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2017
The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditional right by means of constructive type theory (CTT) which provides the means to develop a system of contentual inferences rather than of syntactic derivations. Moreover, in line with Armgardt, we will first study the general notion of dependence as triggered by hypotheticals and then the logical structure of dependence specific to conditional right. I will develop this idea in a dialogical framework where the distinction between play-object and strategy-object leads to the further distinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence and where meanings is constituted by the interaction of obligations and entitlements. The present paper is based on Rahman (2015). However, though the underlying CTT-analysis is the same, the dialogical reconstruction makes use of a new way of linking dialogical logic and CTT. Introduction:
Abstract The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditional right by means of constructive type theory (CTT) which provides the means to develop a system of contentual inferences rather than of syntactic derivations. Moreover, in line with Armgardt, we will first study the general notion of dependence as triggered by hypotheticals and then the logical structure of dependence specific to conditional right.We will develop this idea in a dialogical framework where the distinction between local reason and strategic reason leads to the further distinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence and where meanings is constituted by the interaction of obligations and entitlements. The present paper is based on Rahman (2015). However, though the underlying CTT-analysis is the same, the dialogical reconstruction makes use of a new way of linking dialogical logic and CTT.
The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditional right by means of a dialogical approach to constructive type theory (CTT). We will develop this idea in a framework where the distinction between local-reason and strategic-reason leads to the further distinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence, factual and logical. The present paper is based on Rahman (2015). However, though the underlying CTT-analysis is the same, the dialogical reconstruction makes use of a new way of linking dialogical logic and CTT.
2017
The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditional right by means of a dialogical approach to constructive type theory (CTT). We will develop this idea in a framework where the distinction between local-reason and strategic-reason leads to the further distinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence, factual and logical. The present paper is based on Rahman (2015). However, though the underlying CTT-analysis is the same, the dialogical reconstruction makes use of a new way of linking dialogical logic and CTT.
Preprint, Oct-2014. Abstract Sébastien Magnier provides a remarkable analysis of the notion of conditional right with the help of public announcement logic that he generalizes for the logical study of legal norms. Magnier’s main idea, motivated by the earlier exhaustive textual and systematic work of Matthias Armgardt and the subsequent studies carried out by Alexandre Thiercelin, involves Leibniz’s notion of certifica-tion, which plays a central role in the famous De conditionibus. Magnier proposes to render the notion of certification of A as there is public evidence for A. More generally, the meanings of “conditional right” and “conditional legal norm” are es-tablished by means of identifying a specific kind of dialogical interaction during a legal trial constituted by games of giving and asking for reasons. This yields a theory of meaning rooted in the practice itself of legal debates. The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditional right by means of constructive type theory (CTT) which provides the means to develop a system of contentual inferences rather than of syntactic derivations. Moreover, in line with Armgardt, I will first study the general notion of dependence as triggered by hypotheticals and then the logical structure of dependence specific to conditional right. I will develop this idea in a dialogical framework where the distinction be-tween play-object and strategy-object leads to the further distinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence and where meanings is constituted by the inter-action of obligations and entitlements.
Sébastien Magnier (2013) provides a remarkable analysis of the notion of conditional right that he generalizes for the logical study of legal norms. Magnier's main idea, motivated by the earlier exhaustive textual and systematic work of Matthias and the subsequent studies carried out by Alexandre , involves Leibniz's notion of certification, which plays a central role in the famous De conditionibus. Moreover, inspired by Kelsen's conception of legal norm, Magnier proposes to render the notion of certification of A as there is public evidence for A. This leads him to reconstruct conditional right and legal norm in the framework of a dialogical formulation of dynamic epistemic logic that includes a public announcement operator. The dialogical framework provides a dynamic theory of meaning to the underlying dynamic epistemic logic called Public Announcement Logic (PAL). More generally, the meanings of "conditional right" and "conditional legal norm" are established by means of identifying a specific kind of interaction during a legal trial. This yields a theory of meaning rooted in the practice itself of legal debates. The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditional right by means of a constructive type theory (CTT) according to which propositions are sets and proofs are elements. That a proposition is true means that the set has at least one element. The analysis of conditional norms should follow as a generalization, the details of which are not the subject of the present paper. The CTT approach allows for the formulation of cases of conditional right, such as If A, then Secundus has the right to B, as the hypothetical, Secundus has the right to B, provided there is some evidence x of A. Herewith I follow interpretation that considers the notion of dependence as the most salient logical characteristic of Leibniz's approach to conditional right. Moreover, in line with Armgardt (2001, pp. 220-25), I will first study the general notion of dependence as triggered by hypotheticals and then the logical structure of dependence specific to conditional right. However, in my view, the dependence of the conditioned on the condition is defined with regard to the pieces of evidence that support the truth of the hypothetical, rather than the propositions that constitute it. Accordingly, a basic form of conditional norm is constituted by a set and a proposition such that the set provides the conditions under which the proposition (that establishes the right) is made true. I will develop this idea in a dialogical framework where the distinction between play-object and strategy-object leads to the further distinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence. The proposed approach includes the study of formation rules that model the argumentation on the acceptance of a piece of evidence.
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 2016
According to our view, inferential approaches to legal liability (including cases of pre-emption), embedded in a dialogical framework yield a quite intuitive implementation of Armgardt's proposal to respond to Moore's (2010) study of cases of causal overdetermination in Law, provided the deployment of a fully interpreted language as the one of Martin-Löf's (1984) Constructive Type Theory is casted in a dialogical framework-rather than in a possible-world one-, whereby (1) hypothetical judgements (involving non-actualized tokens) can be explicitly distinguished from categorical conditional judgements, (2) tokens of actions can be introduced as explicit denizens of the object-language, (3) actual harm/tort events are analysed as tokens dependent upon tokens of their (putative) causes-i.e. as (multi) functions over tokens of their causes, (4) tokens of actions can be "enriched" with a timing function. The paper will be divided in two main parts.. The first one follows Armgardt's strategy to start by establishing collective Liability and proceed afterwards with the identification of individual Liability. The second main part, proposes a framework for the attribution of individual responsibility with regard to the determination of individual Causation. This second way is led by the rationale that legally liable is the one who caused the damage, individually or in association with others.
Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference
(An update 7 july )The present contribution delves into a recent development of dialogical rules for proof-theory penned by Ansten Klev that arouse from Per Martin-Löf's take on assertoric knowledge as involved in the notion of valid inference within Constructive Type Theory (CTT). The main aim of our paper is to set out the central steps towards a new Dialogical Framework called Immanent Reasoning II, which on one hand integrates some of the CTT-rules developed by Klev (2023), but on the other it develops further the general tenets of the dialogical perspective on meaning and logic. Different to Klev's approach IR-II contain rules that indicate how to develop plays and winning strategies for a thesis. The paper can also be seen as a case study for combining logical frameworks rather than logics.
It is our main claim that the time is ripe to link the dynamic turn launched by game-theoretical approaches to meaning with P. Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory (CTT). Furthermore, we also claim that the dialogical framework provides the appropriate means to develop such a link. We will restrict our study to the discussion of two paradigmatic cases of dependences triggered by quantifiers, namely the case of the Axiom of Choice and the study of anaphora, that are by the way two of the most cherished examples of Hintikka.
After some historical and philosophical remark concerning the context in which dialogical logic has been developed we start by providing a very simple informal introduction to both, classical and intuitionistic logic. We proceed by linking the dialogical frames with standard inferential systems as Smullyan’s tableaux and Sequent Calculus. We finish this part of the book by adding one chapter on the concept of Dialogical Harmony, that delves into the meaning theory underlying the dialogical take on logical constants, and three appendices containing more advanced material. The first one provides a technical condensed formulation of dialogical logic, the second and the third give a glimpse on recent researches linking Constructive Type Theory (already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter) and dialogical logic, the third appendix relates to ongoing work on the dialogical take on the logic of Belief.
Ansten Klev's dialogue rules for Constructive Type Theory have as main purpose to serve as formalized meaning explanations for the forms of assertoric content employed in type theory. The present paper, is an exploration into what we call Immanent Reasoning II, which endorses some of the concepts of the dialogue rules of the CTT setting; by putting them at work in plays, but has also a larger scope than formalizing the use of assertoric content within CTT. Indeed, different to the CTT and the Built-In Opponent approaches to Dialogical Logic, Immanent Reasoning II, is not a Dialogue setting + a ready-made theory of Inference but a Dialogical grounding of Inference.
2014
Dialetheism holds the thesis that certain sentences are dialetheias, i.e. both true and false, and devises several strategies for avoiding trivialism, the (classical) consequence that all sentences are provable. Two such strategies are aimed at invalidating one of the most direct arguments for trivialism, viz. Curry's Paradox: a proof that you will win the lottery which only resorts to naïve truth-principles, Conditional Proof (CP), modus ponens (MPP) and the standardly accepted structural rules. The first strategy simply consists in observing that the most well-known dialetheist logic, sometimes referred to as the Logic of Paradox (LP), invalidates MPP. The second strategy consists in rather taking one of the primary senses of 'if' to be captured by an entailment connective which does not validate CP. We argue that both strategies prove problematic.
Text to the Joint Talk at the IHPST-Paris1. Immanent Reasoning and CTT: building on Göran Sundholm’s Insight on Dialogical Logic Nicolas Clerbout and Shahid Rahman. Invited speaker to the international workshp "Formalisation vs. Meaning in Mathematics: Formal theories as tools for understanding" Themes from the work of Göran Sundholm It provides an overview of present and past work on dialogical logic, passing from the work on non classical logics by changing some structural rules, to the recent development on the dialogical framework for fully interpreted languages (as developed in Constructive Type Theory) called "Immanent Reasoning"
Slides of my talk at the Centre Léon Robin (CNRS, Université de Paris IV -Sorbonne) PRC Fapesp/CNRS "PATHOS. La doctrine aristotélicienne des émotions" ,23 May 2019 It attempts to link and summarize the joint work on dialectical legal reasoning with natural and deontic necessity, deploying the dialogical approach to constructive type theory (the approach has been called Immanent Reasoning). It is a striking example of the uses of the dialogical framework in order to extend the argumentative approach beyond pure logic., where cooperative moves are integrated as part of the aims of a dialogue. i
Synthese, 2001
Preprint of the paper published in Synthese 127: 105–139, 2001 ABSTRACT: Many of the discussions about conditionals can best be put as follows: can those conditionals that involve an entailment relation be formulated within a formal system? The reasons for the failure of the classical approach to entailment have usually been that they ignore the meaning connection between antecedent and consequent in a valid entailment. One of the first theories in the history of logic about meaning connection resulted from the stoic discussions on tightening the relation between the If- and the Then-parts of conditionals, which in this context was called synartesis (connection). This theory gave a justification for the validity of what we today express through the formulae ~(a=>~a) and ~(~a=>a). Hugh MacColl and, more recently, Storrs McCall (from 1877 to 1906 and from 1963 to 1975 respectively) searched for a formal system in which the validity of these formulae could be expressed. Unfortunately neither of the resulting systems is very satisfactory. In this paper we introduce dialogical games with the help of a new connexive If-Then =>), the structural rules of which allow the Proponent to develop (formal) winning strategies for the above-mentioned connexive theses . Further on, we develop the corresponding tableau systems and conclude with some remarks on possible perspectives and consequences of the dialogical approach to connexivity including the loss of uniform substitution leading to a new concept of logical form.
The present paper, that provides an introduction to standard dialogical logic, has mainly didactic purposes. Thus, the study of the metalogical properties has been left totally by side. However, two sections have been added for those readers willing to go through a technically more demanding material. The first one contains a technically rigorous presentation of standard dialogical logic the second one presents, some very recent work towards a logic with content, applied to modal logic, where modal logic is developed in a purely dialogical way: instead of worlds, we have contexts, constituted by hypothetical assertions and where transitions between worlds are understood as extending contexts by the means of questions.
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