A Priori Principles of Reason

Faith and Philosophy, 2010

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanations. In this volume, the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the PSR, which currently is considered primarily within the context of various cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Discussing several forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes from Parmenides, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, such as metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics.

Faith and Philosophy, 1993

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010

European Journal of Philosophy, 2006

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1981

Epistemological Foundationalism is hardly a tenable candidate for the metaphysics of empirical knowledge. Its main alternative is what may be called the Coherence theory of epistemic justification-if one is able to make sense of a theory deserving such a name-and there are reasons for pessimism when one looks at the earlier attempts to clarify, formulate, and apply the alternatives to Foundationalism. However, I take it that my task here is merely to indicate where exactly the primary problem marring Nonfoundationalism might lie. I shall suggest that outside Foundationalism it is difficult, but not impossible, to make sense of the idea that there is any empirical evidence available to a rational epistemic subject and I shall illustrate the problem by means of an example. Nothing else will be attempted. We shall study an epistemological theory which is closely associated with the Coherence theory of truth in its classic idealistic form. The main issues to be dealt with can be illuminated if we focus on this theory: it dismisses exactly what is important in any explication of the necessary conditions of the existence of knowledge. What I mean is that whatever coherence methods we might develop and use in order to be able to make decisions to the effect that one's (empirical) beliefs are justified in certain circumstances or even that these beliefs are true, they must be grounded on some evidence; they must not be outrightly fictional. That there is suitable evidence available for epistemological purposes in the first place is possibly never proved to be true but merely stipulated to be true, presupposed as a methodological necessity or even dismissed as a possible problem (cf. [4], pp. 38-9). But certainly, coherence methods work only if they are applied to some sets of propositions which are iniriullypluusible as to their truth. It is easy to see that one cannot start one's truth-seeking from some pre-established truths, but neither can one start from merely fictional propositions; one therefore starts from potential truths ([7], pp. 50, 54; also [2]). One must be able to make important preliminary decisions here, but on what basis?

Philosophical Topics, 2021

It is a platitude that when we reason, we often take things for granted, sometimes even justifiably so. The chemist might reason from the fact that a substance turns litmus paper red to that substance being an acid. In so doing, they take for granted, reasonably enough, that this test for acidity is valid. Although it is a platitude that we often take things for granted when we reason—whether justifiably or not—one might think that we do not have to. In fact, it is a natural expectation that were we not pressed by time, lack of energy or focus, we could always in principle make explicit in the form of premises every single presupposition we make in the course of our reasoning. In other words, it is natural to expect it to be true that presuppositionless reasoning is possible. In this essay, I argue that it is false: presuppositionless reasoning is impossible. Indeed, I think this is one of the lessons of a long-standing paradox about inference and reasoning known as Lewis Carroll’s (1985) regress of the premises. Many philosophers agree that Carroll’s regress teaches us something foundational about reasoning. I part ways about what it is that it teaches us. What it teaches us is that the structure of reasoning is constitutively presuppositional.

"Roczniki Filozoficzne" , 2017

The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate metho­do­logical and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology.

The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 2005

One's investigations, reflections and communications are actions. Sometimes they are simply spontaneous, but very often, as with other kinds of action, one needs to opt into them by deliberation, choice and continued effort, all of which make noticeable one's responsiveness to opportunities. This paper revisits some main elements in that responsiveness. 1. Summa Theologiae I-q. 90 a. I ad 2.

2019

The Appendix has often been regarded as a controversial addendum to the Critique of Pure Reason, insofar as it seems incompatible with the results of the Transcendental Analytic and of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, according to which the ideas of reason have no cognitive validity. Moreover, the text has a fragmentation structure, which generates considerable difficulties to provide a comprehensive and unitary understanding of it. Meer, on the contrary, has given his book a clear and systematic structure, which helps in the comprehension of Kant's text.