Predicativism as a Form of Potentialism

Vetter (2015) develops a localised theory of modality, based on potentialities of actual objects. Two factors play a key role in its appeal: its commitment to Hardcore Actualism, and to Naturalism. Vetter's commitment to Naturalism is in part manifested in her adoption of Aristotelian universals. In this paper, we argue that a puzzle concerning the identity of unmanifested potentialities cannot be solved with an Aris-totelian conception of properties. After introducing the puzzle, we examine Vetter's attempt at amending the Aristotelian conception in a way that avoids the puzzle, and conclude that this amended version is no longer to be considered naturalistic. Potentiality theory cannot be both actualist and naturalist. We then argue that, if naturalism is to be abandoned by the actualist, there are good reasons to adopt a Platonist conception of uni-versals, for they offer a number of theoretical advantages and allow us to avoid some of the problems facing Vetter's theory.

In this paper I motivate, develop and defend a potentiality-based (or "dispositionalist") theory of metaphysical modality. (A more comprehensive version of the theory is in my DPhil thesis.) The motivations for such a theory are twofold. On an intuitive level, potentialities of objects (the fragility of a given glass, for instance) are much closer to common sense and much better understood than the more usual philosophers’ device in under- standing modality, possible worlds. On a theoretical level, we can see that potentiality and possibility are closely related, and I argue that potentiality cannot be understood in terms of possibility (section 2); this provides some motivation to try reversing the direction of explanation. To formulate (and defend) a potentiality-based theory of possibility, we first need to gain a better and general understanding of potentiality. Section 3 provides the beginnings of such an understanding, with a special view to those features that are crucial for the account of pos- sibility: in particular, it introduces what I call iterated potentialities. Section 4 formulates the account: roughly, it is possible that p just in case some object has a potentiality for p to be the case. Section 5 looks at two obvious objections to the account and formulates strategies for dealing with them.

T. E. Eastman, M. Epperson, and D. R. Griffin (eds). Physics and Speculative Philosophy: Potentiality in Modern Science, 2016

Prominent constructive theories of sets as Martin-Löf type theory and Aczel and Myhill constructive set theory, feature a distinctive form of constructivity: predicativity. This may be phrased as a constructibility requirement for sets, which ought to be finitely specifiable in terms of some uncontroversial initial “objects” and simple operations over them. Predicativity emerged at the beginning of the 20th century as a fundamental component of an influential analysis of the paradoxes by Poincaré and Russell. According to this analysis the paradoxes are caused by a vicious circularity in definitions; adherence to predicativity was therefore proposed as a systematic method for preventing such problematic circularity. In the following, I sketch the origins of predicativity, review the fundamental contributions by Russell and Weyl and look at modern incarnations of this notion.

2018

Bioethics, 1997

Several criticisms of the argument from potential are reported. It is noted that such criticisms are inspired by two similarly wrong interpretations of potentiality, one confusing it with possibility and another with probability. A brief analysis of the original Aristotelian context in which the concept emerged shows that potentiality cannot be thought of as indicating the provision of some empirical facts in the future, but must rather be referred to the inherent ontological structure of the being in question. It is then argued that such an Aristotelian concept can be useful to express the dynamic structure of the person, as it must be understood according to contemporary phenomenological personalism. In the light of this philosophical tradition, the embryo can be viewed as a being already possessing the human nature and actively developing its potential for personhood: it also follows that human nature must not be understood as a static and predetermined essence, but rather as the principle of becoming and movement toward further achievements.

2021

Is reality the basis of everything or has reality itself an other basis? What makes realitynot the real things-to be active, to exist? The question of what is real seems to be an easy question, because in our daily lives we are and must be naive realists. We ourselves, the things around us, the world, the facts, all that is real.

Linguæ & - Rivista di lingue e culture moderne, 2018

Philosophia Mathematica, 2021

Modal logic has been used to analyze potential infinity and potentialism more generally. However, the standard analysis breaks down in cases of divergent possibilities, where there are two or more possibilities that can be individually realized but which are jointly incompatible. This paper has three aims. First, using the intuitionistic theory of choice sequences, we motivate the need for a modal analysis of divergent potentialism and explain the challenges this involves. Then, using Beth–Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, we overcome those challenges. Finally, we apply our modal analysis of divergent potentialism to make choice sequences comprehensible in classical terms.

American Journal of Bioethics, 2015

Each of the thirteen articles in this collection wrestles with intricate metaphysical and moral aspects of the widespread belief that a thing’s potential—what it could, would, might, or will be, but isn’t yet—matters for how we should treat that thing. As John Lizza explains in his lucid introduction (12), the articles are grouped into three parts according to their aims and theoretical constraints. In this review, I’ll briefly summarize and offer some critical discussion of each part.