in fact, as part of a process indicating the flimsy foundations on which the post-war social and economic system has been built and, also, as an indication of the fact that the systemic crisis in Greece is continuously deepening. In this context, the recent Greek elections in October, which gave an overwhelming parliamentary majority to PASOK’s social-liberals and was celebrated by the political and economic elites both in Greece and abroad, could be shown to be just a sideshow,...

2014

The political landscape in Greece is confused and volatile at the moment; the right and extreme- right-wing parties are accorded a disproportionately large place in political debate, while the radical left-wing SYRIZA party is attempting to maintain a ‘leftist’ profile and demonstrate its capacity to govern through a strategy of image normalisation. These tensions make it very difficult for the Greek government to stick to the EU’s tough reform agenda. The governing coalition is trying to conceal the social effects of implementing structural policy reforms, even postponing some measures to avoid bearing their political cost. At the same time, it is adopting a very rushed, and thus quite worrying, attitude towards a fast-track growth agenda, without taking into consideration the conditions for sustainable economic development.