A typology of privacy

Yale LJ, 1979

Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies

Purpose: This article is aimed to analyze the different Philosophical and legal perspectives of privacy in the United States with reference to a few landmark cases in the U.S. My debate will cover different situations, views, and laws in the US, the EU, and Pakistan (to some extent) to critically view present and ongoing violations (now mostly agreed with opinion) of the right to privacy. W. A. Parents and others on the definition of privacy and Louis D Brandeis on a political and legal ideal of privacy have been talked about. Approach: prior research studies and existing literature was examined regarding privacy. Findings: Privacy is acknowledged as a human rights issue, but it constitutes a real problem when the values and objectives behind privacy are different. Contemporary issues of unlimited surveillance and data collection to battle terrorism by law enforcement agencies and governments are particularly alarming to invade the right.

Globalex, NYU School of Law, USA, 2022

After the invention of computers in the 19th century and the Internet in the late 1960s, the vast majority of our work is done online. The dependence on online platforms has increased over the years, and people have begun using diverse online platforms for various purposes, including learning, business, entertainment, socialization, etc. The growing advancement in information and communication technology (ICT) has brought a radical transformation in the communicating process making life easier, faster, and smarter. This landscape also poses tremendous challenges to privacy, as numerous actors collect, store, and share our personal data with numerous third parties, mostly without our knowledge. Over the last couple of decades, the collection, retention, use, and transfer of personal data have become rampant chiefly by government agencies and businesses. To indicate governments’ aptitude toward data processing, George Orwell once warned in his dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty-Four that Big Brother (government authorities) is always watching you. This trend of government-sponsored data processing has increased significantly over time, especially, after September 11, 2001. While business’s data processing has also become evident by new business models that are mostly grounded on personal data. In course of time, the personal data market has become global due to the constant increase of the access and use of the Internet. Eventually, personal data has evolved as the main fuel of the 4th Industrial Revolution era. In such an atmosphere, ordinary citizens, being private individuals, or consumers desire to have adequate legal protections for their privacy rights. Thus, the worldwide debate on privacy concerns has become apparent. Keeping this in mind, this article aims to explore some basic aspects of privacy, including the meaning, value, historical development, challenges, and legal protections as ensured in international, regional, and national legal frameworks.

Library Philosophy and Practice (e-journal)- Scopus Indexed, 2019

The Concept and definition of the privacy has been changed during the time affecting by different factors. At the same time, the boundaries of privacy may differ from one place to another affecting by the culture, religion, etc. Nonetheless, there is not a unique general accepted definition for the privacy. Privacy has been considered from different disciplines like sociology, psychology, law and philosophy. It is a multidisciplinary domain, having an easy concept but difficult to define. However, by reviewing all different viewpoints, it can be concluded that privacy is an individual tendency, wish and natural need to be away from others' control and surveillance. Moreover, it is the physical as well as impalpable limits of an individual who likes to be free from others intrusion. The present review, is a doctrinal legal study on background, concept, limits and legal development of privacy through comparative and descriptive approach in order to offer a general and understandable idea of the right to privacy.

The meaning of privacy has been frequently disputed in the philosophical and legal literature since Warren and Brandeis first argued for it as a distinct and important personal and social value. Nevertheless, while the meaning of privacy is held to be vague, there is general agreement that Warren and Brandeis were correct in their assessment of its value. Theorists of democracy, on the other hand, have been ambivalent towards the realm of the private. This paper interrogates the intersection between privacy and democracy, questioning the place of privacy as a distinctly democratic value. Introduction My concern in this paper is with the place a right to privacy has in a normative account of democracy. 1 One difficulty with my topic is that both privacy and democracy are highly contested ideas and so I am liable to become entangled in too many matters of definition. I am going to attempt to evade this problem by offering an account of privacy that addresses, I think, the essential worry that advocates of privacy express and one that is not overly controversial. This will not be a full definition of privacy but a partial one suited to my purposes here. With this account in hand I will then show how three alternative views of democracy place different values on privacy. I will end by arguing that only what I call full deliberative democracy requires a right to privacy as a central part of its democratic vision and, consequently, offers a democratic argument for the right to privacy. Although many countries, states, and international organisations have or advocate for a right to privacy, the idea that privacy is valuable is by no means universally accepted. Some have argued that privacy is a dated notion incompatible with modern technology, while others have argued for its limited value. I think it is important at the beginning to distinguish between what privacy amounts to and what its value is. What we value about privacy will change according to how we understand it. However, there is no easy way to say what privacy means, as is evident in the extensive philosophical and legal literature on just this topic, beginning in 1890 with Warren and Brandeis's law journal article called the " Right to Privacy ". There they argued that the right to privacy was a right to be " let alone " (Warren and Brandeis 1890, 205) and free from the invasion of the " sacred precincts of private and domestic life " (Warren and Brandeis 1890, 196). This definition of privacy has some obvious flaws. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for privacy. It confuses solitude with privacy and, as Judith Thomson notes, I can fail to let you alone by dropping a brick on your head, but in doing so I have not violated your privacy (Thomson 1975, 295). Nevertheless, it does capture one aspect of what privacy means by pointing to the idea of limited or restricted access as an important part of its definition. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will focus on a second feature of privacy that has less to do with encroachment into personal domains and more to do with restrictions on what other people and institutions know about a person. On this account, one is in a state of privacy with respect to a piece of information to the extent that others are not in a cognitive relationship with it. In other words, the fewer people who know some fact about me, the more private that information is. If no-one else knows it, then it is absolutely private.

Privacy is preserved in several international legal documents such as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 6 ,the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 7 contains an almost identical provision of UDHR, The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 8 , and The American Convention on Human Rights 9 and so on. However, neither of these documents defines privacy. It's a challenging task to define privacy as it encompasses various dimensions and has different meanings depending on the context in which it is applied. The term 'privacy' is complex and multidimensional, making it difficult to provide a single, concise definition that accurately captures its essence. 10 'What is privacy?' is a question that has confounded legal scholars, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists for centuries. 11 Many of them have despaired of arriving at a satisfactory definition of the concept of privacy. 12 As a concept, privacy has been accused of being 'Vagabondize and evanescent', 13 'equivocal and notoriously elastic', 14 'it is engorged with numerous and distinct meanings', 15 'extremely subjective', 16 'culture-specific, 17 and operating 'in a wide array of context'. 18

HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), 2014

Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any web addresses or links contained in this book may have changed since publication and may no longer be valid. The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher, and the publisher hereby disclaims any responsibility for them. contents Acknowledgements .

2004

Contemporary Political Theory, 2016

This is a frustrating book: on the one hand, it promises a new outlook on the philosophy of privacy, based upon the work of Luciano Floridi and Baruch Spinoza, which is a welcome extension of the sources used to think about privacy in contemporary political philosophy; on the other hand, it virtually ignores the existing literature on the philosophy and law of privacy. As the presentation of the legal and philosophical issues tends to be schematic, it is quite difficult to know what the book offers by way of additions and corrections to the larger literature on privacy. The book has a bibliography after each chapter, which makes it hard to assess the sources overall, and to find references, unless you remember the chapter in which they occurred. This reinforces the sense that what is presented as a monograph is really a set of independent essays or lectures which, while individually interesting, do not give the reader a clearer sense of the way legal and philosophical issues about privacy fit together. For example, while the book discusses some cases from legal history and makes reference to particular contemporary bodies of law, there are no systematic discussion of the premises about the relationship of philosophy and law relevant to the analysis of privacy; no discussion of whether or why different forms of law might matter to privacy (differences between private law and public law, say, or between tort law and constitutional law); and no discussion of what makes something law and, therefore, how we are meant to recognise law when we see it (Does it have to be applied? Are all judicial interpretations equally lawful?). So if the reader is hoping for a systematic examination of the relationship between law and the philosophy of privacy, she is likely to be disappointed. On the other hand, she may enjoy a brief guide to the ideas of Spinoza and Floridi, and an enjoyable critique of Posner's effort to treat privacy as simply one commodity amongst others. A theme running through the book is the significance of privacy for the way we see ourselves, although we are offered no systematic discussion of the way that privacy (or different ways of conceptualising it) affects people's self-conceptions, or of how the legal treatment of privacy does so. We can therefore agree with -and