AModest Minimalism ?

1997

Minimalism about truth has received considerable attention of late. We think that much of the discussion suffers from a pair of deficiencies. First, there has been a failure to discriminate different varieties and dimensions of minimalism about truth. Second, some serious and fundamental problems for the most popular varieties of minimalism about truth have not yet received sufficient attention. This paper aims to remedy those deficiencies. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we distinguish six main varieties of minimalism about truth. In the second section, we identify four dimensions along which views about truth can be more or less minimal, thus clarifying the range of relevant notions of “minimality”. In the third section, we critically discuss four minimalist theses.

Logos Architekton. Journal of Logic and Philosophy of Science, 2011

The investigation from this paper has several purposes. First, I will try to highlight the specific of minimalist approach of truth as opposed to the specific of classical or metaphysical approach of truth. Secondly, I will try to present synthetic the main minimalist theories of truth. Thirdly, I will systematize the main virtues of minimalist theories of truth. I will argue that the main virtues of this approach are: understanding the truth as transparent property, removing unwanted metaphysical implications and eliminating unnecessary theorizing. Finally, I will indicate some difficulties of the minimalist approach of truth.

What is Truth?, 2001

conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich's highly stimulating book Truth 1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate explanation-a move that deprives it from giving support to Minimalism. At the heart of Minimalism lies a theory of truth for propositions. It is called the minimal theory, or MT for short. It consists of a collection of axioms. Each axiom is a proposition of the form (E) The proposition that p is true if and only if p. MT comprises all propositions of this form, except the ones that give rise to the liar paradox. Note that MT should be distinguished from the schema, (E), used to convey MT, as well as from (E)'s substitution instances, which are sentences rather than propositions. MT consists of all propositions expressed by the sentences that would result from replacing 'p' in (E) with a non-pathological declarative sentence of English, or of any possible extension of English-where the non-pathological replacements for 'p' are the ones that do not lead to liar-paradoxical substitution instances of (E). 2

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004

Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project.

Metaphilosophy, 2013

This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what "true" does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a position. In addition, it provides some reasons for thinking that such a theory of truth is "minimal" or "deflationary" in the way that contemporary truth theorists have claimed it to be.

Synthese, 2018

—ABSTRACT— Since the publication of Truth, Paul Horwich's 'Minimalism' has become the paradigm of what goes under the label 'the deflationary conception of truth'. Despite the many theoretical virtues of Horwich's minimalism, it is usually contended that it cannot fully account for the normative role that truth plays in enquiry. As I see it, this concern amounts to several challenges. One such challenge—call it the axiological challenge—is about whether deflationists have the theoretical resources to explain the value of truth. Some philosophers (e.g. Michael Lynch and Bernard Williams) have argued that they do not. The thought is that by being valuable in the way it is, truth plays a non-trivial explanatory role with respect to core phenomena of enquiry. In order to account for this aspect of truth, the challenge goes, we need to inflate truth's nature to an extent incompatible with core tenets of the minimalist conception. In this paper, I first provide some clarifications of what we mean exactly when we say that truth is valuable. By borrowing important distinction from the current debate in axiology, I elaborate a framework within which to conduct investigations into the value of truth. With reference to Horwich's discussion of the issue, I then discuss the link between questions concerning the explanatory role of truth and the issue of its metaphysical inflation. I conclude by briefly exploring a few strategies on behalf of minimalists to address the axiological challenge. 2

Philosophy Compass, 2010

Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a trivial concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I first situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative-the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is trivial concept but not a property). I then outline and appraise two of the primary challenges facing minimalism. Finally, based on this discussion, I draw some conclusions concerning the soundness and stability of minimalism.

Disputatio

Michael Dummett, in ‘Truth,’ mounted an objection to the redundancy theory of truth on the grounds that it neglects to account for the normative features he claimed are part of the concept of truth. Paul Horwich, in ‘The Minimalist Conception of Truth’, notes that the same objection could be leveled against minimalism. He defends minimalism against Dummett’s objection by offering a sketch of an instrumental account of the desirability of truth that is compatible with the minimalist thesis. In this paper, I will review Dummett’s objection and Horwich’s response, identifying some concerns with the account as it stands. I will modify the account to address those concerns, and so that it successfully explains the desirability of having all true beliefs in a way that is compatible with minimalism. I then mount an argument that truth is also intrinsically valuable. The question regarding the adequacy of the minimalist account of truth, then, hinges on whether the account is compatible wit...